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ABSTRACT
Agricultural credit has recently emerged as one of the leading policy
tools for dealing with agricultural production and with income-raising prob-
lems in the rural areas of most Third World countries. The increasing
importance accorded agricultural credit has led to the evolution in these
countries of credit policies that have as their centerpiece the enactment
of low interest rates on agricultural loans.
Low interest rate credit policies are predicated on the belief by
most policy-makers in certain generally untested assumptions about the need
for and uses of agricultural credit and about the behavior of rural farm-
households.
This study tests, for the Nigerian case, six of the more important
assumptions on which credit policy is based. Investigation of these assump-
tions reveals that they are of questionable validity and in need of reformu-
lation if they are to provide a sound basis for credit policy aimed at
improving agricultural sector productivity and rural incomes.
The reformulation of the assumptions suggests the need for a re-
orientation of credit policy away from its almost exclusive focus on the
provision of low interest agricultural credit and toward more informed
approaches involving (i) changes in interest rate policy, (ii) allocation
of non-agricultural credit to farm-households, (iii) emphasis on savings
mobilization, and (iv) emphasis on the detailed analysis and solution of
the real constraints on Nigerian agriculture.
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EXPLANATION OF TERMS USED IN THE STUDY
Rural Financial Markets (RFMs). Those financial institutions and prac-
tices (formal and informal) that deal with the mobilization of
rural savings, the channeling of credit, and other financial tran-
sactions for rural people or in rural areas.
Formal RFMs. Government and private financial institutions that have a
clearly recognizable structural set-up and legal status.
Informal RFMs. Rural financial institutions or practices with no legal
status. May be well-structured or fluid.
Financial Intermediation. The mobilization of savings, the channeling of
credit, and the allocation of credit among productive uses by RFMs.
Rural-Agricultural Population. People in the rural areas, engaged mainly
in agricultural production (as compared with other activities, such
as rural industry/handicrafts).
Rural Farmers. A somewhat redundant term meant to distinguish the majority
of farmers who live and farm in the rural areas from the small but
influential group of elite farmers who are based in urban areas and
own agricultural enterprises in rural areas or on the outskirts of
metropolitan areas.
Coop Members. Members of government-supported, village cooperative societies.
Non-Coop Members. Non-members of the government-supported, village coopera-
tive societies.
Nominal Rate of Interest. The apparent rate of interest paid by borrowers
or earned by savers. The contractual amount of interest in a loan
or savings transaction.
Real Rate of Interest. This is approximately the nominal or contractual
rate of interest plus or minus the change in some price index (e.g.,
the consumer price index) over the period of the loan. This approxi-
mate definition is employed in the study. A more exact definition
of the real rate of interest is:
1 +
-1 , where i is the nominal rate of interest and p is
1 + an annual change in prices.
Effective Rate of Interest. This is defined (for loans) in this study as
the nominal interest costs plus other hidden or apparent transac-
tions costs of borrowing. In some usages, the inflation costs are
also included in the definition of the effective rate of interest.
However, this latter definition might be more accurately termed
the effective real rate of interest.
CHAPTER ONE
STATEMENT OF STUDY AIMS, BACKGROUND ON THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR,
AND DISCUSSION OF DATA
Introduction
The notion that financial resources and instruments can play an
important role in economic development by facilitating an increase in real
output has earlier been espoused by Gurley, Patrick, Shaw, McKinnon, and
others. One aspect of this role could be the encouragement of the devel-
opment of financial services, including the supply of financial resources
(credit) to "lagging" traditional sectors and regions in developing coun-
tries. Policy-makers in many Third World countries have embraced this idea
of the development of financial services by encouraging the growth of formal
rural financial markets (RFMs) to serve the rural areas of their countries.
The policy-makers have also encouraged the supply by both government and
private institutions of financial resources to the agricultural sector as
a means of raising agricultural output and increasing rural incomes.
Nigeria is one of the countries that has been laying increasing empha-
sis on the role of credit and of rural financial institutions in facilitat-
ing productivity and income increases in the rural areas. This emphasis on
the role of credit has largely been due to the recent poor performance of
the agricultural sector. It has also been due to the easier availability
of oil-generated financial resources, which could presumably be used to
improve the agricultural sector's performance, and thereby hopefully
increase lagging rural incomes.
Pursuing the credit approach has necessitated the evolution of some
sort of credit policy, elements of which include legislation on the pro-
portion of credit intended for the agricultural sector, legislation on the
number of bank branches to be set up in the rural areas, interest rate
legislation, and the setting up of specific agricultural credit schemes.
Statement of Study Theme and Aims
The central theme of this study is that credit policy, as currently
pursued in Nigeria, is misguided and inadequate as a means of dealing with
the productivity problems of the agricultural sector, the income-raising
problems of the rural sector, and the financial-service problems and needs
of at least the average and poorer members of the rural-agricultural popu-
lation. This is so because the credit policy is based on a set of assump-
tions (implicit and explicit) whose validity is at best questionable. This
study has three main purposes:
a) to make explicit the more deeply ingrained and important of the
underlying assumptions, and to test their validity with the aid of data
gathered during study sample surveys;
b) to point out and discuss the distortions caused in the behavior of
rural financial markets by the government credit policy; and
c) to reformulate (in the light of information gathered in the study)
the assumptions examined, as a means of suggesting alternative ways of view-
ing credit policy, and more effectively achieving the government's major
objectives of raising agricultural sector productivity, improving rural
incomes, and providing needed financial services for the rural population.
Numerous studies have been carried out on credit policies and prob-
lems in various developing countries (see Chapter Two). In Nigeria itself,
studies have been undertaken on various aspects of credit and savings.
These include, for example, studies of credit needs, inadequacy of credit
facilities in rural areas, ineffectiveness of government credit mechanisms,
formal and informal credit systems, and savings and its link to credit.
However, no one study has been able to provide a framework for viewing many
of the issues discussed as interrelated aspects of the same general problem,
namely, that of government credit policy, and particularly the interest rate
component. This study hopes to provide such a framework, contribute to a
broader appreciation of the workings of informal financial services in rural
areas, and underscore, in particular for the Nigerian case, the distorting
effects of interest-rate legislation. The latter topic in Nigeria (in con-
trast to other developing countries--see Chapter Two) has hitherto either
been ignored or only briefly and casually mentioned in the writings of
authors on Nigerian credit problems.
A note of caution should be sounded about the study at this point.
Most of the data which will be presented comes from a sample survey con-
ducted in five villages in the north and south of the country, with supple-
mentary data from an earlier study by the author in a sixth village. As
such, the facts and figures emerging from these surveys may not be completely
generalizable to the rest of the country. The intent in this study is not
so much to claim generality for the facts and figures as to use them to
question the applicability (throughout Nigeria's rural areas) of the assump-
tions that appear to underlie credit policy for Nigeria as a whole.
Credit and Other Factors
The study focuses on cash credit, despite the fact that other types
of assistance are available to the rural-agricultural sector, e.g., occa-
sional free distribution of improved seeds and the distribution of subsidized
fertilizer. Credit policy is investigated because of its increasing influ-
ence and popularity in the country (this will become evident later in the
discussion in this chapter), and because some of the beliefs on which credit
policy is based are becoming, through constant public repetition, so deeply
ingrained in the country's thinking as to be accepted, without sufficient
justification, as facts.
The author realizes that credit does not and cannot work in a vacuum.
Indeed, as Donald (1976) has stressed, without the presence of adequate mar-
keting channels, needed inputs, and favorable product markets (among other
factors), agricultural credit can be rendered much less effective and per-
haps even useless. It is taken as given in this study that the inadequacies
of these complementary factors feature very importantly in the difficulties
with credit utilization in Nigeria. Considering these factors in any detail
would require a separate study or studies. What is being stressed in this
particular study is that the structure and workings of credit policy itself
have as important an effect on the efficacy of credit use as any of the
factors mentioned above. Credit policy in and of itself therefore also
merits study. In fact, rather than gloss over the importance of the comple-
mentary factors, various sections of the discussion in this study bring out
sharply the fact that credit-policy formulation must take into account the
importance of factors such as prices in agricultural product and input mar-
kets if credit is not to be rendered ineffective.
Before the major tasks of the study can be undertaken, the background
to increasing government emphasis on credit as one of the major solutions
to the agricultural sector's problems will be presented. The presentation
will be done in the next section of this chapter, through a brief discussion
of the past and present roles, performance, and problems of the agricultural
sector, as well as expectations for the future. In the final section of
the chapter, the content of the data collected as a basis for the study,
the methodological problems, and the survey process will be described.
The remainder of the study will be divided into five chapters. In
Chapter Two, the theoretical underpinnings of the study and salient empiri-
cal investigations from other countries will be discussed. Chapter Three
will contain a discussion of the elements of past and present Nigerian
credit policy and a brief description of formal rural financial institu-
tions involved in channeling credit. In these two chapters, the actions
and utterances that give rise to the assumptions outlined at the beginning
of the study will be highlighted. The testing of the validity of the
assumptions and the discussion of the effect of credit (particularly inter-
est rate) policy on the behavior of rural financial markets will be under-
taken in Chapter Four.
Chapter Five will consist of a discussion of revised assumptions, an
alternative framework for viewing credit policy in the light of these and
of achieving the government's objectives of raising agricultural productiv-
ity, increasing rural incomes, and providing needed financial services for
the rural-agricultural population. In Chapter Six, the study's major find-
ings will be summarized, and suggestions will be made for future research.
The Agricultural Sector: Past and Present Trends
Despite the oil boom of the past decade, Nigeria is still predominantly
an agricultural country. The characterization of the economy as essentially
agricultural arises from the fact that 70% of the country's estimated 1978
population of 80.6 million were to be found in the rural areas, while approxi-
mately 56% of the labor force was employed in agriculture in the same year.
(World Bank Development Report, 1980; Olalokun, 1979, p. 3)
The majority of the country's peasant farmers practice agriculture
with few mechanical, chemical, or biological aids. Fertilizer consumption
in the country stood at 1.28 Kg per hectare in 1975, while the total number
of tractors nationwide was estimated at 7,900 in 1977. (Third National
Development Plan, 1975-1980; Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of
the United Nations, Production Yearbook, 1978) Although some parts of
Nigeria (e.g., the East) are experiencing high man/land ratios, most of
the country can be described as land surplus. Increases in output are,
therefore, more likely to be achieved on the extensive rather than the
intensive margin (that is, from opening up new land rather than from farm-
ing the same piece of land more intensively).
Agriculture has always played an important role in the Nigerian
economy. Not only is the agricultural sector the main employer of labor,
but up until 1971 the sector accounted for the single largest percentage
contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (see Table 1-1). Since 1971,
the petroleum or mining sector has taken over from agriculture as the
single largest contributor to GDP.
TABLE 1-1
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
AT 1974 CONSTANT FACTOR COST 1960-1977
Year
1960 1965 1970 1971 1975 1976 1977
Agriculture
Mining
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity, Gas
& Water
Transport &
Communications
Public Administration
& Defense
Other Branches
54.0 46.7 37.2 34.8 24.6 22.7 22.7
5.2 20.9 30.0 36.0 37.2 38.5 37.1
2.8 4.5 5.2 4.5 6.8 7.3 7.0
1.7 2.2 2.3 2.9 6.0 6.3 6.9
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7
2.8 2.8 1.9 2.0 3.2 3.3 3.6
1.3 1.3 3.3 3.0 7.2 7.2 7.6
32.0 21.3 19.8 16.5 14.4 14.2 14.4
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: World Bank, World Tables, 1980.
Sector
The agricultural sector has been important in accounting for the
bulk of domestic food requirements, and also in providing an impetus
for the growth of the Nigerian economy through export earnings. The nature
of the export sector and its role in providing the economic wherewithal
for Nigeria's development has been well-documented elsewhere (e.g., see
Helleiner, 1966), and will not be dealt with in detail here. However, it.
is important to point out that until the mid-1960s, agricultural exports
accounted for well over 50% of total exports by value (see Table 1-2).
Most of the foreign exchange earnings from these exports accrued to govern-
ment in the form of revenues which were used for the development of the
economy.
In spite of its important role in the Nigerian economy, the agricul-
tural sector has been performing poorly since the mid-1960s. As is visible
in Table 1-3, and in contrast to other sectors, the growth rate of agricul-
tural GDP was negative in the decade from 1960 to 1970, while it became
even more sharply negative from 1970 to 1978.
The poor performance of the agricultural sector is also well-
illustrated by production statistics for total agricultural and food crops,
as well as by the statistics for important categories of crops. Table
1-4 shows production indices for agriculture and for food on a total and
per capita basis from 1961/65 to 1978. Total agricultural production
increased very slowly over these years, and, in fact, showed a decline on
a per capita basis. More importantly, total food production, with an
average annual growth rate of 2.3% from 1966 to 1978, did not quite keep
pace with the estimated population growth rate of 2.6% (FAO figures) per
annum. Table 1-5, containing figures for important categories of food
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TABLE 1-3
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF GDP AND
SOME OF ITS COMPONENTS (PERCENT)
GDP
Agriculture
Industry
of which Manufacturing
1960-1970
3.1
-0.4
16.0
9.3
SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Report, 1980.
1970-1978
6.2
-1.5
10.3
13.4
TABLE 1-4
PRODUCTION INDICES FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD, 1961/65-1978
(1969-71 = 100)
Agriculture
Total Per Capita
104
102
102
96
95
100
102
98
100
94
102
106
110
110
112
Food
Total
86
86
86
89
100
102
98
100
93
102
106
109
110
112
Per Capita
104
94
93
93
103
102
96
95
86
92
93
93
91
90
SOURCE: Food and Agricultural Organization
Nations, Production Yearbook, 1976, 1977, 1978.
(FAO) of the United
Year
1961-65
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
TABLE 1-5
PRODUCTION OF VARIOUS FOOD AND EXPORT CROPS
Area Harvested
000's Hectares
11081
12361
12674
12969
13099
Yield (Kg/Ha)
A. Food Crops
Cereals
662
652
667
672
688
Production
000's Metric Tons
7333
8054
8459
8710
9011
Pulses
1961-65 2216 273 605
1969-71 3973 214 849
1976 4160** 224 932**
1977 4210 190 800**
1978 4526** 185 838**
Roots and Tubers
1961-65 2618 8105 21217
1969-71 2610 9608 25073
1976 2828** 9982 28230**
1977 2848** 9736 27730**
1978 2868** 9922 28465**
B. Export Crops
Cocoa
1961-65 550 395 217
1969-71 683 382 261
1976 720** 229 165*
1977 720** 281 202*
1978 700** 229 160*
Seed Cotton
1961-65 300 423 127
1969-71 405 460 186
1976 526 352 185**
1977 704 348 245**
1978 635 176 112**
FAO unofficial figures
FAO estimate
SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
book, 1976, 1977, 1978.
Production Year-
Year
1961-65
1969-71
1976
1977
1978
crops (e.g., roots and tubers) and export crops (e.g., cocoa) tells the
same story of slow growth or even decline in terms of output.
One of the most noticeable consequences of the slow growth in agri-
cultural output is the sharp percentage decline in the export of major
agricultural commodities. Agricultural exports as a percentage of the
total value of exports dropped from 58% in 1965 to 30% in 1970. In 1977,
there was a further drop down to 4.5%. (Refer to Table 1-2.) Petroleum
exports have, in contrast to agricultural exports, risen sharply, and thus
counter-balance the decline in agricultural exports. In fact, the petroleum
sector is now the driving force behind the Nigerian economy, contributing
well over 80% of total government revenues since the mid-1970s.
The agricultural sector's poor performance has been cause for grave
concern among policy-makers, because of its implications for domestic food
supplies, for the supply of raw materials for domestic industry, and for
farmer incomes. Lagging agricultural output (already estimated on a per
worker basis at one-half that in other non-mining sectors1 of the economy)
may mean lagging farmer incomes. This will be so if the output decreases
are not compensated for by price increases for agricultural products.
Increasing domestic demand for food and raw materials from an agricultural
sector seemingly unable to cope implies increased inflationary pressures on
domestic prices. It also implies greater dependence on food and other agri-
cultural imports. Such dependence would represent a drain of foreign ex-
change, which otherwise would be used for importation of much needed capital
iIn 1975, the government estimated that agricultural output per worker
was N 175, or one-half the output in non-mining sectors. (Third National
Plan, Vol. 1, 1975-1980)
goods. It would also present a potential political problem if food-
exporting nations used these exports as a 'political stick' with which to
beat Nigeria.
Given these possibilities and the fact that the agricultural sector
is expected to continue furnishing the bulk of employment, food and raw
materials for domestic industry for some time to come, there has been a
search for reasons and solutions for the agricultural sector's problems.
The main explanations usually proffered by academics and policy-
makers for the agricultural sector's problems can be grouped into four
main categories having to do with inadequacies in manpower, marketing,
economic incentives, technological and other inputs, particularly credit.
1
(E.g., see Third National Development Plan, Vol. 1, p. 66; Osuntogun,
1979, p. 4.)
With regard to manpower, it is thought that the scarcity of high
level personnel in the areas of hydrology, farm management, and agricultural
and irrigation engineering constitutes a constraint on the expansion of
output, because availability of these skills would have opened up possibili-
ties for increasing output in various ways. The inadequate extension service
that results in high farmer-to-extension-agent ratios in parts of the coun-
try is said to affect the introduction of practices and knowledge which
could help farmers increase output.
The lack of feeder roads and other transport facilities in some areas,
and their poor condition in others is cited as an important aspect of the
10ther reasons mentioned in connection with performance problems in
the agricultural sector and which do not fall neatly into any of these cate-
gories are: the communal land tenure system in the country, which does not
allow land to be used as collateral for personal agricultural loans; the
old age of some of the export tree crops such as cocoa; and the problem
posed by the Sahelian drought of the early 1970s.
marketing problem, thought toaccount for shortfalls in marketed surplus.
Poor storage resulting in susceptibility of crops to pest and disease is
also another aspect of the marketing problem linked to lower quantities
of marketed output.
In terms of economic incentives, the arguments involving linkages
to output decreases have not been so well defined in the Nigerian situa-
tion. On the one hand, the government acknowledges the existence of
unattractive returns to agriculture (see Third National Plan, Vol. 1i,
p. 66). Yet, on the other hand, it laments the increasing prices for
agricultural products. Given the importance of the linkages between
prices and agricultural output, this area merits greater consideration.
Further analysis on the subject of prices and output is undertaken in
Appendix A of this study. From analysis in this Appendix, it appears
that while agricultural prices have, on average, been rising relative
to the consumer price index (CPI) since 1965, wages for agricultural
labor (the major production input) have recently been rising just as fast.
(The increase in wages has been caused by greater migration of rural youth
to urban areas, attracted by the better economic and cultural opportunities
in these areas.) Potentially higher increase for agricultural output
prices (particularly food) may have been dampened by large imports of such
food grains as rice. Farmers appear then to be caught in a squeeze between
rising prices for agricultural labor and dampened prices for agricultural
output. Such a situation could be responsible for reduced farmer incen-
tives to produce and/or market increased output. These constitute the prob-
able links between price incentives and agricultural output in the rural
sector.
The fourth category of reasons given for the agricultural sector's
poor performance involve inadequacies in the availability of appropriate
technology packages and farm inputs, particularly credit. The lack of
credit, for instance, is often quoted as constraining the farmer from
using more fertilizer, improved farming techniques, and hiring more labor.
This is then said to limit the possibilities for the expansion of output.
Of all the major explanations discussed, the issue of credit use as
a solution to the agricultural sector's problems has received the most wide-
spread attention on both an academic and policy-making level. This atten-
tion is typified by such statements as that by Fabiyi and Ekong (1979),
that "since farmers' resources are limited, outside sources of capital are
therefore essential to promote investment in agriculture." (p. 2) It is
also typified by Laogun's 1979 remark, that "the use of credit appears to
be one of the most important factors which has to be activated in order to
achieve maximum progress in the area of rural development." (p. 1)
On the government side, the attention to credit is underscored by
a series of actions designed to increase the volume of credit intended for
the agricultural sector. For example, there is the fourfold increase (in
1970 prices) of government allocations to credit, between the two plan
periods (1970-1974 and 1975-1980). These allocations rose from N22.7
million in 1970-74 to N184.6 million in 1975-80. (Third National Develop-
ment Plan, 1975-1980, Vol. 1; Essang and Olayide, 1975, p. 251) There is
also the establishment in 1977 of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme
Fund, with an authorized capital of N100 million to be subscribed to by
the federal government (60%), and the Central Bank (40%). This scheme of
government guarantees is designed to increase the volume of loans by
commercial banks to the agricultural sector, particularly to small-scale
farmers. Finally, there is the series of legislative actions (to be
described in detail in Chapter Three) requiring the banking sector to lend
increased proportions of their loan funds to agriculture at low rates of
interest.
The greater publicity given to credit above other factors probably
arises from the fact that attention to other factors involves more difficul-
ties than attention to credit. For example, investments in transport sys-
tems (to improve marketing) have fairly long gestation periods and involve
a lot of planning. Redirection of product and input price policies in
favor of farmers brings up the specter of political unrest among urban
dwellers. In contrast to these, increased credit for greater investment
in agriculture is an immediately visible, often popular, and easily manipu-
lated policy tool. Hence, the government's predilection is to stress
credit policy above other types of policies in both its rhetoric and
actions.
The basic question being asked in this study is whether an increased
stress on credit, with all the elements of credit policy involved, is indeed
the answer to the agricultural sector's problems. If, for example, unat-
tractive returns to agriculture compared to other activities proves to be
a problem for farmers, then a credit approach (particularly as it is cur-
rently carried out in Nigeria) may do little to help the farmers improve
agricultural production and their own incomes. To examine the suitability
of current Nigerian credit policy for solving the rural-agricultural sec-
tor's production and income problems, this study investigates a series of
generally-untested assumptions on which credit policy is based. The more
common and important of these assumptions are:
1) Rural farm-households in Nigeria face credit shortages, particu-
larly for agricultural credit.
2) Such credit as is needed is not readily available in the rural
areas, or is available only at prohibitive costs from usurious moneylenders.
3) The existence of credit shortages prevents the adoption by farm
households of modern technological inputs which could ensure increases in
output.
4) Such credit as is provided by the formal system must be given at
low or concessional rates of interest in order to persuade farmers to borrow
since their demand for credit is highly interest elastic. (That is, a
slight percentage increase in the price of credit will induce a much greater
percentage drop in the quantity of credit demanded by farmers.)
5) The current distribution mechanisms for credit can, with little
or no modification, be effective in reaching poorer farmers.
6) Lack of credit is the most important problem related to financial
services in the rural areas. Savings mobilization, in particular, is rela-
tively unimportant, since savings capacities are quite low. Given this,
there is little need to revise the interest rate structure in favor of
savings.
The background to these assumptions is presented in Chapters Two and
Three. In Chapter Two, it becomes obvious that Nigerian policy-makers, as
they shape elements of credit policy, are not alone in the Third World in
their unquestioning acceptance of many of the assumptions. Given the impor-
tance of such policy for the agricultural sector, and its effect on formal
rural financial markets, the assumptions merit further investigation. Just
such an investigation is carried out in the current study, with the aid
of data to be described in the next section of this chapter.
Description of Data and Study Sample Surveys
It has already been mentioned that most of the data used in this
study comes from field surveys conducted by the author in Nigeria during
a six-and-a-half month period from May to October, 1979. Supplementary
data from a previous study undertaken in the summer of 1977 are also used.
The surveys involved the collection of two levels of data: one from the
formal banking system, and the other from farmers at the village level.
Banking System Interviews
Information was collected from commercial banks in Lagos, Ibadan,
and Kaduna (shown in Figure 1-1), although the majority of the interviews
were conducted in Lagos, where most of the banks have their headquarters.
The type of information sought concerned eachbank's agricultural lending
activities, particularly its participation in the Agricultural Credit Guar-
antee Scheme set up by the government in 1977 to augment loans to the agri-
cultural sector, especially to the rural smallholder.
More specifically, questions were asked on the types of borrowers
receiving loans (with a request for information on their socio-economic
characteristics--assets, income, education, etc.), total number of loans
applied for and total granted, and total Naira amount requested by grantees.
Visits were made to seven out of the nineteen commercial banks in
the country. The seven were selected so as to minimize travel to distant
FIGURE 1-1
SKETCH MAP OF NIGERIA, SHOWING NINETEEN-STATE
STRUCTURE AND SURVEY VILLAGES
1 Cities or towns of relevance to the study
* Survey villages
State boundaries
* Indicates Rivers Niger and Benue within
country boundaries
KEY:
and disparate headquarter locations since research funds were limited.
The seven chosen, however, included the three most important commercial
banks in the country, accounting between them in 1976 for 65% of all com-
mercial bank loans and advances, 69% of all deposit liabilities, and 80%
of the banking system's reserves. The two oldest and best established
indigenous banks (wholly Nigerian-owned or -controlled) in the country
were also included in the seven. In addition to the commercial banks,
two out of the six merchant banks (banks that deal mainly with corporate
clientele) in the country were visited.
Problems encountered in obtaining the required information include
poor record keeping at the banks, probably because of the novel nature of
the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS). Because of this, only
five of the banks were able and willing to put together at least a part of
the information required. Some of the banks found it difficult to supply
information because they had not yet received certain returns from several
of their branches, and so could not present a total picture of the informa-
tion required for the bank as a whole at that particular time. Moreover,
the banks were loath to give out what they considered private information.
So, although the author was permitted to view records on names and socio-
economic characteristics of borrowers, she was not permitted to write any
of this down, and in fact had to promise in each bank to present any infor-
1This kind of bank selection process introduces a sampling bias.
However, since the banking industry is dominated by a few large banks, it
was more important for purposes of this study to include these banks than
to obtain a random sample, which might comprise many smaller and relatively
unimportant banks. Note that the three largest banks in the country were
originally established by foreign interests and still have a substantial
amount of foreign participation.
mation given for the study without mentioning banks by name. These prob-
lems have resulted in the compilation of very aggregated (and therefore,
less informative) facts and figures on loans and loan recipients under the
ACGS. This is visible later in Table 4-18 (Chapter Four) where the informa-
tion collected is used. Very little information was obtainable from the
merchant banks, because of their limited participation in the ACGS. In
addition to data collection from commercial and merchant banks on the ACGS,
considerable time was also spent at the government-owned Nigerian Agricul-
tural and Cooperative Bank (NACB), collecting information of a descriptive
nature on the bank's own agricultural lending activities. This will be
presented in Chapter Three, where the nature of government credit policy is
explained and further discussed.
Village Level Interviews
The other set of information used for exploring the validity of
assumptions in the study was obtained from farmer interviews in five vil-
lages. The villages are Yakasai, Turawa, and Giwa, all in Zaria Province,
Kaduna State in the north; Araromi in Oyo State in the south ; and Nomeh
in Anambra State, also in the south. Supplementary data came from a former
study in Ogwashi-Uku Bendel State in the south. These villages have been
geographically located in Figure 1-1. The small number of villages sur-
veyed was strictly a function of financial resources. At the beginning of
iAraromi is later also referred to as a western village, because it
is also located in the western part of the country (see Figure 1-1).
Similarly, Nomeh is also located in the east.
the research process, it proved impossible to obtain research grants. The
Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB) gave a small grant in the
middle of the research process which enabled the author to hire translator-
research assistants in the north and southwest, where language differences
presented a problem. Because of these financial difficulties, the scope
and size of the project had to be scaled down to what the author could
handle on personal funds and the small NACB grant. The decision to survey
-villages in both the north and the south was to permit regional comparisons
in the variables of interest (although, admittedly, in such a small study
such comparisons have obvious limitations). A great deal of research in
Nigeria has been geographically restricted, so that intra- and inter-
regional comparisons prove impossible. Such spatial/locational differences
may often prove important for policy purposes.
In the north, a decision was made to study villages in Zaria Province
of Kaduna State because of the body of research already undertaken in this
province by the Institute of Agricultural Research, Samaru, Ahmadu Bello
University. It was felt that such accumulated knowledge would be useful;
this was indeed the case, though, as it turned out, none of the villages
surveyed for this study had been involved in previous studies by the Insti-
tute. This was due to the nature of the selection process (to be described
shortly) for the villages. In the south, existing contacts with people
who could facilitate the research process was the basis for choosing Oyo
and Anambra States.
The selection of actual villages was done with the help of government
cooperative officers at the state and local levels. The author was inter-
ested in comparing cooperative society members' borrowing and production
activities with those of non-members of cooperative societies in the same
villages. Because of this, only those villages in which cooperative soci-
eties had been active (i.e., received loans) for the year of interest
became eligible for consideration. Among these villages, cooperative offi-
cers picked those in which the harvesting and selling of the crops for
which loans had been received had been completed, and which were also
accessible by some sort of motor vehicle. Accessibility was important
because part of the survey was being done at the height of the rainy
season (June and July). Three of the villages picked were easily accessi-
ble by motor cars, while two were more easily reached by motorcycles.
The Survey Villages: Common Village/Farmer
Characteristics Important to the Study
Farming in the villages is carried out with the help of the tradi-
tional implements--cutlass (machete), hoe, and sickle. No animal or mechani-
cal power was used by any of the farmers interviewed. A small quantity of
artificial fertilizers was in use in the villages, especially in the north
where some farmers also followed the traditional practice of using local
(animal) manure to fertilize their fields. Most farmers used substantial
quantities of hired labor, at an average fee of N3 - N3.50 per day, making
labor the most important purchased farm input. Farming practices and the
use of fertilizer will be important variables in Chapter Four, where the
effect of credit on the techniques of cultivation will be examined.
Intercropping is the norm in all sample villages, and all the farmers
interviewed grew together on most of their fields both food and what are
commonly known as cash crops, e.g., cocoa, kolanuts, rice, and palm products
in the south, and cotton, groundnuts, and tobacco in the north. The dis-
tinction between cash and food crops is, however, a tenuous one in this
case, because most of the farmers also cultivated their food crops with
the full intention of selling part for cash. The cash derived from crop
sales forms a major part of the gross cash income measure, which is one
of the more important variables developed and used in the study. Major
crops grown in the southern villages were yams, cassava, plantains, rice,
cocoa, maize, kolanuts, fruits (bananas, oranges), and vegetables. In
the northern villages, guinea corn, millet, maize, yams, groundnuts,
cotton, tobacco, sugarcane, pepper, tomatoes, and onions were more common.
Some of these crops, such as sugarcane and tomatoes, were grown on
the well-irrigated, better manured lowlands or 'fadama' lands, while hardier
crops, e.g., millet and guinea corn, were grown on the higher lying lands.
Possession of 'fadama-land' was much valued because of the better crop
yields. In addition, possession of livestock (a part of the valuation of
the asset measure in the study) was much more common in the north. Most
planting in both the north and south takes place in the early part of the
rainy season (April, May/June), while by January/February most of the har-
vesting and selling of crops has been accomplished. Though government has
taken charge of most land through the recent promulgation of the Land Use
Decree, 1 farmers in the villages surveyed still operated along the lines of
the traditional communal land tenure system, whereby a farmer can hire out
IThe Land Use Decree is dealt with only briefly in the study because
it has not yet been operationalized in the villages; neither has it had any
substantial effect on village land use patterns.
his fields or mortgage his crops, but cannot alienate the land from the
community through land sales.
The pursuit of an occupation additional to farming is an important
characteristic of the majority of farmers in these villages. Almost all
farmers interviewed had an additional occupation throughout the year, but
particularly during off-peak farming seasons. The most popular of these
was trading. The extra sources of income increase the available gross cash
income of the farmer, making his household more economically viable. How-
ever, because of large household sizes averaging 6.5 persons in the south
and 13 in the north,1 large gross cash incomes oftentimes translated into
small per capita gross incomes (see Chapter Four).
The level of western-type education among farmers in all villages
was generally low. Approximately 81% of the farmers in the two southern
villages had no education of this type whatsoever. This rose to 90% in
the north, though every farmerthere had received some degree of religious
Koranic instruction. The importance of education levels is discussed in
Chapter Four, where it is shown that possession of superior reading and
writing skills enabled some people to be among the controlling group in
the cooperative societies, and therefore enjoy attendant privileges.
1This large difference is due to the practice in the Moslem north,
of sons being 'in gandu' with their fathers, i.e., grown-up and married
sons still living with their fathers and farming together, or it may be
younger brothers with older ones. According to Samaru Institute of Agri-
culture researchers, this practice is gradually breaking down, and
smaller family units are becoming more common. However, these large units
were still the norm in the villages visited.
In all villages surveyed, farming was primarily a male activity.
This was more so in the northern Moslem villages, where the practice of
'purdah' or wife seclusion is still common. It was less so in the two
southern villages, where some women actually owned and operated their own
farms or helped their husbands in the fields. In any case, most women
(even those 'in purdah') were economically active, e.g., in petty trading,
and generated incomes that augmented the household's resources. One of
the deficiencies in the study is the non-inclusion (because of measurement
problems) of female-generated cash in the calculation of gross cash
incomes.
Brief Individual Village Profiles
Yakasai
Yakasai is a northern Hausa, Moslem village located nine kilometers
from Zaria on the Zaria-Soba road (see Figure 1-1). It had an estimated
1974 population of 1900 (see Schultz, 1976, p. 114) and little or no modern
amenities at the time of the study. It had no electricity or piped water
(though some concrete wells had been built), and there was only one primary
school. There was no dispensary, and no periodic market to which outsiders
could come. A very small market existed in the village center. Farmers
had fairly easy access by road to the Zaria markets, and there was very
frequent daily contact between the village and Zaria town by motorcycles
and bus-taxis.
Proximity to Zaria has brought periodic contacts with extension
agents from Zaria and nearby Maigana, resulting in occasional provision of
improved seed varieties and increased awareness of artificial fertilizer
use. However, no substantial changes have occurred in farming practices,
and the traditional state of agriculture remains largely unchanged.
Turawa
Turawa is another Moslem Hausa village with an estimated 1974 popula-
tion of 7400 (Schultz, 1976, p. 114). It is located 12 kilometers from
Soba--the district headquarters--on a rough dirt road which becomes totally
unmotorable when it rains. It was one of the two least accessible villages
among those surveyed. Turawa also had few modern amenities at the time
of the study, but was slightly better off than Yakasai in this respect.
There was no electricity or running water (there were concrete wells),
but there was a dispensary, a primary school, a periodic market to which
people from Soba and beyond came, and a cotton market as well. The farmers
here could sell their agricultural produce in their own home market without
worrying about transportation, but, according to them, this sometimes
resulted in a glut in the market and much lower returns for the farmers
than if they had been easily able to transport their goods to other markets.
Farmers here generally appeared to farm much larger fields than those
in Yakasai. This is confirmed by the sometimes very large labor costs (as
much as N1000 for the 1978/79 cropping season in one case) quoted by some
farmers in the village, and their openly expressed need and desire for
tractor-hire services to ease the labor constraint at peak farming periods.
Giwa
Located 28 kilometers from Zaria on the Zaria-Sokoto road, Giwa was
the third village surveyed in the north. It has a more important standing
than Yakasai and Turawa in that it is the district headquarters of Giwa
district. At the time of the survey, there was a primary school, a second-
ary school, pipe-borne water, a dispensary, an agriculture office, and a
post office. There was also a periodic market and a motor park (i.e., a
taxi and bus station for off-loading and loading journeying passengers).
All this contrives to give Giwa a more modern and prosperous outlook than
the other two villages. As in Turawa, farmers here were highly concerned
about the scarcity and high price of labor, and also expressed great inter-
est in finding solutions to the labor constraints, e.g., tractor-hire ser-
vices.
Araromi
Unlike Giwa in the north, full of vitality, Araromi in Oyo State,
southern Nigeria, appears to be a village in decline. Located 40 kilometers
from the city of Ibadan on an old, half-tarred road to Ijebu-Igbo, the
village has a dual religious community comprised of Moslems and Christians.
The Moslem women here, however, are not secluded like their counterparts
up north. They, therefore, participate fully in economic activities out-
side their homes, such as farming. Araromi had, in 1979, two primary
schools and a periodic market visited by buyers from nearby villages and
from the city of Ibadan itself. Marketing of produce was therefore not
much of a problem. There was no electricity or running water, but most
people had access to concrete wells. Buildings (mostly mud houses with
galvanized iron roofs) were old and falling into a state of disrepair.
The outstanding characteristic of this village was the highly
visible absence of young adults, most of whom had migrated to nearby
Ibadan. Consequently, the farming population was relatively old. This
old age is evident when the average age (50) of the sample of farmers
interviewed in Araromi is compared with that of the other four study vil-
lages (37 to 43 years). The absence of young adults has created a labor
shortage problem in the village. Like the farming population, the trees
producing the major cash crop in the village (cocoa) also suffer from old
age, resulting in lower yields. Attempts are underway by the state Ministry
of Agriculture to encourage new cocoa plantings, and some farmers are respond-
ing. Thus, in Araromi, the people, the village, and the trees of the major
crop appear to need urgent revitalization to facilitate future village
growth.
Nomeh
Nomeh in Anambra State, also in the southern part of Nigeria, has a
predominantly Christian community, as is attested to by its ten churches
for a guess-estimated 1979 population of 10,000. In 1979 also, it had a
periodic market, postal agency, police station, and four primary schools.
A maternity center was being constructed by community effort. Though
there was no electricity or running water, the village was adequately
served (in terms of water) by three streams and numerous individually-
built concrete wells. A major problem in this village concerned accessi-
bility. Located 11 kilometers from the nearest tarred road at Nnewe,
Nomeh is served by a dirt road that is most easily negotiated by motor-
cycles, even in dry weather. When it rains, the road may become completely
impassable by any type of motor vehicle. A railway track from the farther
eastern towns runs through the village on its way to the city of Enugu.
However, train service is irregular, and therefore less reliable than
transport by road. Like Turawa in the north, transportation difficulties
in this village exacerbate the problem of economic returns from agriculture
versus returns from other activities. This is because of the downward
pressure exerted on prices as the bulk of produce is sold in the village
market. Additional problems in this village at the time of the survey
involved a slump in the village's major industry--rice growing, a slump
caused by government imports of superior grain rice in an effort to dampen
rice prices in urban areas.
The Survey Process
One hundred and fifty (150) farmers were scheduled to be interviewed
for the survey. One hundred and forty-five (145) were finally interviewed,
of which five were dropped from the study sample because of inconsistent
answers, leaving 140 farmers. The small number of interviews scheduled
(compared with the population of farmers available in the villages) was
again, as with the number of villages surveyed, a result of the lack of
research funds. The author conducted all interviews personally. (Research
assistants were available only for translation services in the north and
west.) The effort was therefore to obtain a detailed amount of information
from a relatively small number of interviews, rather than a few pieces of
information from a great number of interviews.
The farmers interviewed were heads of households, where a household
was defined in a manner successfully used by Samaru researchers, as those
'eating out of the same pot.' For the bulk of its information, the survey
concentrated on male farmers, because, as previously explained, farming in
Nigeria is a predominantly male activity. Household heads are also gener-
ally male. The sample was, however, 8% female, because in the south a few
women were encountered who, as well as being farmers in their own right,
were household heads by virtue of being widows or by virtue of their respon-
sibility for the feeding and care of their own small unit within polygamous
households.
A minimum of twenty-five farmers were interviewed in each village,
with the remaining forty interviewees being distributed by village, accord-
ing to the general willingness of farmers in each village to answer ques-
tions. The sample (for purposes of comparison in the variables of interest)
was divided between members of cooperative societies (coop members) and
non-members of cooperative societies (non-coop members). Eighty-three coop
members and fifty-seven non-coop members were interviewed by means of a
prepared questionnaire (see Appendices). Again, the number of interviews
with coop members is higher because of their greater willingness to cooper-
ate with the author. 1
There was an attempt to sample randomly within the two groups (except
for the 3-5 cooperative society committee members who were compulsorily
IThe greater number of coop members interviewed may seem to create a
sampling bias in favor of coop members. This, however, does little or no
harm to the main purpose or results of the study, because the important
issue is a comparison between the two groups of farmers, i.e., coop members
and non-coop members.
interviewed in each village). This attempt at random sampling was fairly
successful among the group of cooperative society members, but much less
so in the non-coop member group. This was because in some villages, tax
lists (from which samples could be drawn) were not made available by sus-
picious village chiefs. In other villages, uncooperative prospective inter-
viewees had to be replaced by cooperative ones. In each village surveyed,
the author obtained a foothold through introduction to the secretary or
president of the village cooperative society by the government cooperative
or loans officer in charge of that local area. The secretary or president
of the cooperative then introduced the author and assistant to the village
chief, to whom the purposes of the survey were explained.
The author and assistant, during the survey process, lived intermit-
tently for periods of two days to a week at a time in three of the villages
surveyed: Turawa, Araromi and Nomeh. In two of these villages, accommo-
dation was provided by the cooperative society secretary in his compound,
while in the third village, the village chief's nephew took responsibility
for providing accommodation. For the interviews conducted in Yakasai and
Giwa, the author commuted daily from Kaduna and Zaria to the villages, and
spent 8-10 hours per day for a week and a half in each village. The long
hours spent in the latter two villages, and the days and nights spent in
the former three, provided a certain amount of checking and corroboration
of interviewees' answers from key people in the village. It also enabled
the author to familiarize herself with the lifestyles of the villagers.
Farmers preferred to be interviewed early in the morning before going to
the farm, or late in the afternoon on their return. Religious holidays
in the north also provided an opportunity to interview many farmers.
Five farmers were interviewed as a test sample at the beginning of
the interview process. The questionnaire, which had been prepared in
Cambridge, was then revised in the light of their answers. For example,
six questions on loan transactions costs were left out (except in the case
of committee members) since all farmers who received loans had the loans
delivered through the village cooperative society. Only committee members
who negotiated the loans on behalf of their societies incurred transactions
costs. Some additional "countercheck" questions on incomes and savings
were also added (see Questionnaire in Appendix). The interviews lasted
one and a half hours on the average.
Types of Data Collected and Variable Deficiencies
Seven major types of information were sought in the questionnaires
for purposes of examining the validity of the assumptions and exploring
the workings of informal rural financial markets. The categories of infor-
mation sought were:
a) general information on age, education, dependents, acres farmed,
etc.;
b) farm production and sales activities with cash sales being the
key factor; income from non-farm sources (this would be used to
develop a cash-income measure);
c) use of farm inputs--quantity used and amount spent on purchase;
d) borrowing and lending activities, including interest-rate charges;
e) savings activities;
f) opinions and preferences for informal versus formal institutions;
g) assets, i.e., livestock, bicycles, motorcycles, etc.
All questions pertained to the 1978/79 production season. The
stress in gathering income information was on cash sales rather than total
output, because the former measure would be more useful for study purposes,
and also because sales would be more easily remembered. No specific ques-
tions were asked on consumption expenditures, since these are usually made
on a daily basis, are highly variable, and therefore less easily remembered.
In addition to the types of information listed above, data were also col-
lected in a series of mini-interviews in each village from groups of women
on their borrowing, savings, and income-generating activities, for use in
the section of the study dealing with savings. Several variables were
developed from the seven major pieces of information collected (see Chapter
Four). Three of these variables--assets, income, number of acres farmed--
suffer from deficiencies and therefore deserve further explanation.
Income
The income measure developed is a rather special one, and should
therefore be treated with caution. It is gross cash income per respondent.
That is, total cash income from farm and non-farm sources per respondent.
It does not include cash income from other members of respondent's house-
hold, such as wives. This is largely because the respondents themselves
found it difficult to give accounting of these incomes, and when some of
the wives were interviewed, they had difficulty remembering total cash
amounts generated, since for some of them, daily cash-in-hand is directly
translated into goods for the family. The failure to include other house-
hold members' cash income presents a problem when mean per capita cash
income is calculated, since this is done per respondent's household. That
figure, therefore, represents an underestimate. In poorer households,
where wives' economic contributions are often important, the leaving out
of female-generated income could be a significant deficiency (e.g., see
Matlon, 1978).
The cash income figures are measured gross because, as previously
mentioned, consumption expenditure figures were not obtained. It was felt
that any attempt at specificity in these latter figures would result in
untrustworthy estimates which could not easily be checked. The ideal
research situation in this case would have been one where the author lived
with the interviewee-households and recorded daily expenditures.
Because of the above difficulties, there is a problem in attempting
comparisons between the income figures generated for the study and those
of other researchers who have done work at the village level. One point
in favor of the cash income measure, however, is that the farm sales compo-
nent allows direct comparability in the marketable surplus between inter-
viewees who received credit and those who did not; and this comparison is
of great interest in Chapter Four.
For most of the discussion in Chapter Four, respondents are divided
into three gross (total) cash income groupings for purposes of comparison.
The three groups are: 0N-499, N500-1499, and N1500 and above, with the
NO-499 group being regarded as the "poor-farmer-group." Other income group-
ings were tried to see what difference they would make to the figures and
1Note that most farmers grow rather than purchase the bulk of their
own food requirements. Whatever is not put aside for household consumption
is oftentimes sold off in the market, along with such cash crops as ground-
nuts. Hence, cash farm incomes are very much related to the value of the
marketable surplus available.
conclusions generated. In each case, the figures changed slightly, but
the basic conclusions remained the same (e.g., see Appendix B); hence,
the decision to go ahead and use the three income groupings in the discus-
sions.
Assets
The asset measure, like that for income, has several deficiencies.
The assets measured were livestock--goats, cows, chickens and other poul-
try, sheep, donkeys, and other animals; other valuable property (mainly
vehicles), such as bicycles, motorcycles, and other motor vehicles. These
were measured per respondent. Assets such as radios, watches, wives'
sewing machines, and children in secondary school were not included. This
may have resulted in a bias against the two southern villages, where invest-
ment in livestock is not so common because of animal diseases, but where
investment in children's secondary education is more common. Land was also
not included in the asset measure because in the majority of the villages
land is not ordinarily saleable by those who farm it. Besides, as will be
seen below, the land issue involves other measurement problems.
In order to quantify the asset measure, an assumption was made assign-
ing an average size and age to each type of asset. This was done so as to
make the quantification exercise manageable, but would, of course, result
in under- and over-evaluations. Since prices vary from area to area and
village to village, an average figure was calculated for each type of asset
comprising the mean of the prices prevailing for that asset in the various
areas at the time of the study. The number of cows, goats, bicycles, etc.
was then weighted by the mean price calculated for the particular asset.
Acres
During the course of the interviews, the author visited some of the
respondents' farms, but had neither the time nor the equipment to measure
farm areas. Farmers, therefore, had to be relied upon to state the acreage
farmed in the year of interest. In many cases, farmers were not familiar
with the acreage measure and so could not answer this question. In some
villages, e.g., Yakasai, farmers claimed that extension agents had shown
them the approximate size of an acre, so they could measure their own
farms against this. In Araromi, the villagers had their own land measure-
ment system, which had been translated into acreage/hectarage sizes by the
agricultural and loan officers in the area. In addition, some of the vil-
lagers were familiar with acreage measurement. Altogether, 24% of the
sample could not tell the number of acres farmed. For those respondents
who did, the number of acres farmed on average seems to match the cash
income grouping (e.g., see Table 4-10, Chapter Four). That is, those in
the highest income grouping appeared to have also farmed the highest number
of acres on average. However, the author does not claim high reliability
for the acreage figures given.
Methodological Decisions
Partly because of the data deficiencies discussed above, it was
decided, for purposes of data analysis in the study, to use simple descrip-
tive tables rather than other more sophisticated types of statistical
analytical techniques. Comparisons of different groups in the sample,
such as coop members and non-coop members, are carried out through the use
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of difference of means tests (see Chapter Four). Despite the data problems,
the variables developed in the study provide interesting insights into
salient problems of credit policy and of rural financial markets in Nigeria.
In the next chapter, the theoretical underpinnings of the study are
discussed.
CHAPTER TWO
SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE AND DISCUSSION OF THE
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE STUDY
Introduction
There are four key concepts that pervade the discussion in this study
of credit policy and its implications. These are credit, savings, rural
financial markets (RFMs), and concessional (subsidized) interest rates.
Each of these important concepts individually commands a substantial body
of theoretical and empirical literature, which, if reviewed separately,
could constitute an entire chapter in itself. Fortunately, as Chart 2-1
shows, the concepts are interrelated in a way that is important to the
major issues raised in this study concerning the need for and usefulness
of credit and the effect of interest rate policies on the credit and sav-
ings process in rural areas.
As seen in Chart 2-1, rural financial markets (formal and informal)
collect savings from farm-households which have surplus financial capital.
RFMs also channel credit to farm-households whose available financial capi-
tal is insufficient to support their economic activities. These farm-
households may use the credit to purchase physical capital to enhance
their agricultural or other economic activities. They may use the credit
1Concessional interest rates here are taken to mean rates of inter-
est below the theoretical market rate. Very often in developing countries
concessional interest rates are also negative rates, in real terms, because
of high levels of inflation. In the literature, concessional interest
rates are variously referred to as subsidized or low rates. These words
will therefore be used interchangeably in this chapter.
CHART 2-1
INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS,
CREDIT, SAVINGS, AND INTEREST RATES
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to supplement their working capital or to support other non-directly pro-
ductive activities. The credit is expected to be repaid later from savings
made from the households' economic activities.
As can be seen in Chart 2-1, the willingness and ability of RFMs to
channel credit to and collect savings from farm-households is affected by
the prevailing level of interest rates in the financial markets. If, for
example, interest rates on credit are low (i.e., below the theoretical
market rate), then RFMs are presumed (in the literature) to be less will-
ing to extend credit to farm-households, because such credit transactions
are less lucrative. If interest rates on savings are low (compared to
rates or returns from other economic activities), then RFMs are less able
to collect savings from farm-households because these households are pre-
sumed to be less willing to save in financial forms.
Various aspects of these interrelationships are central to the assump-
tions examined in Chapter Four of this study, and to the empirical evidence
presented on these assumptions. As such, in the review of literature in
this chapter, the attempt will be to draw from the various sources on
credit, savings, RFMs, and interest rate policies in such a way as to high-
light the important points and concepts surrounding these interrelationships,
particularly as they are connected with the assumptions discussed in Chap-
ter Four.
In section I of this chapter, a look will be taken at the general
role of capital and credit in economic development. This is important as
a means of establishing a context within which to examine the specific
role of credit in agricultural development. Following the discussion on
the role of agricultural credit, a description will be undertaken, in
section II, of the implications, particularly for the rural-agricultural
population, of concessional interest rates for credit and savings. In
this section, popular arguments for concessional interest rates, and refu-
tations of these arguments, will be discussed, as will the impact of con-
cessional interest rates on the ability and willingness of formal RFMs
to channel credit to and collect savings from farm-households. Since the
issue of small-farmer access to formal RFMs is important in Chapter Four
of this study, particular attention will be paid in this section on con-
cessional interest rates to the issue of limited access of poor rural
farmers to formal RFMs as a result of concessional interest rate policies.
Given that not all interested analysts agree on the disadvantages
of low interest rates (and advantages of high interest rates) for rural
farmers, dissenting viewpoints on high versus low interest rates will be
presented in the third section of the chapter. In the final section, the
major points raised in the analysis of the theoretical and empirical liter-
ature will be summarized.
The Role of Capital and of Credit
Most of the conventional wisdom on the role of credit in agricultural
development owes its foundation to the earlier, neoclassical, and even
classical, economic analysis on the role of capital in economic development.
Before launching a discussion on credit, it is therefore worthwhile to
examine what the essential elements of this view on the role of capital
were.
For most conventional development economists, capital was a necessary,
if not a sufficient, factor in the economic growth and development process.
In order for a given economy to grow, there had to be a sufficient increase
in the rate of capital formation to ensure productivity increases in the
various sectors of the economy. To make the capital formation process
possible, savings (which could be channeled into investment in capital
equipment) had somehow to be made available. Jhingan (1976) summarizes
this thinking:
The main purpose of economic development is to build
capital equipment on a sufficient scale to increase
productivity in agriculture, mining, plantations and
industry. Capital is also required to construct
schools, hospitals, roads, railways, etc. This is
possible only if there is a rapid rate of capital
formation in the country, that is, if a smaller pro-
portion of the community's current income or output
is devoted to consumption, and the rest is saved and
invested in capital equipment.
(The Economics of Development and Planning, p. 202)
The major issue for those economists working on developing countries
was the fact that capital formation depended on three aspects of savings
that they felt were problematic in these countries. The three aspects
were the availability of savings, the mobilization of these savings, and
their investment (i.e., their effective utilization in productive activi-
ties) (Jhingan, p. 203).
Given the Keynsian emphasis on savings as a function of income, many
development economists became more concerned with the supply side of the
savings problem, that is, with the availability of savings itself. They
felt that low per capita incomes in developing countries, coupled with high
marginal propensities to consume out of incremental income, were chiefly
responsible for low levels of savings and capital formation in these coun-
tries. Such thinking manifested itself in the 'vicious circle' hypothesis,
described by Nurkse (1967) as a "small capacity to save, resulting from a
low level of real income. The low level of real income is a reflection of
low productivity, which in its turn is due largely to the lack of capital.
The lack of capital is a result of the small capacity to save and so the
circle is complete." (Patterns of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped
Countries, p. 5) The implications were that one way to break out of the
'vicious circle' would be to encourage the influx of outside aid to speed
up the capital formation process in a given country.
While some 'supply-side' economists worried about ways of breaking
out of the vicious circle, others noted that the problem was probably not
so much the low income levels as the existence of large classes of non-
savers in society. The reasoning behind this was that if the growth
could be encouraged of those classes who were less apt to squander or
consume increases in income, the savings process in the developing coun-
tries would be greatly facilitated. In this vein, Sir W. Arthur Lewis
(1954, 1955) noted that the profit-making entrepreneurs were the signifi-
cant savers in society, and that the lack of savings in many developing
countries was a consequence of the limited numbers of the members of this
class in society. Yet another school of thought on the supply-side of
savings maintained that the major problem was that available savings in
developing countries was invariably channeled into relatively unproductive
investment, e.g., jewelry, land, houses, and stocks of commodities. (See
Basch, 1970, p. 73.) This left little that could be directed towards
investment in needed capital equipment.
The demand-side of the savings issue concerning the lack of invest-
ment also received some attention. Nurkse (1967) extended his vicious
circle hypothesis to this aspect. According to him:
. . . the demand for capital is governed by the incen-
tives to invest . . . .On the demand side, the induce-
ment to invest may be low because of the small buying
power of the people, which is due to low productivity.
The low level of productivity however is a result of
the small amount of capital used in production, which
in its turn may be caused at least partly by the small
inducement to invest.
(Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries,
pp. 4-5)
Again, some increase in capital formation (perhaps aided by the exogenous
introduction of savings) would enhance productivity, which would expand
markets, and thus provide the necessary inducements to invest. Hence, the
vicious circle would be broken.
It is apparent from the arguments presented above that regardless of
what their major stress may have been, that is, the supply-side or the
demand-side of savings, most of the development economists were in agreement
on one point--that lack of savings and the attendant lack of capital forma-
tion were seriously retarding the growth and development process in many
of the developing countries. There were, however, some dissenting opinions
on this strong focus on the role of capital. Bauer (1971), for example,
argued that the vicious circle hypothesis was not supported by empirically
observed evidence showing rapid increases in the Gross National Product
and exports of many poor countries in recent decades. (Dissent on Develop-
ment, pp. 34-35) In fact, in Bauer's opinion, savings and capital forma-
tion might not even be the primary determinants of material progress.
Instead, according to him:
0 . . economic achievement and progress depend largely
on human aptitudes and attitudes, on social and politi-
cal institutions and arrangements which derive from
these, on historical experience, and to a lesser extent
on external contacts, market opportunities and on
natural resources. (p. 41)
Schultz (1956, 1964) had expressed similar dissenting opinions in
earlier writings, stressing that attention to development of people as pro-
ductive agents (that is, investment in human capital) may be a more produc-
tive way of achieving economic progress than investment in physical capital.
Hirschman (1958) noted that many ingredients, among them entrepreneurship
and the ability to save, were necessary for the development process. How-
ever, many of these ingredients were already latent in the developing
countries, and the main task of planning, therefore, was combining and pac-
ing these ingredients in a way that would facilitate the development pro-
cess. (The Strategy of Economic Development, p. 6)
Despite these varying opinions, the mainstream of thought on the
growth and development process has continued to stress the importance of
capital formation. This may be because of the demonstrated increases in
capital equipment that accompanied the growth process of the developed
countries, and probably because action on the other ingredients of eco-
nomic growth provide less visible and less immediate results than actions
to bring in savings to stimulate capital formation.
If conventional economic wisdom was pessimistic about savings avail-
ability in the developing economies in general, it was even more so with
regard to savings availability in the traditional, backward, rural-
agricultural areas. There the typical peasant with an income level even
lower than the average for the country as a whole was assumed to save
"little or nothing." (Buchanan & Ellis, Approaches to Economic Develop-
ment, 1955, p. 301) Or, the peasant was regarded as thrifty but caught in
a debt trap, which demanded the constant redirection of his savings into
debt service. (Lewis, 1955) Consequently, little was left over for the
capital-formation process.
As a continuation of this trend of thought, it would mean that if sub-
stantial economic progress were to be desired in this sector, that is, if
agricultural modernization were to take place, it would be necessary to
introduce aid from outside the rural sector to facilitate the agricultural
development process. Hence, the rationale arose for the introduction of
credit into the agricultural development process. These notions on the
role of credit have been and are still very popular, particularly among
developing country policy-makers. It is only very recently that new evi-
dence, including that from this study, has poured forth, challenging old
assumptions with regard to credit and savings in rural-agricultural areas,
and cautioning that great care must be taken with regard to credit use.
(This new evidence will be discussed further below.) The tide of popular
opinion is, however, yet to be turned. In the following section, a closer
look is taken at the role of credit in development of the rural-
agricultural sector.
Specifics on the Role of Credit
The key to understanding the conventional role of credit in agricul-
ture lies in the desire to 'modernize' the agricultural sector; that is,
to transform traditional methods of production into new methods that would
not only increase farmer productivity, but would also increase the marketed
surplus and farmer income. In a traditional type of agriculture, where
the farmer is combining old and time-tested methods of production, credit
needs are said to be very little or non-existent. However, when the farmer
has to use new inputs, such as fertilizers, improved seeds, insecticides,
and perhaps additional labor associated with these new methods, credit
becomes a necessary factor. This is because of the presumed poverty of
the average rural farmer who, as was pointed out in the above section, was
deemed unable to save. Such a farmer, therefore, would have to "borrow to
innovate" (Zandstra et al., Caqueza: Living Rural Development, 1979, p. 209).
The conventional role of credit is summed by by Mellor (1966) for
the general case, and by Osuntogun (1973) for the Nigerian case. According
to Mellor,
. .. early stages of modernization will create only
small and short-term credit needs. As modernization
proceeds, the financing required in the initial years
of installation of new devices may put a heavy burden
on existing credit facilities. Medium-term credit
will be needed for rapid expansion of work animals,
tools and equipment--wells and irrigation development
will cause similar problems.
(The Economics of Agricultural Development, p. 127)
Osuntogun notes that for Nigerian agriculture, further improvements
. will require basic changes in the traditional
techniques and organization of production. The appli-
cation of advanced technology implied in this trans-
formation will call for considerable investment of
capital and thus increase demands for credit.
The role of credit in the transformation of Niger-
ian agriculture therefore becomes evident. Credit
is needed for the production system including the
payment of wages of hired labor, purchase of ferti-
lizer, improved seeds and other requisites. Also,
there is need for credit to meet the cost of marketing.
("Agricultural Credit Strategies for Nigerian Farmers,"
p. 1)
According to analysts of the role of credit, the need to provide
credit (perhaps subsidized credit) for the poor rural farmers becomes
even more imperative when the problems of the risks or uncertainties
which they face in agricultural production are considered.
The farmer is always confronted with a number of
uncertainties that lie largely outside his con-
trol. As they relate to his production activi-
ties, these uncertainties are attributable to the
unpredictability of the quantity of the product
that will be obtained, to the product price at
the moment of sale, and to institutional uncer-
tainties. These uncertainties are particularly
hazardous to small farmers who may lack the means
to continue their enterprise if they experience a
serious financial setback.
(Zandstra et al., Caqueza: Living Rural Development,
1979, p. 195)
When these uncertainties are combined with those emanating from the
greater yield and price variability of new technology packages, then
rural farmers, close as they are already to the subsistence margin, may
not innovate unless the incentive of outside help in the form of credit
(possibly low cost credit) is available. Thus, credit functions then
mainly as an innovative and risk-bearing aid. Credit may also function
as a 'tiding-over' fund, ensuring the farmer's survival during that interim
period between which he makes his new agricultural investments and the time
in which the benefits of the investment start to pour in. More recently,
other less conventional uses, especially of subsidized credit, have become
evident. These will be described in a later section on subsidized credit.
Early discussions by agricultural economists on the role of credit
often stressed the interdependence of credit use on other factors connected
with the production process. Thus, Mellor (1966) noted that "Credit pro-
grams should be tied operationally with the other services provided to
modernizing agriculture by either the government or private interests."
(The Economics of Agricultural Development, p. 130) Mosher (1966), in
his well-known book, Getting Agriculture Moving, categorized the ingredi-
ents for agricultural development into what he termed 'Essentials' and
'Accelerators.' Essentials (transportation, markets for farm products,
constantly changing technology, local availability of supplies and equip-
ment, production incentives) were factors without which the agricultural
development process could not proceed. Accelerators (production credit,
education for development, group action by farmers, improving and expand-
ing agricultural land, national planning for agricultural development)
were useful in increasing the pace of the development process. Thus, the
usefulness of accelerators such as credit was directly dependent on the
presence of essentials. In Mosher's words:
There can and will be some growth in agricultural
productivity wherever all the essentials are
present but without all of them there will be none.
The case is different with the accelerators. Each
of them is important but not indispensible. There
can be agricultural development without one or more
of them. Nevertheless, most countries need as
rapid agricultural development as possible and to
achieve this each of the accelerators can be of
great help. (p. 122)
Much of the literature on practical experiences with the introduc-
tion of credit shows that such linkages as are mentioned above between
credit and other factors appear to have been forgotten or glossed over
by development practitioners in their enthusiasm over the potentialities
of credit as a transformation agent in rural agriculture. This enthusiasm
was probably spurred on by the practitioners' reinterpretations of emerg-
ing literature citing financial services and instruments as possible
active rather than passive agents in the development process. (See
Patrick, 1966.) Given this, national and international agencies put
together credit programs with little analysis of target population credit
needs and practices, and with inadequate attention to the linkages
between credit and other factors. Consequent to the disappointing results
obtained from these credit programs, evaluations have been done in recent
years of the credit experience in particular countries and particular
agencies. (For example, see AID Spring Review 1973, FAO Credit Conference,
1975.) Such evaluations have redirected attention to the need to reassess
the role of credit and credit policy in various developing countries.
One noticeable factor in the above discussion of conventional views
of the role of credit is the tendency for analysts and policy-makers to
view the essential function of credit as that of an input into the agricul-
tural production process, specifically for the adoption of new technology.
This tendency, of course, arises from the desire to ensure that increased
output is indeed generated from the credit, and with it income increases
sufficient to repay the loans. However, dogmatic belief in the theme of
production credit has resulted, in the case of various developing countries,
in misdirected credit policies, often with rather disappointing results.
Baker (1973), among others, has criticized the narrow conception of
credit programs based solely on the need for production credit, since con-
sumption and other types of credit may also constitute legitimate needs.
One of the key questions raised in this study concerns the legitimacy, in
the Nigerian context, of continued stress on production credit in the face
of what appear to be relatively unattractive returns to agriculture com-
pared with other activities. Another question involves the inevitable
linkage, in the minds of Nigerian policy-makers, of credit with the pur-
chase of fertilizer inputs. The issue is: given the current features of
Nigerian agriculture, such as labor scarcity, might it not be more fruitful
to think of alternative, more productive ways of using credit to help agri-
cultural producers?
Credit and Concessional Interest Rates
It has been the experience with national credit programs that
government-owned or government-regulated credit has rarely been provided
at market rates of interest. Most countries have adopted credit policies
that have as a prominent feature the imposition of below-market ceilings
on interest rates. Such concessional interest rates mean loans given at
artificially low prices, and, in fact, depending on the rate of inflation
in the country concerned, often at negative real prices.
Several recent theoretical and empirical studies (to be discussed
below) have shown that many of the goals given as the basis for concessional
interest rate policies are not really achieved by pursuing these policies.
And, furthermore, subsidized interest rates on credit give rise to several
harmful side effects, particularly as regards the performance of rural
financial markets (RFMs) in serving poor rural farmers. The idea of a
concessional interest rate policy is important to this study, because,
as will be shown in Chapter Three, this is a central feature of Nigerian
credit policy. More than half of the assumptions explored in the study
relate to the effects of and reasons for concessional interest rates on
credit. It is, therefore, worthwhile to look at the reasons for such
policies as well as their impact.
Reasons for Concessional (Subsidized) Interest Rates
and Arguments to Counter These Reasons
Several reasons are cited in the literature for the prevalence and
stability of concessional, frequently inflexible, interest rate policies
in developing (as well as some developed) countries. Adams (1978), in
his article, "Small Farmer Credit Programs and Interest Rate Policies in
Low Income Countries," provides an excellent summary of the four major
reasons. This section draws on his work extensively. The four reasons
are: the need for concessional interest rates to enable farmers to adopt
new technology, to act as compensation for production disincentives, to
serve as an income transfer device, and to facilitate the driving out of
village moneylenders.
Adoption of Technology
The most popular reason cited for concessional interest rates on
credit concerns the presumed poverty and poor risk-bearing ability of far-
mers (discussed in the section on the role of credit above). Because of
these two assumed characteristics of farmers, the argument is, in Adam's
words, that:
.. . low rates are needed to induce farmers to adopt
formal credit and to use same to purchase modern pro-
ductive inputs. This adoption argument holds that
small farmers will not borrow formal credit unless
low rates are charged, that they will not adopt profit-
able new technology unless special inducements are
given, and that low rates are necessary to offset the
uncertainties associated with adoption of new produc-
tion activities. (p. 5)
Khatkhate (1978) provides a more general reason to account for this
attitude on interest rates. He notes that "in the early years of debate
on the problems of economic development, there had been a strong belief
that the level of interest rates in countries [and we add sectors] aspiring
to grow should remain low enough to induce new investment." ("False Issues
in the Debate on Interest Rate Policies in LDCs," p. 1) Such reasoning
could easily account for the attempts to induce further investment in
"lagging agriculture" through low interest rates.
Adams cites research by Meyer (1977) and Tinnermeier (1977) showing
that farmers may not need subsidized or even additional credit for
increased investment in agriculture, because they either own or have access
to enough liquidity to undertake profitable investments. Evidence from
this present study suggests that when the income level is controlled for,
the access to subsidized credit makes very little difference in fertilizer
use (see Chapter Four) among groups of Nigerian farmers. Thus, empirical
evidence fails to support consistently the technology adoption premise
for low interest rates. As regards the risk-bearing situation of certain
particularly vulnerable farmers, other less distorting (though admittedly
administratively more complex) means, such as certain types of insurance
programs, might be found to deal with the problem.
Compensation for Production Disincentives
A second, less conventional reason for subsidized credit concerns
the need to use this credit to compensate farmers for various production
and investment disincentives caused them by government economic policies.
According to Adams:
. . . low interest rates are needed on agricultural
credit to compensate farmers for other economic poli-
cies which cause production and investment disincen-
tives. These policies might include food price ceil-
ings, over valued foreign exchange rates which depress
prices for agricultural exports, various forms of
taxes and policies which raise the prices of major
inputs purchased by farmers. Some policymakers argue
that low interest rates on agricultural loans are an
easy and efficient way to compensate farmers for the
production disincentives inflicted on them by these
various policies. (p. 6)
A general argument against the use of subsidized credit as a compen-
sation for other investment and production disincentives caused by govern-
ment is that while the effect of these disincentives is felt by all farmers,
access to subsidized credit (as will be discussed further below) may be
available to only a limited number of farmers, and the well-to-do ones at
that. Most farmers would thus be left uncompensated.
For example, in Nigeria where only 4-6% of rural-based farmers have
access to subsidized credit in any given year, the use of credit as compen-
sation for production and investment disincentives would be extremely dif-
ficult to justify. This is not, however, one of the main bases for a sub-
sidized credit policy in Nigeria.
It could also be said that in many developing countries, for some
of the farmers who do receive credit, the amount of credit received in
any given year could prove to be an insignificant proportion of the loss
suffered through various production disincentives in that year, so that
greater amounts of credit would have to be given before the compensation
effects could be justified. The fact is that, given further distortions
caused by subsidized credit policy, the costs of using such a policy as a
compensation device far outweigh the benefits.
Income Transfer Device
The institution of a subsidized credit policy is also defended on
the grounds of its use as an income transfer device to achieve government
equity objectives. This is the third argument. In Adams' words:
Policymakers who feel compassion for the economic
plight of the rural poor argue that low interest
rates on agricultural loans are an easy way to
transfer additional purchasing power to the rural
poor. When interest rates are low, borrowers pay
less for their loans and thus have more income to
spend on other activities. A slight variation of
this argument is that low interest rates are justi-
fied to help farmers ride out periods of low income
due to disasters caused by war or weather. (p. 6)
Again, as in the counter-argument made above against use of subsi-
dized credit as a compensatory device, its use as an income transfer
device is argued to be equally ineffective. This is because it has been
proven in country after country (e.g., see Gonzalez-Vega, 1976, 1977;
Besser, 1979) that the bulk of the credit ends up in the hands of the
better-off farmers. Gonzalez-Vega (1976), in particular, has argued that
subsidized, and especially restrictive, interest rates on credit, by
affecting the cost side of formal lenders' portfolios, causes them to
favor large borrowers with small lending costs over small borrowers,
thereby worsening the distribution of income. In his words:
Credit in general and subsidized interest rates in
particular are very inefficient for income redis-
tribution. Subsidized rates affect income growth
potentials through their effect on the access to
resources that different classes of farmers have
and have a direct effect on income distribution.
The grant transferred is directly proportional to
the size of the loan. The larger the loan, the
greater the unrequited transfer. Since loan size
and borrower size are positively correlated, the
amount of the grant becomes a direct function of
the borrower's wealth. The large borrowers receive
large subsidies, while the small borrowers who con-
stitute the target of the strategy receive, at best,
small loans with their implicit subsidy. Non-
borrowers--the smallest and the poorest farmers--
receive no subsidy at all. This necessarily makes
income distribution worse.
("Interest Rate Restrictions and Income Distribution,"
p. 975)
Along the same line of argument, it is clear that credit (subsidized
or otherwise) will not help farmers to ride out periods of low income due
to natural and other disasters if the majority of the farmers do not get
the credit. 1 Therefore, to handle such genuine cases of need, a revamping
of credit policies to ensure better access for a greater number of farmers,
or the instituting of various types of insurance programs, would be in
order.
Desire to Be Rid of Moneylenders
Lastly, the fourth major argument for low interest rates on credit
concerns the desire to be rid of the unwanted influence of moneylenders.
Policy-makers in the Third World generally believe (and it is true in the
rural areas of some developing countries) that a large proportion of the
rural population borrow from moneylenders at very high rates of interest,
payment of which keeps borrowers perpetually tied to lenders in an endless
debt-repayment cycle. The channeling of low interest credit to rural
IAlso, note that if farmers get the credit, the repayment and other
terms should be very flexible in order for the credit to be genuinely
helpful.
areas should therefore provide (according to these policy-makers) competi-
tion for moneylenders, and enable rural borrowers to escape the lenders'
clutches. Adams (1978) notes:
It is widely held in low income countries that
informal lenders apply usurious lending terms
to their loans. These terms lead to either per-
petual economic bondage of borrower to lender,
or even, worse, turnover of borrowers' assets
to the lender to satisfy debts. An objective
of many small farmer credit programs is to pro-
vide inexpensive formal credit to rural house-
holds so they can escape the clutches of the
moneylender. It is also often hoped that an
increased supply of inexpensive formal credit
will at least weaken the economic power of the
moneylenders and hopefully even drive them out
of business. (pp. 6-7)
One major argument offered in the literature against this preoccupa-
tion with the driving out of moneylenders justifies the activities of these
lenders in the rural areas on the basis of the services they perform and
the costs they face for these services. The research points out that pro-
grams aimed at driving out moneylenders may be unwise. Bottomley (1964,
1971), Long (1968), and others note that high lending costs in the rural
areas probably account for and justify the bulk of the high interest rates
charged by moneylenders. These lending costs may be substantial because
of high default rates in rural areas (requiring high-risk premiums),
greater (riskless) opportunity cost of capital in these areas, high infla-
tion rates, and significant administrative and other costs. Barton (1977)
and Singh (1968) add that moneylenders and other informal lenders in rural
areas provide much needed credit services.
McKinnon (1973) and Gonzalez-Vega (1977) note that low interest
rates on credit are, in any case, an ineffective way of dealing with exist-
ing moneylender problems. According to Gonzalez-Vega (1976), " . . . low
interest rates cannot eliminate the monopoly of moneylenders in the rural
areas of low income countries, since they restrict access to formal
credit." (p. 975) This restriction of access--which stems from lender
behavior discussed above--serves to drive rural borrowers back into the
arms of the very moneylenders the governments seek to eliminate. Thus,
the formal financial markets offer no effective competition to the money-
lender.
In any case, the moneylender influence may need to be examined on
a country-by-country and even region-by-region basis, because it is not at
all clear that this influence is as uniformly pervasive as policy-makers
believe. In the Nigerian case, for example, efforts to use subsidized
credit to drive 'wicked' moneylenders out of business may be entirely mis-
placed if the majority of villagers do not obtain credit from moneylenders.
Other Justifications for Low Interest Rates for Credit
A possible reason for maintaining low interest rates for credit is
that low rates help offset the high total borrowing costs that rural farm-
ers normally face in their dealings with the formal system. Borrowing
costs are made up not only of interest costs, but of transaction costs
of getting credit, such as transportation costs, opportunity costs of time
lost from the farm, etc. Because these costs are higher for rural farmers
who have very little practice in dealing with formal financial systems,
concessional rates of interest could be used to offset some of the tran-
saction costs. Adams and Nehman (1977), however, have shown that interest
costs constitute a very small proportion of borrowing costs for most rural
farmers. Therefore, lowering interest costs would compensate to only a
small degree for high transaction costs of credit. A much more effective
way of helping rural farmers would be to lower or eliminate the other sub-
stantial transaction costs of obtaining credit, while increasing interest
costs by some margin so as to assure rural farmer access to credit.
Given the continuation in several countries of subsidized credit
programs in the face of failure to achieve program objectives, many
researchers have become convinced that subsidized credit may often be
little more than a political tool used by governments for buying support.I
According to Dell Amore (1975), "governments may want to reduce interest
rates on agricultural loans for political reasons; it is an easy measure
and one that makes good publicity." (The Credit Markets of Africa, p. 103)
Kane (1976) has warned, however, that the political use of interest ceil-
ings--including the rationing it often involves--may backfire on a govern-
ment, since "it could disastrously increase political and economic aliena-
tion among the less powerful members of society." ("Good Intentions and
Unintended Evil: The Case Against Selective Credit Allocation," p. 68)
The difficulty governments would face in changing the direction of
their credit policies would be the confrontation that might occur with
people benefitting from subsidized credit programs. Of particular impor-
tance might be larger, more influential farmers, or perhaps the government
bureaucrats administering credit programs. Some poor and rural farmers
iViewed more sympathetically, governments could also be said to be
caught in a trap, in the sense that once the decision has been made to
set up a rural credit program, it is politically difficult to announce
high interest charges for "poor" rural farmers.
subject to "credit illusion" might even protest the reduction or abolition
of subsidies on credit. This could be because the demonstration effect of
seeing a fellow villager obtain credit in a given year may make them
believe that even if they lacked access to subsidized credit in that one
year, access would surely be theirs sometime in the future. Despite the
certainty of some opposition, however, the lack of justification for most
of the basic reasons given for subsidized credit programs, and the avail-
ability of other more effective means of achieving some of the goals fre-
quently mentioned, dictate that governments re-examine their rationale
for instituting credit programs.
Disadvantages of Low Interest Rate Policies for Credit
Not only can concessional interest rates for credit not be justified
on the basis of the reasons given for instituting them, but several distor-
tions in financial markets and in the rural sector actually arise as a
result of the concessional interest rates. Some of these, such as the
rationing that occurs in formal credit markets and the distortions in bank
lending portfolios, have already been mentioned in the discussion above,
and will be dealt with only briefly in this section. Most of the critique
on the low interest rate policies in the literature center on the impact
of such policies on rural financial markets and on savings. It will,
therefore, be useful to carry on the discussion in this section under those
major headings.
Impact of Concessional Interest Rates on Rural Financial Markets
There are several ways in which concessional interest rates affect
rural financial markets. Concessional rates of interest could lead to
decapitalization of lending institutions. They could and do lead to
rationing of credit by rural financial markets and to capital market frag-
mentation. Concessional rates of interest affect the way rural financial
markets transfer resources from one region to another (e.g., from rural
to urban areas). All these impacts of concessional interest rates on
RFMs are elaborated below.
Decapitalization
One of the possible effects of concessional interest policies is that
lending institutions involved with agricultural credit may find themselves
in a position where they may run short of capital with which to carry on
their lending activities. This could occur if profit margins are low, and
if interest payments on savings deposits are insufficient to attract domes-
tic and foreign savings. This could leave the financial institutions in
an unsatisfactory situation with regard to credit reserves. At the same
time, these same institutions may experience loan repayment problems, due
to the inability or unwillingness of certain borrowers to repay. Some
influential borrowers, for example, may deliberately refuse to repay if
they feel that they have enough political power to protect themselves
against sanctions. Other borrowers (because of the low cost of credit)
may divert borrowed funds to activities with low or delayed financial pay-
offs, thereby hampering their ability to repay the loans (for examples,see
Boakye-Dankwa, 1979). Given such situations, financial institutions may
find that they cannot maintain an internal revolving credit fund. At the
same time, they cannot raise enough outside capital to continue granting
loans. They may eventually have to shut down, unless the government keeps
providing more capital for their operations.
Rationing
Below-market rates of interest on credit stimulate demand in excess
of supply, resulting in the administrative rationing of credit, during
which process these influential farmers with greater access to financial
institutions are favored over and above poorer, less influential farmers.
In such countries as Nigeria, where the interest ceiling on agricultural
credit and the interest floor on savings are such as to leave a very small
profit margin for rural financial institutions, these institutions have an
added incentive in rationing to concentrate their credit portfolios on
large and influential borrowers. As Shaw (1973) puts it:
, . . effective low ceilings on real loan rates
intensify risk aversion and liquidity preference
on the part of intermediaries. Banks and others
keep a privileged place in their portfolios for
established borrowers, especially trading firms
with a long record of stability. They have little
incentive to explore new and less certain lending
opportunities.
(Financial Deepening, p. 86)
Such policies, as has been mentioned earlier, elbow out small rural bor-
rowers, and even result in a worsening of the distribution of income.
Inter-regional Resource Transfer
Just as concessional interest rates on agricultural credit lead to
the concentration of loans in the hands of well-to-do borrowers, they may
encourage the transfer of any available rural savings from the rural to
the urban areas. This could occur if, with very low to negative real
rates of interest, financial institutions find investment opportunities
in the urban areas far more lucrative and less risky than those in the
rural areas. Adams (1978) cites research in Thailand, Bangladesh, and
Jamaica that shows that concessional interest rates may indeed be respon-
sible for, or at least be reinforcing, inter-regional resource transfer
by rural financial markets.
Capital Market Fragmentation
The effects of concessional interest rates in fragmenting financial
markets has been persuasively argued by Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973).
Since small, often rural, borrowers are excluded from the formal market
by the rationing that results from low interest rates, they have to find
credit in the informal market. There they face different costs from those
obtaining in the formal market. A dual credit market is thereby perpetu-
ated, with people facing differential and preferential prices and costs
for credit, depending on which market they participate in. Such dualism
results in some people getting too much credit, some too little, while
others who may have productive opportunities get none at all. This state
of affairs represents a misallocation of resources and retards economic
development.
Furthermore, some of those with access to relatively unlimited amounts
of credit may over-invest in capital as compared with labor. In an economy
where rural unemployment or underemployment poses a problem, such invest-
ment will represent further resource misallocation. Other people with too
much credit may engage in 'non-productive' consumption (e.g., buying
Mercedes-Benz cars), thereby 'wasting' the borrowed resources. Concessional
interest rates thus reinforce the weaknesses in rural financial markets
instead of building up the strengths.
Effects of Concessional Interest Rates on Savings
Low interest rates paid by borrowers are said to have a detrimental
effect on the mobilization of savings in rural financial markets because
they lead to equally low or lower interest payments to savers. Two
reasons account for the persistence of low interest charges on savings
deposits. The first reason (the foundations of which were discussed at
the beginning of this chapter) has to do with the conventional notion of
low savings capacities in rural areas. Because of the belief that rural
savings are negligible in any case, policy-makers see no need to raise
interest rates for savers. The second reason involves the continuing
debate on the interest elasticity of savings supply. Since there are
empirical uncertainties about the responsiveness of savings to interest
rates, policy-makers again feel no pressure to raise rates to attract
deposits.
On the issue of savings availability and savings capacities in
rural areas, evidence continues to mount contradicting the conventional
notions. Ong et al. (1976), Lee et al. (1977), Roberts (1972), and
Okonjo (1978) have shown empirical evidence in the cases of Taiwan, Korea,
Zambia, and Nigeria confirming the availability of cash savings in rural
areas. The general trend indicated by these findings is underscored by
Shaw's (1973) statement that evidence on curb (informal) market activities
"impress one with the vigor of the propensity to save even under trying
circumstances. The savings they [the curb markets] attract along with
other savings that escape from the low returns of organized finance into
inventories of real assets and foreign assets must be a multiple of sav-
ings that flow on a voluntary basis to repressed monetary systems."
(Financial Deepening, p. 136)
Concerning the issue of savings response to interest rates, debate
continues. Houthakker (1965) and Williamson (1968) present econometric
evidence that suggests insignificant or negative relationships between
savings and real interest rates. Gupta's (1970) work on India contradicts
this with its evidence that "saving responds positively to real interest
rates in both urban and rural sectors, though their qualitative and quan-
titative importance is much greater for the urban than for the rural
sector." ("On Determinants of Rural and Urban Household Saving Behavior,"
p. 583) Khatkhate (1978), however, notes that "Gupta's results are biased
by the misspecification of an interest rate variable." ("False Issues in
the Debate on Interest Rate Policies in Less Developed Countries," p. 9)
As such, Gupta's conclusions have less credence. Khatkhate also critiques
the statistical techniques used in other research (e.g., Emery, 1970) on
savings and interest rates, and remarks that such studies "succeed only
in showing that interest rates influence the form of saving and not its
level." (p. 9)
Despite these diverse results, the general (although largely unsub-
stantiated) opinion in the literature appears to be that both the level and
form of savings can be positively influenced by the level of real interest
rates, Some researchers (e.g., Ruozi et al., 1977) argue, though, that
in some cases (especially in Africa), other motivating factors for savings,
such as the need for insurance and for credit, or the response to social
obligation, will count as much if not more in savings decisions as inter-
est rate levels. Von Pischke (1978) adds that in rural areas, where most
people may not have deposit accounts,
. . . the supply of deposits is initially more
'service-elastic' than interest elastic. The
potential advantage for rural people of the use
of financial services is convenience in terms
of safety and liquidity management . .
At some later stage of financial development
when basic access to deposit services of some
sort have been largely solved, interest rates
will play a more forceful role in influencing
the level of rural liquidity and investment in
financial assets.
("Towards an Operational Approach to Savings for
Rural Developers," pp. 53-54)
In the manner elaborated by U Tun Wai (1972), therefore, the physical
availability of financial institutions and services could be extremely
important.
One point that virtually all researchers are agreed upon is that
concessional interest rates do more harm than good when savings mobiliza-
tion is considered. This is because concessional interest rates are partly
responsible for the relative lack of intermediation in rural areas. Accord-
ing to Von Pischke (1974), 'low' lending rates make it difficult, if not
impossible, for any financial intermediaries to venture into rural areas
without incurring losses. This means that
S. . rural savings in the form of cash cannot con-
veniently be converted into interest-bearing financial
assets and that rural saving potential remains untapped
and unstimulated. The lack of deposit facilities in
rural areas results in low levels of rural deposits,
reinforcing the belief that rural people are indeed
poor and deserving of (subsidized) credit for
developmental purposes.
("A Critical Survey of Approaches to the Role of
Credit in Smallholder Development," p. 11)
Concessional interest rates also result in low rewards to savers,
particularly rural and small savers whose only chance to participate in
formal financial markets may come in the use of deposit facilities.
Low rates force rural households to accept erosion
of the real value of their financial savings or to
hold their savings in other asset forms. This also
results in rural households receiving a lower rate
of return on their total assets. Savings activities
are, as a result, made less attractive to the house-
hold and the opportunity cost of consumption lessened.
Said another way, poor rural households are induced
to consume more and save less through low interest
policies.
(Dale Adams, "Small Farmer Credit Programs and Interest
Rate Policies in Low Income Countries," 1978, p. 9)
From these remarks, it appears that the pursuit of a positive higher
rate of interest policy on savings may be in order. Although the response
of savings to higher interest rates is by no means certain, setting high-
er and real rates of interest on savings may encourage increased financial
intermediation. It could also reward small savers, lead perhaps to
increases in the volume of mobilized savings, and further correct the
misallocation of savings by RFMs.
Dissent on High Interest Rate Policies
The policy prescription of high positive real rates of interest is
not one that sits comfortably with some analysts. One of the issues that
arises is the fact that high positive market rates of interest will exclude
some poor people, who cannot afford to pay such rates, from the credit
market. The question, then, is whether high real rates of interest will
confer more costs than benefits on poorer farmers as a whole than would
an alternative, administratively-rationed system. There is a presumption
in the literature that the benefits would be greater than the costs since,
as practiced in most countries, fewer poor people would be excluded under
the market or near-market mechanism than under a bureaucratically adminis-
tered system. Furthermore, there would be less resource misallocation in
the economy as a whole, and farmers would benefit from higher rates on
savings. As to the very poorest farmers, other more direct methods of
aid, such as grants, might be considered.
One other issue that frequently arises when positive high rates of
interest are discussed is: How high is high? In some countries where
inflation runs extremely high, positive rates of interest might mean
absurdly high nominal rates, such as 100% and upwards. In such cases,
it appears that the initial step would be for the government to work on
the reduction of the inflation level before redirecting its interest rate
policies.
For other (intermediate inflation) countries, some researchers, e.g.,
McKinnon (1973) and Lipton (1976), have mentioned real rates of 15% to 25%
as being (if not exactly market rates) at least high enough to induce better
performance in rural financial markets. Other researchers, e.g., Adams,
suggest flexible interest rate policies, while others, e.g., Khatkhate
(1978), advocate that the rate charged should be based on the rate of
return to investment in the agricultural sector. The problem with this
latter suggestion is that since credit is fungible, it could still be
diverted to other sectors if rates of return elsewhere were higher. It
would seem that no one interest rate or method of setting interest rates
can be mandated across the board for all countries since economic and cul-
tural conditions differ. What can be suggested is that governments move
increasingly towards a policy of positive high rates of interest in order
to reduce biases in rural financial markets.
Finally, other questions raised about a policy of high real rates
of interest concern some adverse effects on indigenous entrepreneurs that
would occur from the increased financial intermediation resulting from
high interest rates. Bhatia and Khatkhate (1973) argue that in some Afri-
can countries where indigenous entrepreneurs face a higher risk environ-
ment than foreign ones, increased financial intermediation may have the
negative impact of allocating mobilized savings away to the foreign
favored customers. They state that "the emphasis on high-interest rate
strategies could yield only partial results; they might, at best, help to
bring about a mobilization of resources with the financial institutions,
but they would not ensure the optimum use of the resources." ("Financial
Intermediation Savings Mobilization and Entrepreneurial Development: The
African Experience," IMF Staff Papers, p. 134) This opinion on resource
allocation is directly contrary to that espoused for high interest rates.
The situation described by Bhatia and Khatkhate would arise if differen-
tial rates between higher risk and lower risk enterprises were not allowed.
Should higher rates for riskier enterprises be permissible (and politically
feasible, since the division in this case is between foreign and indige-
nous enterprises), then the lending institutions' costs would be covered
in this regard, and technically there would be no resource misallocation
in terms of banks' lending portfolios. However, the government would
still be left with the problem of how to help indigenous entrepreneurs
catch up with foreign ones who have derived an initial advantage from
their colonial foundations. The government could, in this case, again
provide direct grants or various other types of direct (rather than
indirect) subsidies to indigenous entrepreneurs. The government could
also, as Bhatia and Khatkhate have suggested, provide direct technical
and managerial services to aid indigenous entrepreneurs in running their
enterprises.
Summary and Conclusion
It has been shown in this chapter that the conventional notions on
the need for credit and the absence of savings in rural areas are being
increasingly challenged by new evidence. In the light of the new evidence,
the emerging consensus appears to be that concessional interest rate poli-
cies have to be evaluated and changed in order to avoid biases in the
behavior of rural financial markets. High real rates of interest promise
to aid resource allocation, and economic development in general. They may
aid savings mobilization. This does not mean, however, that higher real
rates of interest are a panacea for the agricultural sector's problems,
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or even for problems involving rural financial markets. Other institu-
tional factors, such as appropriate prices in input and product markets,
have to be taken into account in policy-making, while solutions have to
be found for those farmers too poor to participate in a more efficient
credit market. In the next chapter, a look is taken at credit policy in
the Nigerian context.
CHAPTER THREE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF PAST AND PRESENT CREDIT POLICY IN NIGERIA
Introduction
In Chapters One and Two of the study, the reasons for ongoing inter-
est in the role of agricultural credit in Nigeria and other developing
countries were presented. In Chapter One, the poor performance of the
agricultural sector in Nigeria was given as the immediate reason for the
current upsurge of interest in agricultural credit in that country. In
Chapter Two, more fundamental theoretical and practical reasons were dis-
cussed for the continuing interest in the role of agricultural credit in
Nigeria and other Third World countries. For example, one reason cited is
the belief by many interested analysts in the underlying poverty and low
savings capacity of the rural-agricultural population in most developing
countries.
Given that the major reasons for interest in credit have been presented
in the two previous chapters, in this chapter attention will be directed to
a description of past and present credit policy in Nigeria, as a means of
providing a more complete background on credit activities and policy in
that country. During the discussion in this chapter, an attempt will be
made to highlight further the pervasiveness--in the Nigerian context--of
the conventional notions on credit need and use discussed in Chapter Two.
This will serve to underscore the bases for the assumptions, outlined in
Chapter Four, as underlying Nigerian credit policy.
This chapter is organized in three main sections. The first section
consists of a brief description of early attempts by the government to
introduce credit into Nigerian agriculture and the reasons for these efforts.
This discussion leads, in the next section, to descriptions of the major
formal institutions created and currently charged with distributing credit
to the agricultural sector. The third section deals with the essential
elements of present Nigerian credit policy.
Formal Agricultural Credit in Nigeria:
A Brief Historical Look,
1 930s to Late 1960s
Though the heightened interest in agricultural credit, and the
increase in its volume (relative to previous years), are fairly recent
phenomena in Nigeria, the introduction of credit into the agricultural
sector dates back to the 1930s. Nigeria was then under British colonial
rule. This first instance of formal credit provision in the 1930s
involved the extension of loans by the Native Authority in the north of
the country to participants in a mixed farming scheme. This was to enable
each of them to buy and use a plough, a pair of bullocks, and a cart in
their farming operations. The idea was to encourage a move away from
'less productive' farming based on shifting cultivation to 'more produc-
tive' practices involving the use of animal power and manure derived from
work animals kept on the farm. Forde (1946) noted that the results from
IThis section draws on the descriptions by Ilori (1975), Ijose and
Abaelu (1973), Osuntogun (1973), and the Consortium for the Study of
Nigerian Rural Development (CSNRD) (1966).
the loan and mixed farming efforts were encouraging, because mixed farm-
ing units had increased in number, from three in 1928 to 2,000 units sup-
porting 10,000 people in 1941 (p. 174). Assessments of the scheme by
later authors, e.g., Teriba (1972), are less optimistic, for they consider
the rate of increase in new units too slow. The loan scheme for mixed
farming was later taken over from the Native Authority by the Ministry of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. This ministry extended it to cover
other types of agriculture, horticulture, fisheries, and the supply of
chemical fertilizers at subsidized rates.
By the early 1940s, the cooperative movement had been set up in the
country, partly as a group marketing device, but also as a means of getting
credit at lower cost from the government organizations to the rural farm-
ers. The movement was supposed to have a thrift component, which would
help mobilize funds internally among members. The cooperative movement,
as will be seen later, has not had much success in reaching rural farmers
in large numbers.
In 1946, the Nigeria Local Development Board was established as a
national loan institution, ostensibly catering to farmers and small
businessmen. It functioned until 1949, when its activities were taken
over by the Regional Development Boards, based on the four major geograph-
ical and political divisions--North, West, East, and Colony--in the
country at that time.1 The Regional Development Boards, however, gave
1The Colony later became the Federal Territory of Lagos and no
longer a region, while the midwest region was carved out of the old west-
ern region. The four regions in the country, by 1964, became West, Mid-
west, North, and East. These four regions were divided into 12 States
in 1967, and further into 19 States in the early 1970s. There are cur-
rently 19 State governments and a Federal government in the country. All
very little emphasis to agriculture. Only 10% of the N 4,992,356 total
loans granted from 1948/49 to 1954/55 went to agriculture. A sizeable
amount--47%--went to industries and transport equipment, while public
services received 31%. (Ilori, 1975, p. 4)
Because of the slight emphasis given to agricultural credit, a 1954
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) mission
recommended the establishment of separate agricultural loans boards,
within the Regional Boards, to meet the credit needs of agriculture. This
recommendation was followed by a spate of institution building for agricul-
tural credit. The Western Region Finance Corporation was created in 1955,
and was charged with responsibility for agricultural and industrial credit
in the west. It was succeeded by the Western Nigeria Agricultural Credit
Corporation (WNACC) in 1964. In 1963, the counterpart of the WNACC had
already been set up in the eastern region of the country as the Fund for
Agricultural and Industrial Development (FAID), while in the midwest, the
Mid-western Nigeria Agricultural Credit Corporation was established in
1964. In the north at this time, agricultural credit was handled through
a program operated by the government registrar of cooperative societies.
The government guaranteed loans from Barclays Bank--a major commercial
bank--to cooperative societies, mainly for produce purchase, but also for
some pre-season production loans. The Ministry of Agriculture, as previ-
ously noted, in addition, operated some loans for mixed farming in the
north.
of these will usually be collectively referred to as the government in the
study. Where there is a differentiation as to which particular government
is being referred to, this will be made clear.
During this period of institution building, two government coopera-
tive banks (mainly for agriculture) were set up in 1954 in the eastern
and western regions of the country. They were supposed to channel credit
to and receive deposits from cooperative societies. In 1962, these banks
became commercial banks, accepting deposits and making loans outside the
field of cooperatives. Like other commercial banks at the time, their
loans to agriculture consisted mainly of short-term produce purchase
(marketing) advances to cooperative unions or societies. Very little
attention was paid to loans for purposes of agricultural production, and
certainly not to the production needs of small-scale rural producers.
It cannot be said, despite the activities described above, that dur-
ing the period of the 1930s to the 1960s, the Nigerian government had any
consistent overall goal or policy for agricultural credit. There was defi-
nite interest in credit activities; however, this manifested itself in
separate regional attempts to introduce credit into the agricultural sector.
There was, as well, a great deal of institution building, but in actual
fact, the institutions disbursed very little agricultural credit.
Volume of Credit
It is very difficult to obtain an overall picture of the volume of
credit to the agricultural sector during the period of the 1930s to the
1960s. Evidence is scattered and fragmentary, and often the figures
quoted as being available to the various public formal institutions for
disbursement differ widely from amounts actually disbursed. What all
writers seem to agree upon, however, is that the credit volume in abso-
lute and relative terms was generally low during these years.
For example, as reported earlier in the chapter, only N 496,952, or
10% of the N 4,992,356 granted by the Regional Development Boards from
1948/49 to 1954/55 went to agriculture. (See Table 3-1.) The various
specialized credit institutions that took over from the Boards did not
do much better. Ugoh (1973), in a study of the Fund for Agriculture and
Industrial Development (FAID) (set up in 1963 to take over from the Board
in the eastern region), noted that a total of N 1.8 million was available
to the Fund for disbursement from government and private sources. Of this
total, he calculated that N 1.2 million was the proportion destined for
agriculture. Between 1963 and 1967, according to his figures, 280 loans
totalling N 615,000 (or 51% of the amount available to agriculture) had
been approved. However, only N 331,7662 for 267 loans had actually been
disbursed by 1967. This figure represented 28% of the total amount avail-
able to agriculture. From 1963 to the beginning of 1967, FAID received
a total of 1,907 applications for loans. As of January 31, 1967, only
950, or 50%, had been processed (pp. 4-5). The Fund, therefore, showed
fairly poor performance in credit disbursement to agriculture and, in
general, processing of loan applications.
1These figures were converted from his dollar figures toa4 by using
the exchange rate, which he reported he used: $US 2.80 tofN. Then, they
were further converted to the new Nigerian denomination Naira (N) by multi-
plying by 2. This is to maintain consistency in the currency used in this
study.
2 These figures are higher than those quoted by the Consortium for
the Study of Nigerian Rural Development (CSNRD), 1966. The latter source
quotes N 1 million as the total amount available to FAID, and notes that
only N 106,000 in total had been disbursed by 1966, with 700 applications
outstanding at this time.
TABLE 3-1
SUMMARY OF CREDIT AVAILABLE AND DISBURSED TO AGRICULTURE
FROM VARIOUS FORMAL (GOVERNMENT) INSTITUTIONS
Institution
1
Period
2
Total Amount
of Loans
Disbursed to
Agriculture (N)
3
Total Amount
of Credit
Available (N)
Regional
Development
Boards
Fund for
Agriculture and
Industrial
Development (FAID)
Western Nigeria
Agricultural Credit
Corporation (WNACC)
Midwestern Nigeria
Agricultural Credit
Corporation (MNACC)
Northern Nigeria
Ministry of Agri-
culture Mixed
Farming Program
1948/49-
1954/55
1963-
1967
1964-
1966
1964-
1966
1962-
1968
496,952
331,766
384,000
02
400,0003
4,992,3561
1,200,000
N.A.
0
3,000,000
N.A. = Not Available
This was credit available not just for agriculture, but for other
economic sectors, such as industry, for which the Boards also had responsi-
bility.
2There were no funds available to this institution during the period;
hence, no loans were made.
3This was the amount disbursed by 1966.
SOURCES: C. 0. Ilori, Agricultural Credit Problems in Nigeria: A Case
Study (F.A.O., 1975); Consortium for the Study of Nigerian Rural Development
(CSNRD), A Proposed Agricultural Credit Program for Nigeria (1966); Sylvester
Ugoh, "Small Holder Agricultural Credit in Eastern Nigeria: An Analysis of
the Fund for Agricultural and Industrial Development," AID Spring Review of
Small Farmer Credit, 1973, Vol. 6; 0. Teriba, "Rural Credit and Rural Devel-
opment in Nigeria," Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Nigerian
Economic Society, 1972, in Rural Development in Nigeria.
4
Column 3
as % of
Column 4
28
N.A.
0
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The Fund's counterpart in the west, the Western Nigeria Agricultural
Credit Corporation (WNACC), made approximately 740 loans to agriculture,
totalling N 384,000 from 1964 to 1966. It had, however, 13,000 loan appli-
cations outstanding in 1966. (CSNRD, 1966, p. 26) Another specialized
credit agency, the Midwest Nigerian Agricultural Credit Corporation (MNACC),
created in 1964, had made no loans by 1966. This was due to lack of funds.
In the north, the Ministry of Agriculture's mixed farming program (see
earlier section in the chapter) had been able to appropriate and disburse
by 1966 only N 400,000 of the N 3 million said to be made available to it
in the 1962-1968 national development plan. Finally, between 1962-63 and
1966-67, the various governments of Nigeria devoted barely 4% of their
N 83.86 million capital allocation for agriculture to agricultural credit.
The figures presented above certainly suggest that the volume of
credit to the agricultural sector was relatively small in the various peri-
ods, compared to other sectors' credit, and compared to agriculture's con-
tribution to the national economy. The 10% share of loans allocated by
the Regional Development Board to the agricultural sector in 1948/49 to
1954/55, for example, is disproportionately small when placed alongside
agriculture's contribution of over 70% to Gross Domestic Product during
the same years. Similarly, the amounts actually disbursed as agricultural
credit by the various specialized credit agencies are miniscule when com-
pared with the potential demand for credit from these agencies during the
various years.
This poor performance by the credit agencies with regard to agricul-
ture did not go unnoticed by policy-makers and academics; and the reasons
for it are discussed below. The picture on credit volume, as noted in
Chapter One, has, however, been changing in the 1970s as more credit in
real terms has been made available from government sources. These changes
will be discussed further in the third section of the chapter on present-
day credit policies.
Interest Rates
Interest rates on agricultural loans in the 1950s and 1960s do not
appear to have differed much from what they were in the 1970s. They were
perhaps slightly higher in nominal terms, and certainly in real terms,
considering the lower levels of inflation in the earlier days. There was
a multiple rate structure varying by size and type of loan, as well as by
type of borrower. Direct borrowers from commercial banks enjoyed lower
interest charges than indirect borrowers, say, through cooperatives. This
may have been mainly because of the higher risk of lending to the coopera-
tive society members, and because loans administered through the coopera-
tive movement probably incurred additional charges for cooperative movement
administrative and other costs. Government credit institutions and the
cooperative (turned commercial) banks charged nominal per annum rates of
interest--5 to 10%--for direct loans. Loans to cooperative unions for
onlending to their member societies were charged from 7 to 10% per annum.
The cooperative unions, in turn, lent this money to their member coopera-
tive societies at 12 to 15% per annum, while the societies lent to the
ultimate rural farmer-borrower at 18 to 20%. (CSNRD, 1966) A farmer who
could obtain a loan directly from a government credit institution or a
bank enjoyed much cheaper rates (barring high loan transactions costs)
than through a cooperative society.
The government was concerned, at this time, with maintaining fairly
low rates of interest on agricultural loans as a means of combatting the
'fabled' high moneylender rates in the rural areas.
Problems with Government Credit Institutions
In the section on credit volume above, it was shown that the govern-
ment credit institutions were not very successful in getting agricultural
credit to the farmer. Neither were the commercial banks much interested
in agricultural transactions, other than in very short-term commercial
advances for the purchase of produce. The poor performance of the public
credit institutions was regarded with a sense of failure and frustration
by policy-makers and academics (e.g., see Osuntogun, 1973; Ijose and
Abaelu, 1973). Several reasons were advanced for this poor performance--
the most frequently mentioned having to do with administrative constraints.
The specialized government credit institutions were said to have
failed in adequately performing their duties because of their complicated,
time-consuming procedures for loan approval and disbursement. Often, these
institutions were said to have been overcentralized and lacking in trained
personnel capable of handling the loan approval and disbursement process.
The institutions were also reported to have suffered from political
interference, resulting in bribery, corruption, and, in some cases, mis-
management of loan funds. Financial difficulties were another category
of problems faced by the institutions; most important of these was a
serious loan repayment problem. For example, Teriba (1972) reported that
of a total of N 3,514,406 loaned to the agricultural sector by the West-
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ern Region Finance Corporation from 1956 to 1964, N 2,431,434, or 69%,
was in default in 1964 (p. 168). Osuntogun (1973) notes that only
N 112,396, or 37%, of the N 305,710 loaned out by the Western Nigeria
Agricultural Credit Corporation (WNACC) in 1965 was repaid (p. 5).1
Political patronage and the tendency of some borrowers to regard government
loans as loans from an extended family member (and therefore probably not
to be repaid in a hurry, or at all) have been blamed for the low loan repay-
ment ratios. Poor timing of loan delivery and the consequent redirection
of loans to consumption purposes by borrowers have also been cited as
reasons for defaults.
In addition to the loan repayment problem, some institutions like
the WNACC suffered from high overhead costs as a result of the duplication
of personnel and because of the hiring of staff with no specialized train-
ing for the job.
Other general reasons mentioned as constraints on the performance of
the government specialized credit institutions were the traditional farm-
ing techniques used in Nigerian agriculture, and the communal land tenure
system. The latter, it was said, prevented farmer-borrowers from offering
the land farmed as collateral for loans. Very little attention was given
to the role of product prices in affecting farmers' incentives to invest.
Neither was the effect of low interest rates on the lenders' ability to
meet lending costs adequately considered. It has been mentioned in Chap-
ter One, and it will become clearer in Chapter Four, that these factors
matter if a credit program is to be useful or successful.
IThe authors do not provide an exact definition of "default."
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The disappointment with the performance of the credit institutions
of the 1950s and 1960s led to recommendations that a new nationwide credit
institution, capable of overseeing the distribution of agricultural credit
in the entire country, be created. The Nigerian Agricultural and Coopera-
tive Bank (NACB) was set up in 1973. This institution, along with other
present-day credit and savings institutions in Nigeria, will be described
in section II below. Before doing this, however, it is worthwhile to con-
sider briefly the reasons for the interest in credit and in institution
building for credit during the early (and even later) years of Nigeria's
economic development, as these reasons help to underscore the basis for
the assumptions examined in Chapter Four.
Interest in Credit and the Role of the Informal Sector
Although most Nigerian farmers were not reached by agricultural
credit during the 1930s to the 1960s, there was government interest in
credit for the agricultural sector during that period. There were several
reasons for this.
One reason, apparently, was related to the concern during the colonial
period (before the 1960s) for continued and increased export crop produc-
tion. Underlying the concern for production of export crops was the theme
of the poverty and subsistence level of the Nigerian farmer (e.g., see
the work of Perham et al., 1946), and the possible effects of this on
export crop production. One line of thought on the relationship between
poverty and production of export crops concerned the fact that the Niger-
ian farmer spent an enormous amount of energy on farming food crops, and
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he had little capital to invest in energy-saving equipment or processes
that would leave him more time and energy for export crop production.
Hence, one way to ensure continued and increased production of export
crops was to provide credit to enable the farmer to obtain energy-saving
equipment. According to Forde (1946):
The need for raising the levels of output among the
rural population of northern Nigeria is abundantly
clear. The release of a larger proportion of the
labor effort from food production and an increase
in the output, and value of, marketable crops are
essential for raising levels of consumption through
internal production and exports. The more efficient
production of the subsistence element of household
needs would release energy both for the production
of other goods locally required and for an increased
output of exportable products.
("The Native Economies," p. 170)
Partly because of this line of reasoning, the colonial Agricultural
Department decided to set up, through the Native Authority in the north,
the mixed farming scheme described at the beginning of this chapter. In
this scheme, credit was to be provided for farmers to purchase a pair of
bullocks, a plough, and a cart to enable them to cultivate a larger number
of acres with much less energy expenditure.
A second line of thought on the connection between poverty and
export crop production involved the fear of a high level of indebtedness
of farmers and the possible seizure of their crops by creditors as com-
pensation for loans. Farmers were thought to be very poor, and conse-
quently constantly indebted. Some farmers were known to have pledged
their export crops--particularly cocoa tree crops in the south--as secur-
ity or as interest payments for loans taken from informal sources. Such
pledging was alleged to have a detrimental effect on cocoa production,
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because the creditor who could harvest the trees only until the loans were
paid would have no incentive to make permanent improvements on the farm.
Likewise, the debtor-owner of the farm would have no incentives to under-
take improvements, or even simple weeding, since the creditor would bene-
fit from the undertakings. The idea was that the level of indebtedness
might be such as to cause disincentives to production, and government
credit to the farmers for the relief of their debt burden might be in
order.
Partly to help ascertain this, a large-scale study of the economics
of cocoa farming was ordered for the western region in the mid-1950s.
The study was completed by Galletti et al. in 1954, and one of the major
sections of the study concerned indebtedness. The researchers found that
in June 1951 and 1952, approximately two-thirds of the 615 families inter-
viewed were indebted (p. 496). However, when the burden of debt was com-
pared with the cash value of the farm families' possessions, and to their
cash income, the debt burden appeared moderate. In Galletti's words,
"The situation of the Yoruba cocoa farmers in 1951/52 appears to have been
comfortable in that for most of the families surveyed the total debt out-
standing was only a moderate fraction of a year's cash income and much
less than the liquid resources in hand." (Nigerian Cocoa Farmers, 1956,
p. 513) Galletti, therefore, recommended that debt relief was not neces-
sary. However, some additional credit to cocoa farmers would be in order.
Though Galletti pointed out that farmers were not as badly off as
was generally supposed, more prominence was given in discussions of the
study to his findings on the extensive role played by informal sources
in borrowing and lending activity in rural areas. The major sources of
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loans then (as now--see Chapter Four) were friends, relatives, and neigh-
bors. Other sources were traders, produce buyers, moneylenders, and tem-
porarily withheld payments to farm laborers.
Nigerian policy-makers and academics (after independence in 1960)
seemed to take this large role of the informal sector somewhat adversely.
In particular, the role of the moneylender took on a great significance,
since Galletti had reported that:
Those who took to money-lending as a trade were
apparently not too scrupulous or compassionate.
To make a considerable income from a limited
capital they practised usury and took advantage
of borrowers' necessities. They operated prin-
cipally in towns (where impecunious civil ser-
vants were often in their clutches) but found
many clients among the cocoa farmers of the
villages. (p. 509)
Nominal per annum interest rates by registered moneylenders of 60% for
secured loans, and 150-240% for unsecured loans, were quoted by Galletti
to support the above statement. Nominal rates of up to 300% per annum,
charged by unregistered moneylenders on unsecured loans, were also quoted.
Because of the dramatic nature of the moneylenders' interest charges,
and because of Galletti's feelings that moneylenders were a source of
danger (given their aim of securing borrowers' property after squeezing
them dry with extortionate interest), his other findings on moneylenders
paled into insignificance. He had also noted that moneylenders were not
so numerous, and that they were responsible for only 10-12% of the loans
outstanding among all the survey families in June 1951 and 1952, respec-
tively. He remarked that they faced considerable risk in the business,
particularly if they were unregistered (p. 529).
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Anti-moneylender feelings, and even anti-informal sector feelings
in general, became the second major basis (in addition to the poverty
theme) for advocating government interest and participation in credit
provision for rural farmers. Such feelings had been expressed as far back
as 1938, when the Moneylenders Ordinance was passed. The ordinance
required registration for every moneylender and nominal interest rates of
not more than 18% per annum on secured loans, or 58% on unsecured loans.
The Galletti research project of 1950-1954 and that of Vigo in 1958 in
the north of Nigeria served to rekindle and refuel the anti-moneylender
feelings and stir up the poverty theme. These feelings have persisted
in one form or another until the 1970s and form much of the basis for the
thrust of present Nigerian credit policy.
For example, in his 1972 article on rural credit in Nigeria, Teriba
stressed the role of outside credit in breaking the 'vicious circle' of
low incomes and low productivity existing in rural areas. He also remarked
that credit could serve other purposes, e.g., as a means of bringing about
change in the rural sector. In the same article, he noted correctly that
pegging interest rates below the theoretical equilibrium rate would exag-
gerate the excess of credit demand over supply. However, he later went on
to suggest that cheap credit should be provided to the rural sector by
monetary means (through the Central Bank). This would help change, in his
opinion, the status quo in agriculture. It would induce farmers to borrow
more and invest more.
In a 1973 paper prepared for the AID Spring Review on Small Farmer
Credit, Ijose and Abaelu continued the theme of low income and savings in
the rural areas, and the consequent constraint on agricultural production
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as a result of this. In their words:
Agricultural production is constrained in the western
state by lack of financial capital. Cocoa farmers
need funds to purchase spraying equipment and to pay
for the substantial costs they incur on weeding and
harvesting labor.° Food farmers, also need working
capital to purchase planting seeds and hire labor.
for major seasonal tasks. Because their personal
savings are so limited, farmers commonly borrow to
finance their production and often-times consumption
expenditures.
("Institutional Credit for Smallholder Farmers: A
Case Study of the Western Nigeria Agricultural Credit
Corporation (WNACC)," p. 1)
Osuntogun (1973) carried on the notion of the hard-heartedness and
pervasiveness of moneylenders in the rural areas. According to him:
Merchant-moneylenders constitute the chief source of
rural credit in Nigeria.1 . . . Even though the mer-
chant-moneylenders provide the bulk of the credit needs
of the farmers, yet a number of short-comings charac-
terize their operation. These include the fact that
the terms of the loans are often too hard on the pro-
ducers and consequently result in deleterious effects
on agricultural production and marketing.
("Agricultural Credit Strategies for Nigerian Farmers,"
p. 3)
In the 1979 Seminar on Rural Banking in Nigeria held at Ile-Ife, the
themes of the vicious circle of poverty, the difficulty of obtaining credit
in the rural areas, and the need to introduce credit from outside the rural
IThis remark is not substantiated by the author with any evidence.
It runs contrary to Galletti's findings, which showed neighbors and labor-
ers (withheld wages) as the major source of credit (55%). Moneylenders
were responsible for 12.3% of indebtedness. If the various produce buyers,
wholesale and petty traders are added to this, the total comes to 40.3%,
still less than 55% and certainly not the bulk of credit. Ijose and Abaelu,
in their survey of 612 farmers in 1971, found only 5% of credit obtained
from moneylenders. Similarly, evidence in this study shows very little
actual moneylender influence in rural borrowing among the sample surveyed
(see Chapter Four).
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sector are repeated in paper after paper presented (e.g., see papers by
Awosika and Nwoko, Oyatoye, Ijere, etc.). In addition, these papers also
stress the need to build institutions to mobilize savings in the rural
areas.
It is important to reiterate that these types of analyses of rural
credit by academics and practitioners, coupled with the poor performance
of the agricultural sector described in Chapter One, inform the decisions
of present Nigeria credit policy. This policy attempts to increase the
amount of concessional or low-interest credit going to the agricultural
sector. More recently, the policy has also aimed at increasing the number
of institutions for savings mobilization in the rural areas. The increased
efforts at stimulating savings can be said to be ancillary to the concern
over credit, because the government maintains an interest rate structure
very much in favor of borrowers as opposed to savers.1
The assumptions explicitly set out and examined in Chapter Four as
underlying credit policy are based on the preceding analysis of agricul-
tural credit problems by Nigerian academics, practitioners, and policy-
makers. They are also based on the government's actions in the financial
sector, actions that appear to rely heavily on and reflect the opinions
of the above analysts of the Nigerian rural credit and savings situation.
In the last section of this chapter, the government's actions in
the financial sector with regard to credit policy are discussed. In the
IIndeed, the government appears to have accepted the untested hypoth-
esis put forward by the Committee on the Nigerian Financial System (1976),
that savings are highly interest inelastic. Therefore, extremely high
rates of interest will be needed to induce additional savings, particularly
from small farmers.
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section below, a description is presented of the present apparatus for
the channeling of agricultural credit and the mobilization of savings in
Nigeria.
Formal Institutions Involved in the Distribution
of Credit and Mobilization of Savings
for Nigeria's Rural Areas
The drive in the 1950s and 1960s for building agricultural credit
institutions was discussed above. The disappointment with the performance
of these institutions and the pressure to build new ones were also mentioned.
These pressures, coupled with the continued belief in the need for agricul-
tural credit in the rural areas, have resulted in increased agricultural
credit legislation by the Nigerian Central Bank. They have also resulted
in the formation of the Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB).
The Central Bank and the NACB will be described below. Other insti-
tutions to be described are shown in Chart 3-1. They are the Ministries
of Agriculture and Cooperatives and State agricultural finance agencies,
the cooperative societies, the Federal post office savings bank, the gov-
ernment production companies and commodity boards, and the commercial and
merchant banks. Each description will be intended to explain the institu-
tion's role in the credit distribution system and the type of financial
services it provides for the rural-agricultural sector. Descriptions of
these institutions are necessary because the institutions are an essen-
tial part of the present Nigerian rural savings and credit picture.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of some of the institutions in reach-
ing rural farmers, particularly poorer rural farmers in the villages, is
an important issue explored in Chapter Four.
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The Central Bank
The Central Bank of Nigeria was established only as recently as
1958. It is Nigeria's major financial institution with headquarters in
Lagos and branches throughout the country. It performs typical central
banking functions, such as control of the nation's money supply. The
Central Bank regulates and supervises all formal financial institutions
in the country--both government and private. The regulatory function is
performed, for the private and for the mixed private and government sector,
through the issue of a yearly Monetary Policy Circular. This circular,
issued regularly since 1969/70, describes national monetary policy objec-
tives and issues guidelines on banks' activities in accordance with these
objectives.
The Central Bank does not have direct financial dealings with the
rural-agricultural sector, though it makes marketing credit available to
government commodity boards for purchase and marketing of various crops,
such as cotton and cocoa. The Central Bank does, however, have extensive
influence on the rural sector and on agricultural credit through its
control of the activities of formal financial institutions. For example,
through the Monetary Policy Circular it legislates the interest rates
to be charged on agricultural and other types of credit. It provides
guidelines for yearly maximum expansion of credit in the banking sector
and stipulates the percentage share of credit for each economic sector
and subsector.
Most of the above is done in a bid to help the government's 'pre-
ferred' or 'favored' sectors (such as agriculture, residential construc-
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tion, and export) obtain greater shares of credit on more favorable terms.
Recently, the Central Bank has also stipulated a certain number of bank
branches to be opened by each commercial bank in designated rural areas.
This is expected to bring financial intermediation closer to the rural
people.
The legislative efforts of the Central Bank with respect to the rural
sector will be discussed in greater detail in the section on current credit
policy.
The Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB)
The Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB) was set up as
a result of the frustrations and disappointment with regional and special-
ized credit institutions in the 1950s and 1960s (see section above). It
was built as an apex (that is, the top institution in a hierarchy of agri-
cultural credit institutions) nationwide agricultural credit institution,
and is currently the Federal government's most important channel for agri-
cultural credit in the country. The Bank began operations in April 1973
from its headquarters in Kaduna in the northern agricultural belt. It has
ten offices in various state capitals, and more are planned in the future.
The structural set-up of the NACB permits it only a credit-channeling
function, with technical aid to projects as an ancillary function. The
Federal government sees the Bank as a way of directly aiding agricultural
production and marketing, particularly as carried out by small-scale
farmers. However, though the Bank was set up with a particular bias
towards aiding small-scale farmers, it has no direct individual dealings
with such farmers. It lends credit to this category of farmers through
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a series of 'on-lending' agencies (that is, agencies that channel credit
to the farmers) (see Chart 3-2), which are mostly state ministries of
agriculture and state credit finance agencies. These latter are then
responsible for reaching the farmer through the government-supervised
cooperative societies. Before receiving loans, 'on-lending' agencies
that have dealings with the NACB must provide a guarantee of some sort
that the loan given them will be repaid. The Bank also lends money
directly to larger scale farmers, cooperative societies, or other bodies
who can present it with viable projects and adequate security to cover
their loans. The NACB is not permitted to mobilize deposits from the farm-
ing population it serves or from elsewhere. It is therefore wholly depend-
ent on Federal government and Central Bank financing, and has to compete
with other institutions and sectors for government funds. Such a dependence
on government funds means yearly fluctuations in available finances and
could be problematic if and when the Federal government experiences finan-
cial difficulties.
The NACB, like other financial institutions in the country, is stipu-
lated to charge very low rates on agricultural loans. Its nominal per
annum rate of interest on agricultural production loans is 3-5%, while it
charges 7% for marketing loans. These rates apply to the Bank's direct
borrowers. The small-scale farmers, who receive their loans through on-
lending agencies and cooperative societies, may be subject to higher rates
to be decided by their cooperative societies. Despite the low rates of
interest, the NACB has slightly more flexibility in terms of profit mar-
gins than the commercial banks. This is because it receives its funds
virtually free from government sources.
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The NACB's lending rates prevent it from increasing its volume of
loanable funds through recourse to non-domestic sources. For example,
at a time when government seemed willing for the NACB to seek additional
funds from outside the country--specifically, from the World Bank, the
arrangement proved unworkable, since the World Bank was willing to release
the funds at 8%, while NACB could only lend at 3-5%.1 These interest rates,
coupled with its mandate not to mobilize savings, effectively restricts
the NACB's ability to serve, to its full capacity, the rural-agricultural
sector.
In terms of credit volume, the government has been able to use the
Agricultural Bank fairly successfully to increase its injection of credit
into the agricultural sector. In the 1970-74 plan period, a total of
N 22.7 million, or an average annual rate of N 5.7 million, was assigned
by the governments (Federal and state) to agricultural credit. Within a
comparable period of operations, 1973-78, the NACB approved loans totalling
N 286.3 million, and actually disbursed N 124.4 million (N 24.9 million on
average per annum).2 (NACB,Annual Report, 1977/78, p. 5)
Of the total amount of N 124.4 million disbursed between 1973 and
1978, N 90.3 million, or 72.5%, went to small-scale farmers in on-lending
marketing and production loans. This would appear to be a significant
IPersonal communication from Bank management.
The disbursements were not evenly spread out in practice. For
example, in 1975/76, the Bank disbursed approximately N 20 million. This
amount went up to N 40.5 million in 1976/77, a 100% nominal increase, or
78% increase in real terms. In 1977/78, the amount disbursed was further
raised by N 12 million, to N 52.5 million, giving a smaller nominal
increase of 29.6%, or 5.2% in real terms. (NACB,Annual Report, 1976/77,
p. 7, and 1977/78, p. 5)
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improvement over the performance of the specialized credit agencies in
the 1950s and 1960s. However, if the amount disbursed is viewed with
regard to the potential demand for credit in the country, NACB's achieve-
ments become much less significant. For example, the total amount of
N 90.3 million disbursed to small-scale farmers represents an approximate
amount of N 2.3 per farm family per year. With farm families (really house-
holds) in the survey sample spending an average N 21 per acre farmed in
the study year, the N 2.3 amount becomes fairly insignificant. NACB itself
claimed, in its 1976/77 annual report, to have reached 135,853 farming
families. It was not clear whether this was just for the year in question
or all the years of operation. If the figure is taken to be the number
of farm families reached in 1976/77, then it means that only 1.7% of the
nation's farm families received credit through NACB's on-lending scheme
that year. This, again, could be said to represent a very small number of
farm families.
When the Bank's loan disbursement record, however, is compared with
that of previous government credit agencies, it would seem to have made
tremendous strides. The government expects to continue to use the NACB
as a key institution in its strategy of improvement of agricultural sector
performance through the use of credit. Because the NACB does not deal
directly with rural-based or small farmers, its impact on reaching these
farmers is not directly examined during the testing of the assumption on
the efficacy of the credit distribution system in Chapter Four. The coop-
erative societies and the commercial banks are the institutions looked at
because of their supposed direct contact with rural farmers.
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State Ministries of Agriculture and Cooperatives
and State Finance Agencies
The credit function of the Ministries of Agriculture and the state
finance agencies has been mentioned in connection with the NACB lending
scheme described in Chart 3-2. The ministries, of which there is one at
the Federal level, and one each in the nineteen States of the federation,
have other functions in addition to credit channeling. They carry on agri-
cultural extension work, direct production of various crops, infra-
structure development, livestock, forestry and fisheries projects, among
others.
With regard to the credit function, the ministries can borrow money
from the NACB or from commercial banks to 'on-lend' to small farmers in
their states. The borrowing is often done through the ministry's coopera-
tive division (headed by the Registrar of Cooperatives). The cooperative
division then lends the money to cooperative unions and thence on to farmers
through their cooperative societies. Some states (e.g., Oyo State, Anambra
State) have, in addition to the ministry, a state agricultural finance
agency. In the case where such an agency exists, it handles the financial
side of any loan transactions, while the ministry provides needed technical
and logistical support in the field, in terms of agricultural officers,
extension agents, etc.
In some cases, the state may decide to guarantee bank loans for
cooperative societies, and the banks may then disburse these straightaway
to individual cooperative unions and societies.
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The actual amount of cash credit disbursed by the cooperative divi-
sions of the ministries or the state finance agencies varies yearly and by
state. The amount depends on how much the state has been able to borrow
from the various banks, and on how much supplemental credit it can generate
from its own sources. Most states are usually not able to satisfy the
demand for loans from their cooperative unions and societies. For example,
in Kaduna State, with loan applications totalling approximately N 5 million
from its cooperative societies and unions for the 1978/79 cropping season,
the Ministry of Agriculture found itself able to raise (from outside and
inside sources) and disburse only N 2.7 million for production and market-
ing loans. This left a substantial shortfall of N 2.3 million for that
season.1 As such, many farmers could not obtain loans for that cropping
year, while others received small amounts relative to their requests.
Though the ministries are not always successful in mobilizing and
disbursing the total amount of funds needed by farmers in their states,
they have managed to maintain more of a rural/small farmer bias in their
loan functions than other institutions, e.g., commercial banks.
The ministries have managed to do this through the use of government-
aided, supervised cooperative societies at the village level. Because the
cooperative societies are the formal sector's main institution for contact
with small-scale farmers in the rural areas, they merit separate discussion
as to their organization and influence.
1Personal communications with cooperative officer Mallam Mohammed
Aminu Umar.
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Cooperative Societies
The cooperative movement has been in existence in Nigeria for almost
40 years. During this period, it has been the formal sector's most widely
used means for getting credit into the hands of rural farmers from govern-
ment and other loan institutions. During the period also, it has been the
subject of varying degrees of government attention and interest. Recently,
there has been renewed interest in the activities of cooperative societies
because of the government's desire to use them as vehicles for getting more
credit down to the rural areas. To this end, the Nigerian Agricultural and
Cooperative Bank (NACB), which started out originally as the Nigerian Agri-
cultural Bank (NAB), was renamed to emphasize the government's intended
focus on cooperative societies.
Cooperative societies are important in this study because they are
one of the formal institutions whose credit distribution activities are
investigated in Chapter Four. As such, there will be a somewhat detailed
description of their organization and activities below.
The cooperative movement in Nigeria has been much studied. One of
the most interesting research efforts is that of Roger King on northern
Nigeria cooperatives. Most of the following condensed description of the
movement's organization and structure comes from King's study. (See King,
1975.) Although King's work was confined to one part of the country,
this author's investigations in the north, west, and east of the country
indicate that his description is applicable in general (if not in specific
details) to most cooperative organizations in the country.
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Broadly, the cooperative movement was seen by government as a way of
mobilizing farmers' managerial abilities to help promote government agricul-
tural development policies, given the shortage of personnel capable of
reaching large numbers of geographically dispersed farmers. More specific-
ally, cooperative societies were seen as a means of channeling credit to
the small farmer at lower cost, mobilizing farmer-members' savings as an
additional pool of money from which loans could be drawn for members, mak-
ing available improved farming practices and inputs to small farmers, as
well as collectively marketing farmers' produce. Various kinds of coopera-
tive societies were envisaged and set up: for example, multipurpose soci-
eties dealing with produce marketing, credit allocation, and savings mobili-
zation, consumer products sales to members, etc.; single purpose societies
dealing with one activity or the other; and even lately, some cooperatives
undertaking joint agricultural production. The societies visited during
this research project were mainly concerned with credit allocation and
savings mobilization. The latter are the types of societies of particular
interest in this study.
Any group of ten people over eighteen years of age from an area (e.g.,
a village) can be registered by the State Registrar of Cooperatives as a
primary cooperative society, eligible to receive government loans for mem-
bers and to carry on other cooperative activities such as those mentioned
above. "Membership is voluntary and open to all farmers subject to the
approval of existing members. A condition of membership is purchase of a
minimum number shares in the society. No member can purchase more than
20% of the total share issued." (King, 1975, p. 197) Most farmers appear
to pay on average N 10 to N 12 as deposit or purchase of minimum number
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of shares at initial joining. (This was ascertained during the study sur-
vey process.) A few, desirous of purchasing more shares, pay as much as
N 30 to N 40. In theory, a cooperative member also becomes entitled to
share in any profits arising from the society's activities. A proportion
of such profits must be deposited with the society's 'reserve fund' but
the rest is distributed on the basis of business done (bonus) or shares
held (dividends).
A primary society is usually run by a committee comprising a presi-
dent, secretary, treasurer, and two or three other members. The committee
is elected by the membership. According to observations from various
studies (e.g., King, 1975), village cooperative committee members sometimes
appear to be the more influential members of the village society at large.
At least one member of the committee, the secretary or treasurer, has to
be literate, so as to be able to sign documents on behalf of the society
and record transactions for internal use as well as for the occasional
inspection of visiting cooperative officials. Usually, two or three other
committee members are also literate.
The committee is very active in the sharing out of loan funds, decid-
ing with the membership what criteria are to be used: amount of land avail-
able for farming for that season, ability to repay, past repayment records,
etc. A group of primary societies in one area may join together to form
a secondary society or a union. Such a union may provide its members addi-
tional loan funds, help market their produce, and perform other helpful
functions. Chart 3-3 shows how a cooperative credit society is theoreti-
cally supposed to function and be organized. It is supposed to be able
to generate its own funds internally and add this to credit obtained from
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CHART 3-3
BLUEPRINT FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF COOPERATIVE CREDIT
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outside sources as a pool of loanable funds for its members. In practice,
however, cooperative credit societies really function as depicted in
Chart 3-4, with little attention to their savings mobilization and finan-
cial intermediary roles and with almost total focus on their roles as
disbursers of direct government loans or loans from government guaranteed
sources.
As regards interest rates, variations may exist between rates
charged cooperative societies for their loans and charges ultimately paid
in different states by farmer-members. The cooperative division at ministry
headquarters, or the state credit finance agency, receives state government
guaranteed loans at the prescribed preferential nominal rate of 6% per
annum for production loans. The loans are passed on to the unions at a
higher rate. The unions loan the money to the primary societies at an
even higher rate, and by the time individual farmers get the loans, they
could end up paying considerably more than the original 6% rate of inter-
est. In fact, among the societies surveyed by the author, farmers paid
nominal per annum interest rates ranging from 12 to 20% for their loans.
No real justification has been given by the ministries or unions for the
large difference in interest charges to farmers. Presumably, the differ-
ence goes to cover large loan administrative costs, default risks, and
an inflation element.
There is, again, no real explanation for the variations in interest
charges paid by farmers in different parts of the country. The author
found that while farmers in an eastern village paid 12% per annum nominal
rates for their cooperative loans, those in the west paid 18%, and in the
north 20%. These differences cannot be justified by differing opportunity
CHART 3-4
ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE ACTUAL OPERATION
OF COOPERATIVE CREDIT SOCIETIES
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costs of capital, since all the ministries and state finance institutions
receive their loans at the same preferential rate. Neither can they be
accounted for by different sized loan bureaucracies in the states, because
these states' administrative apparatus is usually at par. Variations in
default risks cannot really be held accountable either, because within a
broad geographical area (north and south), risks due to agricultural condi-
tions and/or cultural attitudes toward loans are broadly similar. A plausi-
ble explanation for the different rates paid by farmers could be differen-
tial demand conditions. That is, in those states where the demand for
loans is relatively high, the ministries and cooperative unions use higher
loan rates as a rationing device to reduce loan demand. Anecdotal informa-
tion from ministry and cooperative union officials in the different states,
however, does not support this view. Given the lack of explanations for
variations in loan rates paid by cooperative members in different states,
there would appear to be much existing horizontal inequity in the rates
charged by the credit distribution system at the rural cooperative level.
With their flexibility in charging members higher rates, it would
be presumed that cooperative societies or unions would individually be
frequently willing to borrow directly from commercial banks and other
sources to augment their loanable funds. This is not the case. Coopera-
tive societies or unions are not usually aggressive in seeking additional
loan funds. They are attuned to waiting for credit to be handed down
from or through the government hierarchy. Furthermore, commercial banks
do not make it especially easy for these societies or unions to borrow
individually, because they (the banks) do not benefit in any way from
the high rates charged members by these societies. The banks can only
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receive the government-mandated rates on agricultural loans, which, for
cooperative societies borrowing directly, varies from a low of 4% per
annum to a high of 6%. Moreover, for the banks, the usual state guarantee
of loan repayment (their hedge against risk) would be missing from such
individual transactions.
How effective has the cooperative movement been in reaching small
farmers with credit and mobilizing savings among its members? Given the
movement's long existence in Nigeria, the results, as elsewhere in the
Third World, are rather disappointing. In 1966, the number of farmer-
members of cooperative societies was estimated at 300,000, or 4 % of the
farm family population (CSNRD, 1966). In 1975, the Federal government
put total membership in all cooperative societies in the country at
450,000, or 6% of the farm family population (Third National Plan, p. 319).
Given that not all members of the societies were rural people, the
6% figure is really an overestimate of rural participation. However, tak-
ing this latter figure as an upper bound, it is clear the movement reaches
few farmers, and has made little progress in increasing its membership
over the years. In fact, an inequity that has thus far gone unrecognized
is built into the virtually static membership situation of the cooperative
societies. Given that membership in cooperative societies does not vary
much from year to year, it means that virtually the same set of farmers
receive government loans in each year they are available. This gives
them an edge over other farmers in the village. Since the cooperative
society members may, on the average, have been the more well off people
in the village to begin with, the inequity in access to credit is further
compounded. This point is further explored in the discussion on the
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efficacy of the credit distribution system in Chapter Four.
Cooperative societies acquired a reputation in the past for default-
ing on loans. This has hurt their image with the commercial banking sys-
tem, and perhaps (along with the fact that they receive preferential rates
on loans) partially accounts for their poor record in raising extra loans
for their members. The default on loans in the past was largely due to
the political patronage and interference in the loan system discussed
earlier in this chapter. Cooperative society members came to believe that
loans received were a form of reward for their support of local politicians,
and they could therefore regard the loans as grants not to be repaid.
Even at that, cooperative societies were often better than other government
organized institutions at loan repayment (e.g., see Osuntogun, 1973, p. 6).
The loan repayment picture of cooperatives has been changing in most
states because there has been no political interference in recent years.
Furthermore, any defaulting society or union is penalized by being given
no government loan the next season in most of the states. Only one of
the four finance agencies/ministries visited during the survey process
for this study mentioned loan repayment problems with cooperative societies
in one part of the state. And this, they acknowledged, was due to the fact
that farmers were having difficulties selling their rice crop, given
increased government imports of superior quality rice.
Cooperative societies have not been very successful in mobilizing
savings. In fact, this function has been neglected, while they have con-
centrated on disbursing government credit. Available statistics on coop-
erative society savings are fragmentary, outdated, and sometimes unclear.
From what can be pieced together (see Table 3-2), accumulated net savings
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TABLE 3-2
ACCUMULATED NET SAVINGS OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES BY STATE, 1970-19751
(FOR ALL TYPES OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES), FOR SELECTED AVAILABLE STATES
(N '000s)
State 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Benue-Plateau 65.1 68.1 Unc. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Kano 90.3 90.3 92.2 93.4 N.A. N.A.
Lagos 308.0 786.8 743.3 2,194.9 2,463.4 N.A.
Bendel N.A. 487.4 613.3 806.7 924.5 528.6
North Central 52.0 101.4 N.A. 159.0 N.A. N.A.
North Eastern -- N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
South Eastern N.A. 1,360.6 892.9 1,889.9 2,035.8 N.A.
Western 9,628.4 10,833.7 3,827.9 3,703.1 N.A. N.A.
Unc. = Unclear
N.A. = Not Available
1975 is the latest year for which the Abstract of Statistics gives
figures.
2Some of the names indicated here for the States have since changed.
See Figure 1-1 for an explanation of current (1979/80) names of States.
SOURCE: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1975, pp. 139-46.
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in many states have either grown slowly or have even declined in both
nominal and real terms over the years. In some states, e.g., in the west,
the cooperative societies appear to have drawn down their deposits without
any replenishment. Societies visited during the survey appeared not to
be mobilizing savings, even though members seemed aware that this was sup-
posed to be one of the societies' functions. No reason was given for this
omission, although plans werebeing proposed for the contribution of small
weekly amounts in the future. The neglect by the cooperative societies of
the savings mobilization function is a serious issue, because it stunts
the growth of the societies themselves through depriving them of possible
additional funds. It deprives farmers who would like a medium for savings
deposit of such a facility, and it paints the cooperative movement (in
the eyes of farmers) as nothing more than a receptacle for government
funds. All three factors obviously detract from the usefulness or attrac-
tiveness of the movement.
Given the difficulties of the cooperative credit and thrift movement
in Nigeria, it is perhaps surprising that the government continues to stress
its importance in its credit schemes. The government presumably continues
to believe in the efficacy of cooperatives in reaching the poorer of the
rural farmers. Whether the movement effectively helps poorer farmers is
a subject to be explored in Chapter Four.
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The Federal Savings Bank
Although the Federal Savings Bank, formally known as the Federal Post
Office Savings Bank, has no credit functions, it is one of the institutions
the government relies on to provide financial services to the rural-
agricultural population. Its major mandate since its establishment in 1923
has been to mobilize small savings in both rural and urban areas. It oper-
ates out of 600 post offices and postal agencies throughout the country
and has state offices in five locations. It is obviously not a new insti-
tution like the Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, but like the
cooperative movement, it has recently been in the limelight due to the
government's desire to improve credit and savings facilities for the rural-
agricultural population.
As a financial institution geared toward small savers, the Federal
Savings Bank (FSB) seemed ideal for providing the type of savings facili-
ties needed by small-scale farmers. For one thing, it started with a sen-
sible policy of allowing savers to open accounts with a very small minimum
deposit of 10 Kobo (N 0.1). Secondly, it would pay savers a 5% nominal
rate of interest, which, though low, was (prior to 1978/79) 1% more than
the rate allowed other savings institutions, such as commercial banks.
(The rates are now, as of the 1978/79 fiscal year, equalized.) In spite
of these measures, the Bank has proved relatively unpopular over the years,
as can be seen by the overall decline in its deposits from 1964 to 1975
(Table 3-3)--at a time when deposits in other institutions were growing
in real terms. These deposits have picked up recently. However, a few
more years of data are needed in order to ascertain whether the increased
TABLE 3-3
VOLUME AND REAL GROWTH RATES OF DEPOSITS IN THE FEDERAL
COMPARED TO COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1964-1977
SAVINGS BANK
Year
1964
1968
1969 (December)
1970 (December)
1971 (December)
1972 (December)
1973 (December)
1974
1975
1976
1977
(December)
(December)
(December)
(December)
Deposits
in Federal
Savings Bank
(N million)
5.9
4.9
5.1
4.9
4.6
4.3
4.5
4.7
8.02
6.92
8.02
Deposits
(Time and
Savings) in
Commerical Banks
(N million)
102.0
183.6
215.4
336.7
371.8
456.9
582.3
973.2
1,572.4
1,979.2
2,225.1
Real Growth
Rate of
Deposits
Federal Savings
Bank (%)
- 7.4
-16.9
-23.4
- 7.6
+ 0.5
- 9.9
+39.1
-36.0
+ 6.1
Real Growth
Rate of
Deposits
Commercial Banks
(z)
+ 7.1
+42.5
- 5.7
+20.3
+21.8
+54.6
+27.9
+ 3.8
-17.6
1The growth rates were calculated using the International Monetary Fund
Financial Statistics Consumer Price Index, with 1975 = 100.
(IMF) International
2It has not been possible to find out exactly what accounted for these large fluctuations in
the deposits in the years 1974-1977. However, Ijere (1979, p. 35) notes that the transfer of
deposit accounts of local government bodies to indigenous banks, the deterioration in export earn-
ings, and the legal limitation on withdrawals from the FSB to only N 10,000 may have accounted for
some fluctuations.
SOURCES: Report of the Committee on the Nigerian Financial System, 1976, p. 41; Central Bank
of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, December 1977, p. 40.
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growth in deposits is a permanent phenomenon.
There are several reasons for the FSB's relative unpopularity.
First, in many rural areas it takes several days for a depositor to be
able to make a withdrawal from his/her account. Many times, customers
in the villages have been told to wait for clearance and delivery of money
from the nearest state headquarters. This has happened for sums of money
sometimes as little as N 25. Such waiting periods have been known to last
from 3-5 days. For a small rural farmer urgently in need of money, such
procedures mean not only great inconvenience, but, in fact, arouse suspi-
cions as to the money's safety.
Second, the FSB does not grant any loans. This makes it less
attractive than many rural informal savings and credit institutions, most
of which perform both functions. Ojo (1976) has noted that in extending
banking facilities to non-urban areas:
& . . it is not sufficient to offer savings facilities
alone. Credit facilities are also necessary in order
1) to make people utilize the banking facilities and
make savings more effective and 2) to increase the pro-
ductive capacity in the areas, as well as the savings
capacity of the people, and banking business itself.
(The Nigerian Financial System, p. 32)
Ijere (1979) has further remarked that without the credit function, the
FSB just serves to draw away the pool of savings from rural areas. Such
savings may be invested in safe government bonds or treasury bills. How-
ever, rural people may not obtain additional benefits from the extra money
in government hands. The government Committee on the Nigerian Financial
System (1976) recommended, after its inquiries (and the government
accepted the recommendation), that the FSB not disburse credit, because
this would mean competition with the commercial banks. Given that the
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FSB has an edge over commercial banks in reaching more rural areas, such
a policy appears contradictory to the government's aim of increasing the
amount of credit available to the rural-agricultural sector.
Third, though the FSB has 600 branches and reaches many more rural
areas than the commercial banks, its branch network, with a ratio of only
one facility per 133,333 people, is still small. Many rural communities
are left unserved. A case in point is Nomeh, one of the survey villages.
With its enterprising population of rice growers and traders, Nomeh has
no post office savings facilities, and the FSB obviously loses the many
possible deposits that could have been made in the area.
The Committee on the Nigerian Financial System recommended that the
FSB, whenever possible, hire its own personnel (instead of using post
office workers) and aim to acquire an image distinct from that of the
post office. This would help speed up transactions. While the recommen-
dation is sound, more reform is needed to make the FSB attractive and
thereby tap its full intermediary potential at the same time.
Commodity Boards and Government Production Companies
Commodity boards and production companies are not actual financial
institutions in the sense that they channel no credit and mobilize no
savings among the rural population. They are worth mentioning only for
the fact that they constitute one further means through which government
directs money into the agricultural sector. Direct government production
companies employing wage laborers are as yet new and few in number, so
that their impact on the rural farm population cannot as yet be judged.
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However, such companies do divert funds away from the small farmer to the
government, and government companies may not necessarily be more productive
in the sense of obtaining more yield per acre.
Commodity boards replaced the old marketing boards. They deal with
the purchase and marketing of crops--especially export crops such as cocoa
and cotton. They receive direct Central Bank loans for their operations,
and their revenues go directly to the government. Sometimes, the commodity
boards employ cooperative unions and individuals to act as their Licensed
Buying Agents (LBAs) for their operations. These agents are essentially
middlemen buying from the farmer and making the produce available to the
commodity boards. Some of the individual agents--themselves wealthy
farmer-traders from the villages--have been known to advance loans to far-
mers for the planting season against a promise by the farmer to repay in
kind with his produce delivered to the LBA. Farmers are often said to
lose in such arrangements, since, by repaying in kind, they may obscure
their payment of very high real rates of interest for the loan. Two LBAs
were encountered during the course of the survey for the present study.
Unfortunately, none of the farmers surveyed claimed to have received a
loan from an LBA during the 1978/79 cropping season. (This may be because
the loans from LBAs may also have been classified by the farmers inter-
viewed as loans from friends.) As such, it was not possible within the
scope of the survey to determine the extent of their influence on the
credit situation of the rural farming population.
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Commercial Banks
Next to the Central Bank, Nigerian commercial banks perhaps constitute
the second most important set of institutions in the country's financial
sector. They command over 80% of the consolidated assets of that sector.
Three of these banks (First Bank, Union Bank, and United Bank for Africa,
Ltd. [UBA]) together form a very powerful bloc, accounting in 1976 for 65%
of all commercial bank loans and advances, 69% of all deposit liabilities,
and 80% of the banking system's reserves. (Report of the Committee on the
Nigerian Financial System, 1976, p. 16) As of December 1977, there were
nineteen commercial banks in Nigeria, with a total branch network of 492
branches. (Central Bank,Annual Report, 1977) This network is expected to
increase to almost 600 by 1980, since the Central Bank has mandated the
opening of 195 new branches in rural areas by that date.
Commercial banks in Nigeria have been traditionally known to show
less interest in the financing of the agricultural sector than in that of
various other sectors, such as manufacturing, trade and construction, per-
sonal and professional loans. Therefore, though the absolute amount of
loans and advances to the agricultural sector has been increasing substan-
tially in real terms over the years (see Table 3-4), the government has
been concerned with the poor relative performance of agriculture's loan
share. This poor performance is visible when that loan share is compared
to the share of other sectors, and when it is compared to the government's
stipulated loan ratio for the agricultural sector.
Loans to the agricultural sector from all commercial banks rose (in
1966 prices) from N 29 million in 1966 to N 359.5 million in 1977 (see
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TABLE 3-4
COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS AND ADVANCES TO THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
IN 1966 'CONSTANT NAIRA 1966-1977'
Value of Loans
Value of Total & Advances to the Agricultural Loans
Loans & Advances Agricultural Sector as Percent of
Year (N '000s) (N '000s) Total Loans
1966 1,541,352 29,012 1.9
1967 2,864,344 47,371 1.7
1968 2,752,040 43,821 1.6
1969 2,327,240 41,644 1.8
1970 2,649,255 57,052 2.2
1971 3,769,905 86,511 2.3
1972 4,547,298 105,920 2.3
1973 5,080,306 152,800 3.0
1974 5,756,047 179,769 3.1
1975 5,791,219 160,831 2.8
1976 8,346,609 275,663 3.3
1977 9,177,188 359,504 3.9
SOURCE: Constructed from data given in Osuntogun, "Commerical Banks
and the Financing of the Nigerian Agricultural Sector: An Analytical Over-
view," 1979, p. 7.
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Table 3-4). This amounted to an average annual increase of 28.6%. This
growth rate for agricultural loans was somewhat higher than the 20.3%
figure for total loans and advances over the same period. The total value
of agricultural loans from commercial banks during various years has been
higher than the value of government agricultural credit during those years.
For example, the government budgeted approximately N 23 million for agricul-
tural credit for the 1970-74 plan period. The total amount of agricultural
credit going to the agricultural sector from commercial banks in 1970 alone
was N 57 million. This makes the commercial banking sector an extremely
important source of finance for the agricultural sector. However, several
problems exist with this seemingly impressive performance of the commercial
banking sector.
First, as was remarked earlier in the chapter, the bulk of the com-
mercial banks' loans have gone to government agencies or large marketing
companies for the very short-term marketing of export produce. While the
marketing function in the agricultural sector is important and cannot be
ignored, the commercial banks have tended to over-concentrate in this
relatively safe lending area, to the detriment of loans for agricultural
production.
Moreover, from anecdotal information obtained during the survey, it
appears that the remainder of the loans that have not gone for marketing
have mostly been given for ancillary agricultural activities, such as
food processing, import of food items, agricultural transportation, etc.
All of these have been classified as agricultural loans, with the result
that the banks' lending picture with regard to that sector is made to
look better for government inspection purposes. As the Committee on the
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Nigerian Financial System (1976) noted, classification of loans according
to sectors is at the discretion of the bank managers. They can, therefore,
reclassify loans that might otherwise seem to belong to other sectors
into agriculture to make their loan percentage to the agricultural sector
appear greater. In this process, agricultural production, for which the
government is primarily interested in getting commercial bank support,
suffers. The banks make it seem as if great efforts are being made on
their part to obey the letter of the government's laws to help agricultural
production, while in actual fact it is not clear that they are fully observ-
ing the intent of these laws. The effects of these commercial banks'
actions on rural, small-scale farmers is one of the issues examined in
Chapter Four.
Another problem with the performance of the commercial banking sector
is that, even though the absolute value of loans going to the agricultural
sector has increased, that sector's relative share of loans remains fairly
low. This is visible in Table 3-4, where the share of agricultural loans
as a percent of the total has moved gradually from 1.7% in 1966 to a still
low level of 3.9% in 1977. In no year since the government established
lending quotas for agricultural loans, have the banks met the required
minimum quota for agriculture. For example, the prescribed minimum quota
for agricultural loans from 1972 to 1974 was 4%. The banks lent between
2.3 to 3.1% of their funds to agriculture. In 1975, the prescribed mini-
mum figure increased to 6%. The banks have still not met that minimum,
even though their performance in this regard has been improving. The
improvement has been due to stricter Central Bank surveillance and to the
enforcement of penalties for non-compliance.
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At the same time that the commercial banks have underperformed in
meeting the lending requirements for agriculture, they have in most years
overperformed in other sectors bearing higher interest charges, such as
Miscellaneous loans. In 1972/73-1974/75, for example, when the Central
Bank prescribed ratio of loans for this latter subsector was 3%, 6.7% of
all commercial bank loans went, in fact, to the Miscellaneous subsector.
(Committee on the Nigerian Financial System, p. 29) It would therefore
seem that funds which could have gone to the agricultural sector may have
been diverted to other sectors.
Apart from their relative performance with regard to loan volume,
the commercial banks' disinterest in the rural-agricultural sector is
often illustrated by the lopsided spatial distribution of their branch
network. In 1976, over 54% of all commercial bank branches were to be
found in Lagos and the State capitals. These cities contained, at the
time, less than 20% of the country's population. Furthermore, while metro-
politan Lagos had a ratio of 1,800 people per bank, rural Gongola State
had a ratio of as much as 400,000 people per bank (Ijere, 1979, p. 14).
Such scanty networking in the rural areas has partly been responsible for
poor commercial bank services in terms of credit disbursement and savings
mobilization in these areas. The Central Bank has recently resorted to
legislation to force the banks to set up branches in designated rural
areas. It has also set up the Agricultural Credit Guarantee scheme (to
be described later in the chapter) to help persuade the banks to lend
more to the agricultural (particularly small-scale production) sector.
What accounts for the commercial banks' reluctant attitudes toward
the rural-agricultural sector? Part of the explanation lies in the com-
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mercial banking sector's traditional methods of operation. Commercial
banks insist on some kind of collateral or security for their loans, and
the majority of Nigeria's rural dwellers do not possess the type of col-
lateral (real estate, insurance policies, etc.) that would be attractive
to the banks. Furthermore, the bulk of the banks' deposits are short-
term, and they are reluctant to tie up these funds in agricultural projects
which may be fairly long-term.
The historical domination of the banks by foreign 'metropolitan'
interests may also be partially responsible for some of the banks' atti-
tudes, due to their focus on loans for export-import trade. However, the
major explanation offered in this study has to do with the margin of
profitability with which the banks operate in the agricultural sector.
This is a key issue explored in the next chapter.
Merchant Banks
Merchant banks are financial institutions whose main functions com-
prise wholesale banking, medium- and long-term financing, equipment leas-
ing, debt factoring, investment management, issue and acceptance of bills,
and management of Unit Trusts. (Committee on the Nigerian Financial Sys-
tem, p. 36) As such, their clientele is almost exclusively corporate.
There are currently six such banks in Nigeria, and they constitute a rela-
tively new phenomenon--the majority of them having started operations in
1975. Given the above background (clientele, functions, and relative new-
ness), it is difficult to see this category of banks as an integral part
of the credit distribution system to the rural-agricultural sector.
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Nevertheless, the government expects the merchant banks to play a role
in the channeling of credit to the rural sector. Like the commercial
banks, the merchant banks have been asked to assign a certain percentage
(currently 5%) of their total loans and advances to agriculture. The
banks are even expected to participate in the Agricultural Credit Guaran-
tee Scheme, which seeks to make government-guaranteed loans available to
the small farmer.
Merchant banks are also subject to the low government-imposed inter-
est rates of 4-6% per annum on agricultural loans. Perhaps the government
hopes that the merchant banks will assign some of their medium- and long-
term financing to the agricultural sector, which is sorely lacking in this
type of financing. If this is the case, then such hopes may not material-
ize, since by 1975, over 80% of merchant banks' loans and advances were
due to mature in one year. (The reason for this has been given to be the
short-term nature of their deposits.) It may be that some of the remain-
ing 20% for medium-term loans went to agriculture. However, not much can
be said about this, since there are no figures available on loan maturity
by sector.
What can be said, however, is that so far the merchant banks are
underperforming, like the commercial banks, in meeting the Central Bank's
prescribed ratio for agricultural loans. They are doing this for much
the same reasons as the commercial banks, i.e., greater attractiveness/
profitability of other sectors compared to agriculture. In 1976, they
allocated 1.7% of their loans to agriculture, compared with the then
prescribed ratio of 6%. In 1977 this went up to 2.9%, a much better per-
formance. However, considering the misgivings expressed by officials of
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three merchant banks visited during this study's survey process about
lending to agriculture (partly as a result of lack of familiarity with
that sector), not much should be expected from these institutions in the
future in terms of agricultural lending. The question also arises as to
whether these banks can really be expected to participate fruitfully in
agriculture as it now exists in Nigeria, given their structure and pri-
mary functions.
Other Institutions
Another set of institutions in the formal sector which might be
channeling credit to the agricultural sector in the country is the insur-
ance companies. This would appear to be the case from directives in the
latest (1979/80) Central Bank Monetary Policy Circular, requiring insurance
companies to report their lending activities to all sectors, including
agriculture. This same circular makes these companies subject to almost
the same lending rates as the commercial and merchant banks. At this
point in time, very little can be said about insurance companies' dealings
with the agricultural sector because there is virtually no information
available on the subject. Perhaps, as reports are forwarded to the Central
Bank in the future, more can be said about this possible source of finance
for the agricultural sector.
An effort has been made in the previous sections to describe the
current important financial institutions that make up Nigeria's credit
distribution and savings mobilization system. Most of government legis-
lation directed at agricultural credit is made with the performance of
142
these institutions in mind. As such, the institutions play a key role
in agricultural credit policy, underscored by their mandate to carry out
government instructions. In the next and final section, the essential
pieces of agricultural credit legislation and other aspects of current
government credit policy are discussed.
Essential Elements of Present Nigerian Credit Policy
In section I of this chapter, a description was given of past attempts
to inject credit into the agricultural sector through a variety of govern-
ment institutions. It was noted that these attempts did not really consti-
tute a credit policy, since the attempts were fragmented and regionalized
and since there was no clear nationwide perception by the government of
the role it wanted agricultural credit to play. Moreover, there were only
relatively weak attempts made during the period of the 1930s to the 1960s
to involve commercial banks consistently in the channeling of credit to
the agricultural sector.
The picture with regard to the emergence of an overall credit policy
began to change in the 1970s as agricultural sector performance started
to decline. The government began to speak more consistently of agricul-
tural credit as one of the important means of turning agricultural sector
performance around. This perception was bolstered by the feelings, dis-
cussed earlier in the chapter, that lack of credit was an important con-
straint on rural farmers' productivity, and that needed credit could only
be obtained at prohibitive costs in the rural areas. To this end, the
government set up in 1973 a national agricultural bank, the NACB, to
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distribute credit nationwide. The government also increased in real terms
its volume of credit to the agricultural sector. This was done generally
through the agricultural bank.
More importantly, the government undertook a series of legislative
actions designed to improve commercial banks' credit performance in the
agricultural sector. All these policies were consistently directed at
increasing the volume of credit going to the agricultural sector, particu-
larly to small-scale rural farmers. The government saw the use of credit
as a means of improving agricultural sector productivity, the surplus mar-
keted, and the incomes of the rural-agricultural population. As of 1979,
the government also began to pay increased attention to the issue of sav-
ings mobilization in the rural sector. The government's nationwide drive
with regard to credit in the 1970s, unlike that of the 1950s and 1960s,
presents a clear overall picture concerning its intent in the agricultural
credit sector--a picture that can be more formally described as a credit
policy.
The three major elements of this policy are the government-supplied
increase in the volume of credit to the agricultural sector, institution
building, and legislation related to the banking sector of the economy.
These three elements will be described below.
Government Credit to the Agricultural Sector
An indication of the amount of government credit to the agricultural
sector can be obtained through the various development plans and other
government documents, as well as through research papers analyzing govern-
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ment performance in the agricultural sector. From the various sources,
it appears (as noted in section I of this chapter) that from 1962/63 to
1966/67, N 3.3 million, or 4% of the estimated N 83.9 million government
capital expenditure for agriculture, was directed to credit. In 1970-74,
the amount allocated to credit was N 22.7 million, or approximately 6.8%
of the planned capital allocations for agriculture during that period.
Allocations for agricultural credit during the 1975-80 plan period
rose to N 184.6 million, or 8.4% of planned agricultural capital expendi-
tures. (Third National Development Plan, 1975, Vol. 1; Essang and
Olayide, 1975, p. 251; Awosika and Nwoko, 1979, p. 7) In 1970 prices,
therefore, the increase in government allocations to credit between the
last two plan periods represented a 330% increase. Most of the credit
(N 150 million, or 81% of the total) allocated for the 1975-80 period
was to be disbursed through the Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank
(NACB). 2
1This figure represents allocations by the Federal and State govern-
ments. While the Federal government makes its allocation of N 150 million
clear, the State governments sometimes lump their credit allocations
together with those for other farm inputs. It is, therefore, very diffi-
cult to decipher the amounts to be spent by these States. Through a
detailed analysis of the plan, Essang and Olayide (1975) arrived at the
N 184.6 million figure above. Awosika and Nwoko (1979) report a figure
of N 165 million.
A further point to note about the figures is that planned alloca-
tions for a period may not equal the actual amount of expenditures at the
end of the period.
It should be noted that the figures for agricultural credit under-
state the total volume of finances going into the agricultural sector.
For example, government production companies and agencies (described at
the end of section II above) undertake direct production of food crops
and livestock, and their activities are financed by the Federal and the
various State governments. For the livestock sector alone, the govern-
ment allocated, during the 1975-80 plan period, a total of N 344 million,
the bulk of this to be spent on government ranches and other direct gov-
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The planned government credit allocation of N 184.6 million during
the 1975-80 period may be small when compared with the potential demand
for credit in the country, and when viewed alongside amounts disbursed
in other much smaller developing countries. However, it becomes signifi-
cant when considered in terms of relative increases over past periods.
It signifies the government's determination to use credit as an important
tool in the solution of the agricultural sector's problems. The increased
allocation to credit underscores the need to examine, as is being done in
this study, the fundamental bases for such allocations before they become
of greater significance in credit policy in the future.
Government Legislation of Banking Sector Activity
An even more important element of credit policy than direct govern-
ment allocations of credit is the government's regulation of banking sector
activity with regard to agricultural credit. This regulation, which began
seriously only in the early 1970s, is one of the prime responsibilities of
the Central Bank. It is mostly achieved through the annual publication of
a Monetary Policy Circular, designed to steer the activities of commercial
ernment livestock projects. In addition, fertilizers and seeds are pro-
vided at subsidized rates to rural farmers so that when these projects are
taken as a whole, the government's total impact on finances is much more
than would be presumed from the agricultural credit figures above.
1For example, in the Dominican Republic, with a population of about
5 million, over $140 million (N 83 million) was disbursed as agricultural
credit in one year (1976/77) (Adams, 1978, p. 15). This can be compared
with the planned average annual figure of N 37 million for Nigeria over
the five-year period, 1975-80.
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and merchant banks (and recently, insurance companies) in the direction of
government monetary and financial policy objectives, including increased
agricultural credit. The Circular contains some major regulations and
guidelines that can be regarded as constituting a part of government's
policy toward agricultural credit. These are the sectoral guidelines on
credit, the guidelines on rates of interest chargeable on agriculture and
other sectors, and credit ceilings on the Bank's aggregate expansion of
credit.
Sectoral Credit Guidelines
The sectoral credit guidelines stipulate the percentage of total bank
loans and advances to go to agriculture and other sectors. The prescribed
ratios for sectors are revised periodically in line with government's pri-
orities. Table 3-5 shows the prescribed ratios for commercial banks from
1972 through 1980. Ratios for merchant banks are broadly similar. The
prescribed ratio for agriculture was 4% of each bank's total loans and
advances from 1972 to 1975. It was revised upwards to 6% in 1976 and has
remained at that figure to date. This ratio for agriculture is a minimum
ratio, as are those for other sectors and subsectors that the government
terms 'preferred' in any given year. This means that these sectors are
the priority sectors for that year. Agriculture has consistently been one
of the preferred subsectors. Others for 1979/80 are the production sec-
tor, with all its subsectors, the services sector, and the export subsector.
For the 'less-preferred' sectors and subsectors, such as general commerce
and others, the prescribed ratios are maxima.
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TABLE 3-5
CENTRAL BANK PRESCRIBED RATIOS FOR COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS AND ADVANCES
Sectors & Subsectors 1972/73-1974/75 1976 1977/78 1979/80
PRODUCTION
Agriculture, forestry,
fishing
Manufacturing
Mining & Quarrying
Real Estate Construction
SERVICES
Public Utilities
Transportation &
Communication
GENERAL COMMERCE
Bills Discounted
Domestic Trade
Exports
Imports
OTHERS
Credit & Financial
Institutions
Governments
Personal & Professional
Miscellaneous
TOTAL:
48.045.0
4.0
30.0
4.0
7.0
11.0
3.0
8.0
6.0
30.0
2.0
10.0
10.0
2.0
8.0
32.0
2.0
12.0
8.0
10.0
10.0
3.0
32.0
2.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
12.0
1.0
2.0
6.0
3.0
100.0
2.0
4.0
1.0
48.0
6.0
30.0
2.0
10.0
10.0
2.0
8.0
30.0
2.0
12.0
6.0
10.0
12.0
3.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
100.0 100.0
SOURCES: Report of the Committee on the Nigerian Financial System,
1976, p. 29; Central Bank of Nigeria, Developments in the Economy During
the First Half of 1978, p. 55; Central Bank, Monetary Policy Circular,
1979/80, p. 4.
53.0
6.0
36.0
2.0
9.0
11.0
2.0
9.0
24.0
2.0
11.0
5.0
6.0
12.0
3.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
100.0
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As is obvious from the above, the ratios are designed to influence
(reduce or increase) the amount of credit going to different sectors.
Commercial banks have never strictly obeyed the ratios for every sector.
In the case of agriculture, the banks have not in any one year met the
minimum requirement (see the description of commercial bank activities
in section II above), though their performance has improved in the past
couple of years. This improvement is due partly to the imposition and
enforcement by the Central Bank of penalties for non-compliance with the
minimum ratios in the case of agriculture and residential construction.
Since the banks have to send monthly statements on their ratios
(and other activities) to the Central Bank, any bank not complying in the
case of the two subsectors mentioned above has to deposit the shortfall
at no interest with the Central Bank. In the case of agriculture, the
Central Bank then passes the funds to the NACB for use. Furthermore, the
refund of the credit to the defaulting bank may not be automatic, even if
they meet the required ratio in the future.
It is not exactly clear how the Central Bank decides on the percent-
age shares of each sector. Government priorities, of course, play a part;
but the other factors taken into account to determine specific ratios are
not clear. However, it seems that the opinions of banking sector leaders
as to how much credit they feel a sector can absorb probably plays a
large part.
In the case of agriculture, such opinions may work to keep the
ratio down below what it might be, given the interest rate disincentives
to agricultural lending. That is, banking sector leaders may (because of
the relative unprofitability of agricultural lending) downplay the propor-
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tion of total credit which they feel the agricultural sector can absorb.
Credit Ceilings
Ceilings on the expansion of aggregate credit by the banking sector
represent more of a monetary policy tool to help curb inflation. However,
the policy on ceilings is worth mentioning for the fact that the agricul-
tural sector (along with residential construction) is excluded from the
ceilings on the expansion of credit. So, for example, in the 1979/80
Monetary Policy Circular, banks were told not to expand their aggregate
credit to the economy for the fiscal year beyond an extra 30% (for large
banks) and 40% for small ones. However, any loans granted to the agricul-
tural sector above the government's prescribed minimum ratio were to be
excluded from this policy. So were loans for residential construction,
purchase of shares of foreign companies by Nigerians, and loans for buying
motorcars by workers in the public and private sectors. The exclusion of
agricultural and other types of loans indicates the government's desire
to encourage credit expansion to those activities.
Interest Rate Structure
The Central Bank's prescription of interest rates chargeable on
various loans represents one of the single most important aspects of
credit policy. Its importance has been continually brought out in every
chapter of this study, because of its influence on banks' activities in
agricultural credit and also because of its possible influence on the
desire to save for current and potential savers. Interest rate policy,
unlike the other policies above, was designpd explicitly with the bor-
rower in mind. The policy is aimed at helping the rural-agricultural
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sector by favoring the borrower (who is charged low rates) over the
lender. One question asked in Chapter Four of this study is whether the
policy really helps the small rural borrower (whom the government has in
mind), or in fact favors other types of borrowers.
There is a multiple rate structure in the agricultural sector with
varying rates, depending on the type of agricultural activity, the type
of borrower, and the type of financial institution. This interest rate
structure is set out in Table 3-6, along with the rates payable on savings.
Nominal rates are shown in the table. These nominal rates can be converted
to approximate real rates by deflating the figures by the annual rate of
inflation in the year of interest (1978). Deflating the figures by the
IMF International Financial Statistics inflation rate of 24% for 1978, or
by the Nigerian Federal Office of Statistics rate of 16.6% for the same
year, results in highly negative (as conventionally defined by economists)
real rates of interest on loans and on savings. For example, if the 6%
nominal per annum rate of interest paid by direct borrowers for agricul-
tural production loans is deflated by the above inflation rates, negative
real rates of interest of -18% (for the IMF figure) and -10.6% (for the
Federal Office of Statistics inflation figure) are obtained. This means
that, in this case, the interest rate paid banks by borrowers lies far
below the rate of inflation. Banks, however, also get to pay highly nega-
1Note that this conventional definition by economists of negative
real rates of interest does not really consider the issue of alternative
returns to capital for lenders, for example. Lenders could be happy to
lend at negative real rates of interest if alternative uses of their
capital would result in lower returns than could be earned through lend-
ing.
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TABLE 3-6
INTEREST RATES CHARGEABLE ON AGRICULTURAL LOANS
AND PAYABLE ON SAVINGS DEPOSITS (1978/79)
Nominal Per Annum1
Type of Institution, Loan, and Borrower Rate (%)
1) Commercial & Merchant Banks
A. Loans
Agricultural Production Loans (Direct Borrowers) 6
Agricultural Production Loans through the
Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme2  6
(Direct Borrowers)
Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme
Production Loans (Farmers' Groups or 4
Cooperative Societies)
Other types of agricultural loans 9 (maximum rate)
Agricultural Production Loans taken out by 12 to 20
Rural Farmers from their Cooperative Societies
B. Savings
Savings Deposits (minimum rate) 5
Deposits with 7 days notice 4
Time Deposits (1 month to 12 months) 4.5 to 5.5
2) Nigerian Agricultural Bank
Agricultural Production Loans (Direct Borrowers) 3 to 5
Marketing 7 to 9
3) Insurance Companies
Agricultural Production Loans 6
Other types of agriculture 7 to 9
4) Interest charges on other 'less-preferred' 7 to 11
sectors, e.g., General Commerce
1It was not possible to elicit the specific method by which the Central
Bank arrives at the rates for each sector. However, interest rates are tied
to the Central Bank's minimum rediscount rate. When this rate moves up or
down (in response to monetary policy objectives), most other rates in the
economy move with it. The minimum rediscount rate set in 1978/79 is 5%.
2The Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme is a special credit scheme
for agricultural production set up by the government through commercial and
merchant banks. It is described further on in the chapter.
SOURCES: Central Bank of Nigeria, Developments in the Nigerian Economy
During the First Half of 1978, p. 42; field surveys.
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tive real rates on savings deposits, so that the only issue with regard
to the profitability of their operations becomes the margin of difference
between the two sets of rates.
One noticeable point about the interest rate structure is the vari-
ation that exists between the rates direct borrowers pay and those paid by
farmers receiving loans through the cooperative societies. While direct
borrowers (those who can obtain the loan directly from the banks them-
selves) and cooperative societies enjoy very low rates (as was noted ear-
lier for the 1950s and 1960s), farmers who receive their loans from the
cooperative societies pay much higher rates. Though the high rates of the
cooperative societies can be justified by the higher risk (because of no
collateral requirements), etc. of loans to these rural farmers, the system
of differential rates between direct and indirect borrowers may result in
some horizontal inequities. This is because a farmer--small or large--
who can obtain a loan directly from a bank (barring high loan transactions
costs) enjoys a much higher subsidy on his loan than an equivalent farmer
who receives the same loan amount through a cooperative society. Given
that larger or wealthier farmers (who may not necessarily be better risks)
are likely to have more direct access to the banks, the system may also
result in some vertical inequities.
A third point about the interest rate structure is that rates charge-
able on non-agricultural 'less-preferred' sector loans are higher than on
agricultural loans and more favorable to the commercial banks. They will,
therefore, be inclined to try and lend more to these sectors. Some poten-
tial agricultural loans might get diverted to these sectors in this way.
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As well as stipulating the interest rates banks can charge on loans,
the Central Bank also stipulates the method for calculating these rates.
According to the Monetary Policy Circular for 1977/78, only the reducing
balance method can be used to calculate interest charges on loans payable
by installments. Any other method, such as the straight-line '2 (discount
or simple interest) method, is disallowed because it results in higher
rates than the mandated ones. This additional regulation came about
because some banks had contravened the interest rate ceilings by using
various methods of interest rate calculation that resulted in higher effec-
tive rates than the Central Bank's prescribed ones.
Finally, as touched upon at the beginning of this section, attention
should be drawn to the minimum rates on savings, which, because of the low
IIn the reducing balance method, banks would subtract previously
repaid amounts from the loan principal before calculating the amount payable
as interest for a given year. This would not be the case with the straight-
line method, where the amount of interest would be calculated on the full
loan principal each year, without regard to amounts already repaid. Both
methods may apply the same nominal rate of interest (e.g., 10% per annum)
on a loan that is repaid in installments. But, given a loan period of,
say, five years, the reducing balance method would result in lower effec-
tive interest charges than the straight-line method, because the nominal
rate of interest would have been applied to successively reduced principal
loan amounts each year.
Note that the nominal rate of interest agreed upon by a borrower on
a loan may differ from the rate the borrower effectively pays, because of
different methods of loan repayment, different methods of calculating inter-
est payments (as above), or because of additional costs of borrowing imposed
on the borrower by the lender.
2The reducing (or declining) balance and straight-line methods are
more commonly associated with the depreciation of assets by firms than
with the calculation of interest rates.
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rates on credit, are also low. The probable effects of this on potential
savers is explored in the next chapter.
Other Facets of Government Credit Legislation
Apart from the major Central Bank guidelines described above, the
government pursues other policies to influence bank behavior with regard
to agricultural credit. This may be done through special schemes, such
as the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme, or through legislation separ-
ate from what is available in the Monetary Policy Circular. These two
further aspects of credit policy are described below.
The Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme
The Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS) was set up by the
Federal government in 1977 to encourage an increased volume of loans from
the commercial and merchant banking sector to agricultural production,
particularly to small rural farmers. The scheme has an authorized capital
of N 100 million, of which 60% is to be subscribed by the Federal govern-
ment and 40% by the Central Bank.
Under this scheme, 75% of bank loans to agricultural production are
guaranteed by the government and the Central Bank. Eleven million Naira
in guaranteed loans had been disbursed from the fund at the end of 1978.
The government hopes that, given the security provided by the guarantee,
banks will increase, within a short period, the volume of loans to agricul-
ture, especially to small farmers. The performance of commercial banks
under this scheme (which bears even lower 4-6% interest rates than the
norm) is one of the issues discussed in Chapter Four.
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Government Equity Participation in the Commercial
and Merchant Banking System
As a means of directly influencing the decisions of the banking sys-
tem, the government has tried to acquire an increased number of shares in
those banks in which it had little or no participation. It passed the
Nigerianization decree, by which at least 60% of the equity participation
in the banking system was to be made Nigerian. By 1976, the government
had itself acquired a 30 to 40% share in most major banks that were not
indigenous (Nigerian) or government-owned. The government has been con-
sidering acquiring a controlling (51% or more) share in the same banks to
increase its power to influence the banks. The Committee on the Nigerian
Financial System (1976) dubbed this latter move as unnecessary for the
government's purposes, given the already existing methods for influencing
bank behavior.
The government's aim in increasing its participation in the banking
system is primarily to ensure that its directives on increased credit dis-
bursement to priority sectors, such as agriculture, are obeyed. The govern-
ment has indeed been able to influence the choice of managers and directors
for the major banks, and this has probably had an impact on getting increased
compliance to directives on the agricultural and other sectors. The exact
impact of increased direct government control and participation on bank
behavior, however, is difficult to measure.
Legislation on Establishment of Bank Branches
The latest piece in the legislative effort of the government towards
the rural-agricultural sector concerns its attempts to increase by fiat the
number of bank branches in the rural areas. As discussed in section II of
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this chapter, the commercial bank branch network is highly concentrated in
urban areas. The government feels that this serves to frustrate its efforts
to improve financial services (particularly credit availability) to the
rural sector. Lately, the savings mobilization function of the banks in
the rural areas has also been stressed, though, as was earlier remarked,
it is not clear that it has the same priority in the government's agenda
as credit.
The legislation requiring compulsory establishment of bank branches
was passed in 1977. The Central Bank apportioned the 195 new rural
branches to be set up for the different banks, based on the proportion of
their branches concentrated in urban areas and on their size. The govern-
ment expected all the branches to be set up by the end of 1980. It has
given some incentives to the banks, such as certain tax deductions, to
encourage a rapid opening up of these branches.
While the new legislation will certainly serve to increase the physi-
cal presence of intermediaries in the rural areas, it is not certain that
intermediation services to rural people will increase significantly, given
the traditional banking practices of the commercial banks and the disincen-
tives implicit in the government's interest rate structure. In fact, if
these aspects of bank operations are not changed, the proliferation of
commercial banking institutions might even serve to drain away from the
rural areas whatever savings is mobilized. The question also remains as
to whether the commercial banking system can effectively serve more remote
rural areas. It might be that some alternative or supplementary mode of
intermediary services are needed to reach such areas.
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Comment on the Government's Regulation of the Banking Sector
The legislative aspects of credit policy, e.g., use of credit con-
trols described above, have broad welfare implications, the discussion of
which lies outside the scope of this study. These implications have been
well documented elsewhere (e.g., see Johnson, 1974) and include the gross
losses and gross gains in consumer surplus of sectors forced to grow at
slower or faster rates as a result of these policies. Of importance to
this study, however, are the narrower implications of the policies for
banks' profitability and the indirect effects of these policies on service
to the rural-agricultural population.
One thing seems clear; that is, the government's legislation appears
to be having some effect on the commercial banking sector in terms of
increasing its volume of credit to the agricultural sector (see Table 3-4).
The question is whether these increases are ultimately effective, in the
sense of reaching the rural population about whom the government is con-
cerned, and whether the increases are productive in the sense of increasing
production and the marketed surplus in the agricultural sector. These and
other issues are explored in Chapter Four.
Institution Building
The final major element of government credit policy deserves only
brief mention, because it has been more extensively discussed in section
II of this chapter. This is the drive at institution building as a means
of improving the allocation of credit to the agricultural sector. This
drive has been responsible for the setting up of the Nigerian Agricultural
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and Cooperative Bank (NACB) in 1973, and accounts for the renewal of inter-
est in cooperative societies and other credit-channeling institutions.
These institutions play a key role in the allocation of credit to the agri-
cultural sector. Many of their current operations are based on old, estab-
lished procedures. This presents some difficulty in their ability to dis-
charge their functions effectively. Again, the efficacy of certain insti-
tutions of the credit distribution mechanism is a subject for discussion
in the following chapter.
Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, a broad look has been taken at overall credit policy
in Nigeria. In section I, a historical look at past government credit
efforts (including the bases for these efforts) was undertaken. In section
II, the major public and private institutions for channeling credit to and
mobilizing savings in the rural sector were described. In the last section,
the concerted effort being made by government to influence the volume and
direction of credit flow was explored. What seems evident is that a clear
government policy in favor of agricultural credit increases has emerged
and taken hold in the country. The main task in the next chapter is to
examine the fundamental premises for the present government credit policy.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CREDIT POLICY IN NIGERIA:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
Introduction
In Chapter Three, the discussion centered on the essential elements
of past and present credit policy in Nigeria. In that chapter, it was
noted that the major objectives of present credit policy are a) to facili-
tate increased agricultural production, particularly of the marketable
surplus, and b) to improve the incomes and living standards of poor far-
mers.1 Underlying credit policy in general, as discussed in Chapter Three,
and objectives of credit policy in particular, as outlined above, are a set
of assumptions--many of which are never explicitly acknowledged or examined
by policy-makers as being of crucial importance to decision making in the
credit area. Failure to examine the validity of these assumptions means
continuation of a credit policy that not only falls short of achieving its
main objectives, but actually contributes to distortions in the behavior of
rural financial markets (RFMs)--distortions which prove to be detrimental to
the provision of financial services to the poor farmers whom the government
ISince rural farmers obtain the bulk of their livelihood from agricul-
tural production, government officials tend to assume that the only (or the
major) way to improve the incomes and living standards of farmers is through
improving agricultural production. This may not necessarily be the case.
Farmers may find other, more economically attractive ways (e.g., trading)
to improve their incomes. This could influence their use of agricultural
credit, thereby creating some conflict between the two goals of improving
agricultural production and improving farmer incomes. It becomes apparent
in later discussion in this chapter that such a conflict does occur.
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has expressed interest in helping.
The major objective of this chapter is to explicitly set out these
underlying assumptions, and then to attempt to throw some light on their
validity, with the aid of data collected in the sample surveys described
in Chapter One. Such an exercise will lead to a reformulation of the
assumptions; and the reformulated assumptions will, in turn, provide in
Chapter Five a guide towards the discussion of alternative credit policies
that would hopefully better achieve the objectives set out by the govern-
ment. The list of assumptions to be provided here may not be exhaustive,
in the sense that other assumptions may be apparent to readers from the
discussion in Chapter Three. However, the six assumptions outlined are
certainly the most important in terms of their effect on the shape and struc-
ture of credit policy; and, as in evident in Chapter Two, these assumptions
appear to be the same as those implicit in credit policies in various other
developing countries.
The assumptions have to do with the behavior and desires of rural
farm households, as well as institutions--formal and informal--that deal
with the channeling of agricultural credit. They also concern the nature
and constraints of agricultural production in Nigeria. These assumptions
are:
1) Rural farm-households face credit shortages, particularly for
agricultural credit.
2) Such credit as is needed is not readily available in the rural
areas, or is available at prohibitive costs from usurious moneylenders.
161
3) The existence of credit shortages prevents the adoption by
farm-households of modern technological inputs that would ensure increases
in output.
4) Such credit as is provided by the formal system must be given at
low or concessional rates of interest in order to persuade farmers to bor-
row, because their demand for credit is highly interest elastic. (That is,
a slight percentage increase in the price of credit will induce a much
greater percentage drop in the quantity of credit demanded by farmers.)
5) The current distribution mechanisms for credit can, with little
or no modification, be effective in reaching poorer farmers.
6) Lack of credit is the most important problem related to financial
services in the rural areas. Savings mobilization, in particular, is rela-
tively unimportant, since savings capacities are quite low. Given this,
there is little need to revise the interest rate structure in favor of sav-
ings.
Testing the Validity of the Assumptions
Assumption (1)
Rural farm-households face credit shortages, particularly for agri-
cultural credit.
It appears true that rural farmers face credit shortages. Table 4-1
shows that of the 83 cooperative society members in the study sample who
obtained loans from the formal system (coop members), 30 of them (or 36%)
also felt a need to borrow from informal sources. Fifty-four percent of
those who had no formal system loans (non-members of cooperative societies)
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TABLE 4-1
INDEBTEDNESS TO THE INFORMAL SECTOR
Cooperative Society Non-Members of Coop and
Members Cooperative Societies Non-Coop Members
Region (% Indebtedness) (% Indebtedness) (% Indebtedness)
Northern 15.7 19.3 35.0
Villages (13)1 (11)
Southern 20.5 35.1 55.6
Villages (17) (20)
Total Category 36.2 54.4
iNumbers in brackets represent numbers of respondents borrowing in
each category.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
also borrowed from the informal system in the study year. Southern vil-
lagers tended to be more indebted to the informal system than their northern
counterparts, probably because of the lower incomes found among these vil-
lagers, and also because of the greater availability in the south of infor-
mal institutions, such as Rotating Credit Associations (Roscas) and Non-
Rotating Credit Associations from which loans can be obtained.
Although a substantial number of farmers borrow, signifying their need
for credit, what is not so apparent is whether this credit need is solely,
or even predominantly, for agricultural production purposes, as government
officials seem to assume.
Given the fungibility of money, the nature of the farm-firm-
household, and its complex decision making processes, involving consump-
tion, production, and investment (Adams, 1978; Baker, 1973; FAO, 1971),
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it is difficult to make definitive statements about the particular purpose
to which any given amount of credit will be put. This may be in spite of
claims made by borrowers at the time of obtaining a loan, consigning the
loan to a particular purpose. Since one of the government's objectives
for credit policy is increasing agricultural production, its expectations
or desires with regard to credit is that recipient farmers increase agri-
cultural investment by the amount of credit received. This situation is
depicted in graph (A) of Figure 4-1.
FIGURE 4-1
DESIRED AND ACTUAL SITUATIONS WITH REGARD TO USE OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT
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In this situation, the farmer's original equilibrium position is at
point 11C 1 with given amounts of agricultural investment, consumption, and
investment in all other activities. The reception of credit shifts the
farmer's budget constraint outwards in the manner shown, permitting him to
attain higher activity levels on the new indifference curve. Government
officials, however, assume that all new activity will involve an increase
in agricultural investment 12, while the farmer maintains his original
position with respect to consumption and all other investment activities
Cl'
While some farmers, especially larger, better-off farmers, may follow
the scenario depicted in graph (A), the more typical situations are those
shown in graphs (B) and (C), where farmers spend in varying proportions
some of the credit received on agricultural investment and the rest on
other activities, or they spend all the credit on other activities, while
maintaining the previous agricultural investment level I . This viewpoint
is supported by figures in Table 4-2, which show formal credit recipients
or cooperative society members (coop members) and non-members of cooperative
societies (non-coop members) spending, on average, approximately the same
amounts on farming, despite higher mean amounts borrowed by the coop member
group from formal, and in some cases informal, sources.
If we take the farm expenditure figures by non-coop members to be
what coop members would have spent had they had no formal credit, for
instance, it becomes clear that some of the formal credit received goes
into activities other than agricultural investment. This situation tends,
on the average, to be more applicable to the 64% of coop members in the
two lower total cash income groups (N 0-499 and N 500-1499) than to the
TABLE 4-2
MEAN FARM EXPENDITURES (1978/79) AND MEAN AMOUNTS BORROWED:
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS OF
COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES COMPARED BY INCOME GROUPS
(All Money Values in N)
Mean Farm Expenditures
Coop Non-Coop
Members
118.0
500-1499 329.0
1500 and
Above 1112.8
Formal
Coop Members Only
Number of
Respondents
Borrowing
in Each
Members Amount Category
92.7 129.4 18 out of 18
345.0 200.7 35 out of 35
782.5 280.0 30 out of 30
Mean Amounts Borrowed
Informal
Coop Members
Number of
Respondents
Borrowing
in Each
Amount Category
70.0 5 out of 18
172.1 14 out of 35
459.1 11 out of 30
Non-Coop Members
Number of
Respondents
Borrowing
in Each
Amount Category
93.4 19 out of 28
205.7 7 out of 12
248.0 5 out of 17
NOTE: Changing the income groupings changes the figures slightly, but the basic conclusions
remain the same. See calculations in Appendix B.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
Total
Cash
Income
Group
0-499
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36% of coop members in the total cash income group above this. There are,
however, indications that even in this highest group, recipients have also
invested some credit in non-agricultural activities.
Evidence on a demand for credit for purposes other than agricultural
production comes from the answers of 26 respondents replying to questions
pertaining to activities undertaken in addition to or in place of further
agricultural investment because of the availability of formal credit.
Table 4-3 shows the low priority accorded consumption in these activities.
Instead, investment in other non-farm business activities, particularly
trading, appears to have been more popular. This signifies the importance
of possibly higher and quicker returns to be obtained by participation in
trading rather than in current agriculture.
TABLE 4-3
EVIDENCE OF DIVERSION 1 OF FUNDS BY FORMAL SYSTEM BORROWERS
Number of Respondents Percent of Total
Diverting Funds Number of Respondents
Purpose for Purpose Diverting Funds
Trading 13 50.0
School Fees 5 19.2
On-Lending to Other Farmers 4 15.4
Consumption 4 15.4
TOTAL 26 100.0
'The diversion referred to in the table indicates that the respondents
used some, if not all, of the formal agricultural loans received for the
non-agricultural purposes stated in the table.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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A look at supposed purposes for borrowing from the informal market
(Table 4-4) shows that although farming predominates as a reason, at least
42.5% of the purposes stated were non-farm-related. Again, non-farm invest-
ment activities, such as school fees for children, trading, building, etc.,
appear important.
What emerges from the above discussion is that although credit for
agricultural production may be important, the demand for credit for non-
agricultural activities, especially non-farm-related investment, is sig-
nificant and cannot be ignored. For some farm-households at least, as
long as these non-farm-related activities appear more important or more
profitable than agricultural production, credit intended by authorities to
be used to increase agricultural production will be diverted by these house-
holds to activities which increase the household's overall welfare level
more than agricultural investment would. While this is perfectly rational
in an economic sense, it points to the fact that while credit may be used
as an instrument for increasing the welfare of recipient households, given
present prices and the state of technology in Nigerian agriculture, other
means or additional means must be found to induce such households into
further investment in agriculture.
Assumption (2)
Such credit as is needed by farmers is not readily available in the
rural areas, or is available at prohibitive costs from usurious moneylenders.
In the discussion on the validity of assumption (1) above, it was
noted that borrowing from the informal sector is very important. Of the
TABLE 4-4
PURPOSES FOR INFORMAL BORROWING, TOTAL SAMPLE
Number
of Loans
Farming 38
Trading 5
Coop Members
Number
of Loans Percent
18 - 48.6
4 - 10.8
Non-Coop Members
Number
of Loans Percent
20 - 55.6
1 - 2.7
Farming & Ceremonies
Farming & Trading
Farming & Feeding
Farming & School Fees
Trading & Feeding
Feeding & School Fees
8.1 - 16.7
Blacksmithing
Vehicle License
School Fees
Illness
Funeral
Ceremonies
Weaving
Household Food
Building 2
37TOTAL
- 10.8
- 2.7
- 2.7
- 5.6
- 2.7
- 2.7
- 2.7
- 5.6
99.7
- 2.7
- 13.5
5.4
99.9
NOTE: Percentages may not add up
SOURCE: Field surveys.
to 100.0 due to rounding.
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sample of farmers surveyed, at least 44% took one loan from an informal
source during the study year. Of those who had no access to formal loans,
54% borrowed from the informal sector, and 36% of those who received formal
loans also obtained loans from informal sources. Table 4-5 sets out borrow-
ing from the informal sector by source. It is clear from the table that
loans are, as has been noted elsewhere, available from a wide variety of
sources.
TABLE 4-5
INDEBTEDNESS TO THE INFORMIAL SECTOR BY SOURCE
Percent of Loans Borrowed from Source
Total Samplel
Northern and Northern Southern
Source Southern Villages Villages Villages
Rotating and Non-Rotating
Savings and Credit 20.5 0.0 31.9
Organizations
Moneylender 1.42 0.0 2.1
Patron 2.7 7.7 0.0
Relatives 45.2 69.2 19.1
Friends 30.2 23.1 46.9
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total number of loans for entire sample = 73. Number of loans in
the north = 26. Number of loans in the south = 47.
2The remarkably low percentage of loans from moneylenders will be
discussed in more detail later in this section of the chapter.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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Studies on Nigeria (Okonjo, 1978; King, 1976; Ojo, 1976; Ijere,
1979) show that relatives and friends are the most important sources of
credit or financing for activities in rural areas. In addition, in the
south, where rotating and non-rotating savings and credit organizations--
known locally as "esusus" and "safes"--are widely available and very
strongly established, these prove to be a source of credit even more impor-
tant than relatives. The range and mean amounts borrowed from these vari-
ous sources, and mean amounts borrowed from informal sources as a whole,
by income group, are displayed in Tables 4-6 and 4-7.
The figures in Table 4-6 suggest that fairly large amounts are avail-
able from all the credit sources in the rural areas. However, large loans
between N 300-1000 are fewer in number than small ones, and the tendency
is towards small- and medium-size loans, thereby making mean amounts bor-
rowed smaller than would be expected from the sizeable amounts at the
upper end of the loan range.
In Table 4-7, upper-income farmers appear able to borrow larger
amounts than lower-income farmers, probably because of their greater
credit-worthiness and their larger expenditures. Poorer farmers, however,
fare better than do more well-off ones, from the viewpoint of the percent
of these farmers who borrow from informal sources. When Table 4-7 is com-
pared with Table 4-8, informal sources do almost as well as formal ones
(namely, the cooperative societies) in terms of mean amounts loaned out.
Poorer farmers seem to obtain larger loan amounts from the formal than
the informal system once they gain access to the former. However, the
percent of poor farmers served by the formal system is lower than that
for the informal.
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TABLE 4-6
RANGE AND MEAN AMOUNTS BORROWED FROM THE INFORMAL SYSTEM BY SOURCE (N)
Source
Savings Organizations
Moneylender
Patron
Relatives
Friends
Range of Amounts
20 - 500
500 (1 loan)
260 - 400 (2 loans)
10 - 1000
14 - 700
Mean Amount
146
N.A.
330
158
168
N.A. = Not Applicable
SOURCE: Field surveys.
TABLE 4-7
BORROWING FROM INFORMAL SOURCES BY INCOME GROUP
Income Group (N)
0 - 499
500 - 1499
1500 and Above
TOTAL
% Informal Borrowers
39.3
32.8
27.9
100.0
Average Amount
Borrowed (N)
88.5
182.5
381.8
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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TABLE 4-8
COMPARISON OF MEAN AHOUINTS BORROWED AND IEAN FARM EXPENDITURES
FOR FORMAL SYSTEM BORROWERS (COOP MEMBERS)
Mean Amount Mean Farm
Number % Total Borrowed Expenditure
Income Group Borrowing Borrowers (N) (N)
0 - 499 18 21.7 129.4 118
500 - 1499 35 42.2 200.7 329
1500 and Above 30 36.1 280.0 1112.8
TOTAL 83 100.0
SOURCE: Field surveys.
It would have been instructive to compare amounts borrowed from
informal sources with total expenditures of farm-households. However, as
explained in Chapter One, it was not possible to obtain figures for consump-
tion and non-farm business expenditures for the study year. Nevertheless,
comparing the mean farm expenditure figures in Table 4-2 with mean amounts
borrowed from informal sources, it is apparent that farmers in the two
lower-income groups who have access to informal loan sources should, on
average, be able to borrow from these sources substantial proportions of
their current farm expenditures.
One problem remains, however, and that concerns the percent of far-
mers needing loans from the informal sector who cannot obtain such loans.
Hard statistics are not available, but anecdotal information obtained
during the survey suggests that during the peak farming months, when
expenditures for all farmers are highest and when credit demand for both
production and consumption is also highest, informal loan sources within
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some villages may not be adequate to meet the demand of all farmers needing
credit in those villages. And, with the fragmentation of the informal mar-
ket, loan sources that may be available in the next village, only a mile
or two away, are not accessible to borrowers outside of that village.
In summary, a wide variety of informal credit sources are available
in rural areas. Informal sources are more important and more effective
than formal sources, with regard to the percent of poorer farmers served;
and in terms of loan amounts for this latter group, informal sources com-
pare favorably with formal sources. However, during certain peak credit
demand periods, and within certain villages, informal sources may be inade-
quate to meet all farmers' credit demand, thereby indicating the need for
extra outside credit sources.
Table 4-9 shows the per annum interest charges (nominal) in the
informal sector. It is noticeable that the bulk of loans from the two
most important credit sources (relatives and friends) incur no monetary
interest charges. However, such loans do bear a non-quantifiable 'social
charge,' one example of which is the obligation of the borrower to be
ready to reciprocate the action towards the lender, should this become
necessary even in the immediate future. Of the loans that do incur
charges from the three most important credit sources (savings organiza-
tions, relatives, and friends), the per annum nominal rates of 17.4 to
34.2% are not that much higher than the 12, 18, and 20% nominal rates
charged by government cooperative societies in the villages surveyed.
The 60% nominal interest charge on the single moneylender loan
stands out above the rest. Though this interest charge may be viewed by
some as "usurious," it will be argued later on in the discussion that,
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TABLE 4-9
MEAN PER ANNUM INTEREST CHARGES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR BY SOURCE
Number of Loans Mean Per Annum
Incurring Interest % of Loans Interest Charge
Charges out of Total Incurring (%) for Loans
Number of Loans from Interest Incurring Charges
Source Each Source Charges (Nominal)
Savings 11 out of 15 73.3 29.3
Organizations
Non-Registered 1 out of 1 100.0 60.0
Moneylender
Patron 2 out of 2 100.0 N.A.
Relatives 2 out of 33 6.1 17.4
Friends 5 out of 22 22.7 34.2
N.A. = Not Available
SOURCE: Field surveys.
given certain circumstances surrounding the moneylender's operations (e.g.,
expected high risk of default by borrowers on loans), such rates may be
justified. High per annum nominal interest charges by moneylenders have
also been found in other studies on Nigeria (e.g., see Okonjo, 1978;
Galletti and Baldwin, 1956). In the 1977-1978 study conducted by Okonjo
in the rural town of Ogwashi-Uku in Bendel State, Nigeria, nominal interest
charges of slightly over 300% were found for the relatively few loans made
by unregistered moneylenders in that community.
Bottomley (1964, 1971) and Long (1968) have discussed possible reasons
for the high interest charges by village moneylenders. Their arguments are
mentioned in Chapter Two and need not be repeated here. Of the components
of high interest charges that they list (opportunity cost, administrative
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costs and risk), this author feels that a high expected risk of default
on loans largely accounts for any high interest charges that may be
encountered from moneylenders or other sources in the rural areas. This
is attributable to the uncertainties and vagaries of life in the rural
areas. In any given year, it is not uncommon for some farmers to have
bad luck with their crops, and thus experience temporary money shortages
which may hamper their ability to repay a loan.
In addition, the degree and extent of personal relationships between
the moneylender (or other lenders) and the borrower are important in deter-
mining the expected risk of default, and hence the level of interest
charges. If a borrower has relatively close relationships with a prospec-
tive moneylender, the borrower is likely to encounter low or zero monetary
interest charges on the loan, because the moneylender feels adequately
secure in his/her ability to get the principal back. Furthermore, indirect
'social interest' is obtained by the lender, due to the obligation of the
borrower to reciprocate the lender's action--perhaps in a non-monetary
form--whenever called upon to do so.
If, on the other hand, the personal relationships between the borrower
and the moneylender are either non-existent or tenuous, then the expected
risk of default becomes greater, the obligation on the borrower's part to
reciprocate the lender's action in the future is lower, and thus the mone-
tary interest charges on the loan are likely to be much higher. The risk
is further aggravated for the majority of moneylenders operating in the
rural areas because they operate without the required government authoriza-
tion. If a borrower were to default on a loan, therefore, it would be
virtually impossible for them to bring the case to court because of their
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own illegal status.
With regard to the inflation rate (another potential component of
nominal interest charges), borrowers and lenders are aware of inflationary
conditions and sometimes make investments to take advantage of these con-
ditions--for example, investing in livestock and reselling at a later date.
However, it is difficult to judge the extent to which inflation figures
into the lender's interest calculus, and it is safe to say that the
expected risk of default discussed above is far and away the most important
factor.
What is perhaps more interesting than the rates of interest charged,
or even the magnitudes of loans obtained from informal sources, is the
remarkably small role of the moneylender1 among the list of informal lend-
ers in the study. This seems to belie the widespread belief of policy-
makers concerning the pervasive influence of village moneylenders. Only
one loan out of 73 in the study is attributable to a moneylender. In the
1977-1978 study of Ogwashi-Uku cited above, two loans out of 39 were
attributable to moneylenders; and in a 1972 study by Aluko et al., cited
by Ojo (1976, p. 77), approximately 2.9% of financing by owners of small-
scale enterprises in a survey of four States in Nigeria came from money-
1The question on sources of loans in the survey listed a variety
of sources, one of which was the moneylender. Respondents were also free
to mention sources not included on the list. No special care was taken
to ensure that moneylenders were not excluded from borrowers' lists of
sources, because there was no reason why respondents should leave out
moneylenders as a source. Borrowers are not prosecuted for taking loans
even from unregistered moneylenders. Respondents talked freely about
the existence of moneylenders. However, the majority of them had not
taken any loans from these moneylenders in the study year.
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lenders. In his own survey of sources of finance in urban and non-urban
areas of Ekiti Division, Ojo found that moneylenders were a source of
finance for only 9% of the respondents in the non-urban areas (p. 62).
In contrast, Akpabio (1979) found, in a case study of small-scale farmers
in Cross-River State, that 55% of their loans came from moneylenders.
Some of the reported variations may arise from varying definitions
of who and what moneylenders are, with some patron-client and other types
of relationships defined as moneylender-borrower relationships, thereby
broadening the scope of those considered. In this study, moneylenders
have been defined as villagers engaged in lending money at agreed 'in-kind'
or cash rates of interest to relatives or non-relatives alike, and who are
perceived by their fellow villagers as moneylenders in the community.
Despite the difficulty of generalization, what seems suggested by the data
in this study, and in the other two cited above, is that relatively few
people do borrow from moneylenders. Thus, excuses for low or negative
interest rate credit policies as a means of driving out or reducing the
influence of moneylenders in Nigeria may be self-deceptive, because the
phenomenon of poor villagers in the clutches of these moneylenders appears
to be relatively rare.
In any case, several Nigerian writers (Ojo, 1976; Igben, 1978) have
argued the merits of moneylenders in Nigeria's rural areas as an extra
source of timely credit in the community. Certainly, moneylenders them-
selves feel their role in the community to be an important one. They feel
that they are obligated to lend money to farmers in need, even when they
do not want to. This was the case with two unregistered moneylenders
interviewed in one of the northern villages. They both stated that at
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times when they were short of money for lending, they felt obligated to
go out and borrow money in order to take care of the needs of those who
came to them.1 The moneylenders see themselves as indispensable members
of the community playing a significant part, and feel that rather than
being antagonistic, government officials should make more resources avail-
able to them to enable them to better carry out their role. Though the
lenders may have an exaggerated sense of their own importance, they do
make the valid point that without them a few farm-households might have
to do without the credit that is perhaps necessary for their survival in
any given year.
In their concern with interest rates and loan sources in the informal
financial market, policy-makers tend to lay less emphasis on a point that
is perhaps of greater importance to the farmer-borrowers--and that is the
IThe moneylenders interviewed were both wealthy farmer-traders who
had started in the moneylending business seven and ten years ago, not
because they wanted to make money from fellow villagers, they said, but
because their fathers had been lenders "helping" villagers out before them,
and they had to continue the tradition. They claimed that they charged
little or no interest, since Islamic law is clearly against this. When
taxed with the issue of how they could carry on this 'generosity' yearly
with little in return, they both admitted that some borrowers did pay
interest in cash, and that giving out loans allowed them tremendous influ-
ence in the community so that they could and did, in fact, call on borrow-
ers to render one or several days' labor services in their vast fields.
In many cases, this was the interest charge (often higher than would have
been the case had it been a straightforward cash transaction) and was
clearly understood by the borrowers as such.
The two moneylenders kept loan records, one in Arabic and the other
mentally. They were very flexible as to their clientele, though they pre-
ferred people they were very familiar with, or those who had easily sale-
able property, such as livestock. The lenders did not really inquire as
to loan purposes, although they were again more enthusiastic toward loans
taken for farming or trading. Both lenders noted that because of monetary
resource constraints, in any given year, they could fulfill only a few
of the loan requests received. In the study year, one lender granted six
out of 15 loan requests he received.
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duration of informal sector loans. Of the 55 loans whose durations were
given in the sample survey, 50.9% were for a 6-12 month period. This is
comparable to the 6-9 month duration of government cooperative loans. A
substantial 36.4% of the 55 loans, however, were for a period of five
months or less, while only 12.7% were given for a period of over 12 months.
Compounding this problem of the short-term nature of the loans is that
of the uncertainty of the loan period agreed upon. That is, rural borrow-
ers stressed that before the end of the agreed-upon loan duration period
had been reached, lenders could, and frequently did, call on borrowers to
repay the loan. This might occur if the lender suddenly experienced cir-
cumstances requiring immediate or large monetary expenditures. In fact,
when asked to compare government and informal sources of loans, one of the
points in the government's favor, mentioned frequently by those surveyed,
is that once given the government (cooperative) loan, there is no fear of
being bothered about repayment until the agreed-upon loan period is up.
The short-term nature and the uncertainty of loan durations from
informal sources means that borrowers desiring loans for possible longer-
term agricultural or other types of investment--one to two years perhaps,
cannot rely on the informal financial market for such loans. Neither, at
present, can they rely on the formal system, because most of the loans
forthcoming from that source are only for a period of 6-9 months. It
appears, then, that there is a financial service gap (definitely felt by
some of the farmers surveyed) which formal loan sources can better fill.
The existence of this gap might be one of the problems that could be
meaningfully handled by a formal credit program in an effort to increase
small farmer agricultural production.
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One of the salient facts that has emerged from the exploration of
this assumption on availability, size, source, and costs of credit in the
informal sector is that some credit is available to farmers in the various
income categories. Moreover, credit can be obtained in sizeable enough
amounts to cover a substantial proportion of current farming costs, should
borrowers be interested in using their loans for this purpose. However,
during the peak farming periods and within certain villages, outside credit
sources may be necessary, as the informal financial market may not be capa-
ble of coping with the credit demand of all needy farmers.
Another important fact is that with regard to interest charges, a
substantial proportion of informal sector loans do not incur monetary
costs. For those that do, the charges are not necessarily high or exorbi-
tant when compared with nominal interest charges of formal cooperative
loans, and when other economic factors, such as high expected risk of
default and high opportunity cost of capital, are considered. It also
appears that the typical source of a loan in the rural areas is not the
village moneylender, who, despite what people may feel are his shortcomings,
serves a useful purpose as an extra source of credit in the community.
Finally, the short-term nature and uncertainty of loan duration of informal
sector loans presents a real problem to rural borrowers, especially those
desirous of making potentially profitable longer-term investments in agri-
culture or other enterprises.
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Assumption (3)
The existence of credit shortages prevents the adoption by farm-
households of available modern technological inputs that could increase
output.
It has been argued in the two sections above that at least some
farmers can satisfy their credit needs from informal sources, and that
farmers may not necessarily be interested in credit for purposes of agri-
cultural investment. This implies that deficiencies in agricultural
investment may not necessarily be due to lack of capital, but may stem
from other more intractable problems, such as lack of profitability of
agriculture, which could then be responsible for the disinterest in agri-
cultural investment beyond the minimum necessary for farm-household sur-
vival. However, the belief in credit shortages as a major factor in input
adoption and output increases in Nigerian agriculture is a deep-seated
one and therefore merits further exploration.
Of the few modern inputs available in Nigeria's rural areas, ferti-
lizer is the more common, and even then in some villages there are many
farmers who have neither used it nor heard about it (e.g., see Okonjo,
1978).
Table 4-10 (columns 1, 2, and 3) show fertilizer use among different
income groups of coop members (formal system, cooperative society borrow-
ers) and non-coop members (non-members of the cooperative society) who
had no formal system loans. The figures show that coop members tend to
have a higher frequency of fertilizer use than non-coop members, and, in
almost every instance, they spend twice as much as non-coop members on
FERTILIZER AND LABOR USE: COOP MEMBERS
(All
TABLE 4-10
AND NON-COOP MEMBERS COMPARED IN THREE INCOME GROUPS
Money Values in N)
Income Groups
0-499
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
Borrowing Informally
Not Borrowing Informally
500-1499
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
Borrowing Informally
Not Borrowing Informally
1500 and Above
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
Borrowing Informally
Not Borrowing Informally
(1)
Number
Using
Fertilizer
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% Mean Mean Mean Fert. Labor Mean
Using Exp. Exp. Farm as % of as % of Farm Mean Total
Fert. Fert. Labor Exp. Farm Exp. Farm Exp. Income Cash Income
72.2 7.1
55.6 3.5
50.0 3.6
66.7 3.1
88.6 22.3
58.3 12.7
57.1 11.8
60.0 13.9
90.0
94.1
80.0
100.0
83.4
60.2
42.0
67.8
74.2
59.6
72.9
35.6
118.0
92.7
106.9
64.4
209.7 329.0 6.8
238.9 345.0 3.7
201.4 324.7 3.6
291.4 374.2 3.7
852.6 1112.8
602.9 782.5
468.0 679.8
659.2 825.3
62.7 296.9 346.0
64.3 234.8 274.8
68.2 229.0 282.9
55.3 246.1 258.3
63.7 738.5 935.0
69.2 787.7 977.0
62.0 829.4 999.7
77.9 729.2 945.2
76.6 2613.2
77.1 1921.1
68.8 1818.8
79.9 1963.7
3125.0
2978.6
2327.6
3249.8
(10)
Mean
Off-Farm
Income
49.1
40.0
53.9
12.2
(11)
Mean Farm Income
+ Mean Farm Exp.
2.5
2.5
2.1
3.8
196.5
189.3
170.3
216.0
511.8
1057.5
508.8
1286.1
Numbers in parentheses in column (12) refer to number of respondents for whom this
information was available.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
(12)
Mean Number
of Acres
6.8 (12)
5.5 (21)
5.4 (14)
5.6 ( 7)
11.0
10.6
8.3
12.8
(32)
( 8)
( 4)
( 4)
47.7 (28)
59.4 (11)
20.7 ( 3)
73.9 ( 8)
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fertilizer. This relationship holds even when controlled for region,
as in Table 4-11 (columns 1, 2, and 3). The figures imply that there is
truth in the belief that reception of subsidized credit leads to higher
fertilizer use.
Other very plausible explanations, however, exist that could also
account for the higher incidence of fertilizer use by coop members, and
these throw doubt on the validity of a causal relationship between receiv-
ing of credit and higher fertilizer usage. Fertilizer is a commodity
whose distribution is very much government-controlled, and therefore it
is not freely or easily available on the open market. Cooperative society
members often have fertilizer at subsidized prices delivered to their
societies along with cash credit, thereby making purchase of the commodity
much easier for them. In fact, in some cases--as was encountered in one
of the survey villages, Araromi in the south--cooperators are made to sign
agreements upon receiving cash credit that they will spend a certain amount
of the credit on the purchase of government-supplied fertilizer and chemi-
cals. Such cooperative society members also imbibe more knowledge from
visiting government cooperative officers and extension agents as to the
usefulness of fertilizers.
There is little wonder, then, that higher fertilizer usage would be
encountered within this group of coop members. What is in fact remarkable--
given their greater difficulty in purchasing fertilizer and the higher
prices paid--is the fairly high percentage of farmers using fertilizer
among the group of non-coop members from the same villages as the coop
member group. This means that one of the positive side effects of having
a government cooperative society, whose members are introduced to the use
TABLE 4-11
FERTILIZER AND LABOR USE: COOP MEMBERS AND NON-COOP MEMBERS COMPARED BY REGION IN THREE INCOME GROUPS
(All Money Values in N)
Regions and
Income Groups
Southern Villages
0-499
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
500-1499
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
1500 and Above
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
Northern Villages
0-499
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
500-1499
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
1500 and Above
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number % Mean Mean Mean Fert. Labor
Using Using Exp. Exp. Farm as % of as % of
Fertilizer Fert. Fert. Labor Exp. Farm Exp. Farm Exp.
10 out of 15 66.7 5.2 64.1 107.2 4.9 59.8
11 out of 21 52.4 2.2 68.2 97.7 2.3 69.8
(8)
Mean
Farm
Income
(9)
Mean Total
Cash Income
289.9 344.2
218.6 245.3
(10)
Mean
Off-Farm
Income
54.3
26.7
(11)
Mean Farm Income
2 Mean Farm Exp.
2.7
2.2
16 out of 19 84.2 11.8 139.5 225.4 5.2 61.9 799.3 979.0 179.7
1 out of 4 25.0 4.0 182.5 294.8 1.4 61.9 1000.0 1023.0 23.0
4 out of 6 66.7 17.6 492.7 641.2 2.7
1 out of 2 50.0 50.0 170.0 328.0 15.2
3 out of 3 100.0 16.3 124.3 173.3 9.4
5 out of 6 83.3 7.9 33.4 75.5 10.5
16 out of 16 100.0
6 out of 8 75.0
23 out of 24 95.8
15 out of 15 100.0
76.8 1707.0 2120.7 413.7
51.8 1290.0 1890.0 600.0
71.7 340.0
44.2 291.1
35.9 291.8 406.1 8.8 71.7 662.2
18.5 267.1 370.6 5.0 72.1 681.5
99.8 942.5 1255.7 7.9 75.1 2839.8
62.9 660.7 843.1 7.5 78.4 2005.2
355.0
309.6
15.0
18.5
882.8 216.6
954.0 272.5
3376.5 536.7
3123.7 1118.5
Numbers in parentheses in columen (12) refer to the number of respondents for whom
this information was available.
N.A. = Not Available
SOURCE: Field surveys.
(12)
Mean Number
of Acres
5.9 ( 9)
6.1 (14)
5.6 (16)
NA.
25.0 ( 5)
15.0 ( 1)
9.3 ( 3)
4.8 ( 6)
16.3 (16)
11.7 ( 7)
52.7 (23)
63.7 (10)
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of modern inputs, may be the demonstration effect on non-coop members in
the same village. 1
The temptation to deduce a causal effect between credit and fertilizer
use is further dampened by the fact that those non-coop members who borrowed
informally do no better, and in most cases perform worse, than those who
took no informal loans, in terms of incidence of fertilizer use and amounts
spent (see Table 4-10, rows 4, 5, 9, 10, 14, and 15). It is, therefore,
highly likely that in present Nigerian agriculture, there is very little
causal effect of credit (subsidized or otherwise) on higher fertilizer
usage. In fact, it could be argued that should non-coop members have
the same access to subsidized fertilizer, and the same knowledge as coop
members, there would be little or no difference in fertilizer usage
between the two groups.
Figures in Table 4-10, column 6 show that for coop members and non-
coop members alike, expenditure on fertilizer is a fairly low percentage
of total farm expenditures. Therefore, the bulk of expenditures must go
to labor and other items. It would be expected, then, that were subsidized
credit recipients (coop members) to be primarily interested in investing
their credit in agricultural production, they would spend significantly
more than non-coop members on farm expenditures. This would appear to be
the case on an aggregate level from the mean farm expenditure figures of
N 566.5 for coop members and N 356.2 for non-coop members. These figures,
however, merit a more disaggregated look, as was done earlier in Table 4-2.
10Observations on fertilizer use in a control group of villages with
no cooperative societies would be necessary in order to make definitive
statements on a demonstration effect.
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When farm expenditure figures are broken down by cash income group
and by region, as in columns 5 of Tables 4-10 and 4-11, coop members do
not consistently spend more than non-coop members in all the income group-
ings. 1 This finding is better illustrated in Table 4-12, which shows the
F-statistic and significance levels pertaining to a difference of means
test between mean farm expenditures of coop members and non-coop members
for each income group. The null hypothesis is that there are no statisti-
cally significant differences in mean farm expenditures of coop members
and non-coop members by income groupings. If the decision rule is to reject
the null hypotheses at or below the 5% level of significance, as is con-
ventional, then it is obvious from the figures in Table 4-12 that the null
hypotheses cannot be rejected for all except one income group. This
exception is for the lowest income group in the northern villages, where
the much higher farm expenditures by coop members of this group may be
attributable to a desire on their part for greater per capita household
food consumption.
This view is supported by the fact that while mean household sizes
for coop members and non-coop members in this group are the same, at 12
members per household, there is no (as will soon become clear) statisti-
cally significant difference in mean cash farm incomes (marketable surplus)
between the two groups; neither is there any real difference in off-farm
incomes (Table 4-11, column 10). This must imply that for this small group
IThere is admittedly a trend showing coop members spending more
than non-coop members in most of the groups. However, the important
point is whether these larger mean expenditures are significant in a
statistical sense. This is tested in Table 4-12.
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TABLE 4-12
MEAN FARM EXPENDITURES OF COOP MEMBERS AND NON-COOP MEMBERS
COMPARED BY INCOME GROUP AND REGION
(Expenditures in N)
Total Cash
Income Group
0 - 499
500 - 1499
1500 and Above
0 - 499
500 - 1499
1500 and Above
0 - 499
500 - 1499
1500 and Above
Coop
Members
118.2
329.3
1112.8
107.2
225.4
641.2
173.3
452.8
1230.7
Non-Coop
Members F-statistic
Entire Sample
92.8
345.3
782.5
1.63
0.03
2.13
Southern Villages
97.7
294.8
328.0
0.17
0.98
0.85
Northern Villages
75.5
370.6
843.1
9.20
0.32
2.35
Significance
0.21
0.86
0.15
0.68
0.33
0.39
0.02
0.58
0.13
1For a brief explanation of the significance level, the
and the test used in this and similar tables, see Appendix C.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
F-statistic,
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of coop members, unlike their counterparts in the south and in other income
groups, who seem more interested in off-farm activities, credit is being
spent on farming.
It is a possibility then (although there is no evidence available
on this) that food increases resulting from the farm expenditures are not
being marketed (as the government would have hoped) but consumed. The dif-
ference in farm expenditures observed for this income group, coupled with
the high, though non-significant, differences in the highest income group
in the north (significance level 0.13) account for the statistically sig-
nificant differential (at the 3% level) between mean farm expenditures for
coop members (N 566.5) and non-coop members (N 356.2) when both groups are
considered at an aggregate level.
A look at mean cash farm incomes (a proxy for marketable surplus)
at a disaggregated level reveals patterns similar to those discussed above
for expenditures (see Tables 4-10 and 4-11, columns 8, and Table 4-13).
Again, given a little flexibility in the decision rule for hypothesis test-
ing discussed above, only one group, the highest income group in the north
(where differences in farm expenditures were also high), exhibits statisti-
cally significant differences (at the 6% level) in mean cash farm incomes.
As before, differences in this group help explain statistically significant
differences (at the 2% level) in mean cash farm incomes between coop mem-
bers (N 1320.3) and non-coop members (N 858.3) when both groups are consid-
ered at an aggregate level.
Finally, if coop members and non-coop members are compared on their
ability to generate marketable surplus per Naira of farm expenditure, coop
members, on the average, do no better than non-coop members. This is true
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TABLE 4-13
FARM INCOMES OF COOP MEMBERS AND NON-COOP MEMBERS
COMPARED BY INCOME GROUP AND REGION
(Cash Incomes in N)
Total Cash
Income Group
0 - 499
500 - 1499
1500 and Above
0 - 499
500 - 1499
1500 and Above
0 - 499
500 - 1499
1500 and Above
Coop
Members
296.9
738.5
2613.2
288.6
799.3
1707.0
338.3
666.2
2839.8
Non-Coop
Members F-statistic Significance
Entire Sample
234.7
787.7
1921.1
2.25
0.19
3.23
Southern Villages
218.6
1000.0
1290.0
2.53
1.18
1.77
Northern Villages
291.2
681.5
2005.2
0.16
0.01
3.69
SOURCE: Field surveys.
MEAN CASH
0.14
0.66
0.08
0.12
0.29
0.23
0.70
0.91
0.06
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both on a disaggregate level (Tables 4-10 and 4-11, column 11) and on an
aggregate level, where the cash farm income generated by coop members and
non-coop members per Naira of expenditure is N 2.3 and N 2.4, respectively.
It should be noted that for the disaggregate information presented above
on mean farm expenditures and mean cash farm incomes, changing the income
groupings changes actual figures in each category, but does not change the
major trends and conclusions suggested by the data in the discussion above.
(See Appendix B.)
What light does all the information presented in this section throw
on the validity of the assumption being examined? So far, it has been
argued that the higher expenditures on fertilizer by coop members cannot
be wholly or even largely attributed to credit availability as such,
because coop members have greater access to, knowledge about, and cheaper
prices for fertilizer. Furthermore, even for coop members, the level of
expenditure on fertilizer is low when compared with other inputs, such as
labor.1 In terms of farm expenditures and cash farm incomes, the evidence
available points to the fact that the higher mean aggregate figures observed
for coop members are attributable to one or two income groupings in the
north of the country. For the majority of the income groupings, the differ-
ences between coop members and non-coop members' mean farm expenditures
and cash farm incomes are not statistically significant.
IMore importantly, the level of expenditure on fertilizer is probably
very low when compared with the expectations of government officials con-
cerning fertilizer use by coop members.
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Given these pieces of suggestive evidence, it is difficult to accept
the validity of the assumption that lack of credit is the major factor in
low levels of modern input adoption and in the lack of increases in the
marketable surplus. Other possible constraints on agricultural production
have been mentioned in earlier sections of this chapter and will be dis-
cussed in Chapter Five.
Assumption (4)
Such credit as is provided by the formal system must be given at
low or concessional rates of interest in order to persuade farmers to
borrow, since their demand for credit is highly interest elastic.
It is virtually an article of faith in most developing countries
that credit should be given to farmers at low or negative real rates of
interest. A number of reputable economists (Gonzalez-Vega, 1976; McKinnon,
1973; Shaw, 1973; Adams, 1978), in sharp contrast, have argued the merits
of allowing the forces of supply and demand to play as much of a part as
possible in setting the prices (interest rates) for credit (see Chapter Two).
These same economists have pointed out the distortions and inefficiencies
in allocation that arise from concessional interest rate policies. Some
of these economists have argued that the hidden or transaction costs of
credit (bribes, transport costs, costs of hours lost at work, etc.) in
most developing countries are so high that these costs may ultimately be
more important to the small farmer than the nominal interest costs.
They have pointed out that in many cases, lenders may impose high transac-
tion costs on small-farmer borrowers in order to discourage these borrowers
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from seeking loans. This is because of low profitability margins on
small farmer loans which render such loans unat-ractikve. If governments
could move away from concessional interest rate policies (while maintain-
ing attractive margins of profitability for lenders), many of the barriers
to small-farmer borrowing listed above would be eliminated. Small farmers
would have better access to credit, and many of the allocational ineffi-
ciencies that arise when small farmers are in effect excluded from getting
loans would also be eliminated.
Despite the intellectual force of these arguments, developing country
governments have continued to insist on low or concessional interest rate
policies that often do poorly with regard to their welfare objectives.
This insistence on low interest credit policies is partly a result of the
"moneylender mentality" discussed earlier in this chapter. That is, there
is a feeling that it is wrong to make money out of the plight of a needy
person (as people believe moneylenders do). Part of the insistence could
also be attributed to political motives. It is easy to use cheap credit
as a way of currying and buying "favor votes" from the poor. Though the
majority of these people may never receive the credit, they are left with
the feeling of a sympathetic government trying to help poor farmers.
Furthermore, low interest credit may benefit the politically powerful,
who will be loath to see a revision of such policies (Ladman, 1979).
In Nigeria, the assumed unwillingness of rural farmers to borrow
unless interest rates are very low is used as another excuse for conces-
sional interest rate policies, which in actual fact deprive the rural
areas, and particularly poorer rural farmers, of one important source of
credit, namely, commercial banks (see section below).
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It has been shown in the discussion under assumption (2) that for
informal loans incurring interest charges, farmers seem willing to pay
fairly high charges (up to and above 30% per annum) to obtain a loan.
This willingness could be partly explained by the fact that some of the
borrowers may need a certain amount of cyclical consumption credit to
tide them over until harvest time. They are, therefore, prepared to pay
high rates to obtain the necessary survival amounts. For other borrowers
who might be interested in off-farm activities, as long as the returns from
such activities exceed the rate of interest, they would be willing to bor-
row at what might be perceived as high rates.
Table 4-14 displays attitudes toward higher interest rates among the
study sample. In the villages surveyed, three sets of nominal per annum
interest charges prevailed on formal (cooperative) loans: these were 20%
in the northern villages of Turawa, Yakasai, and Giwa; 18% in the western
village of Araromi; and 12% in the eastern village of Nomeh. Effective
interest charges in these villages could be slightly higher if the minimum
amount of N 10-12 that must be used to purchase a compulsory number of
shares in the society (before obtaining a loan) is taken into account. The
table shows that the majority of respondent farmers surveyed would have been
willing to pay twice the current amount being charged in order to obtain
the loan amounts given out. Non-coop members show an even greater willing-
ness to pay, indicating their greater desire for access to the formal loans
from which coop members are benefitting. A minor, though significant, per-
centage of both coop members and non-coop members would even have been
willing to pay up to three times the current charges in order to obtain
loans.
TABLE 4-14
ATTITUDES TOWARD HIGHER INTEREST CHARGES
Cooperative Society Members
Pay Twice
Current Charges
(24-40% P.A.
Nominal)
Number %
Pay Triple
Current Charges
(36-60% P.A.
Nominal)
Number %
Non-Members of Cooperative Societies
Pay Twice That
Currently Paid
by Coop Members
In Your Area
(24-40% P.A.
Nominal)
Number %
Pay Triple That
Currently Paid
by Coop Members
In Your Area
(36-60% P.A.
Nominal)
Number %
Unconditionally
Willing to Pay
Not Willing
to Pay
Conditionally
Willing to Pay
TOTAL
57 68.7
24 28.9
21
2 2.4
83 100.0
18 21.7
142
61.4
16.9
83 100.0
43 75.4
12 10.5
3.5
57 100.0
44
36.8
56.1
7.0
57 100.0
IConditions stipulated: (a) if marketing produce
loan sources.
becomes easier; (b) if there are no other
ZConditions stipulated: (a) money must arrive at appropriate time, i.e., during beginning
of planting season (4 respondents); (b) willing to pay triple if amount given is substantially
higher than current amount (1 respondent); (c) if marketing produce becomes easier and gains
can be made (6 respondents); (d) if others ingroup agree (1 respondent).
3Condition stipulated: if there is no other source (2 respondents).
4 Conditions stipulated: (a) if money amount large enough (1 respondent); (b) if there are
no other sources (3 respondents).
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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Some of the conditions stipulated by those conditionally willing to
pay are indicative of the organizational and policy problems that beset
credit policy and agriculture itself. The failure of credit to arrive at
the height of the planting season, when it is most needed for production
and consumption, poses an organizational problem that has been repeatedly
pointed out by researchers in the Nigerian case, while the inability in
the village of Nomeh, for instance, to make gains from locally produced
rice due to massive government importation of superior quality rice is a
policy problem. This latter point is dealt with in more depth in Appendix
A and in Chapter Five.
The figures in Table 4-14 suggest that farmers' demand for credit
is relatively interest inelastic. The range of interest rates at which
the demand for credit would significantly diminish is fairly high. This
finding contradicts policy-makers' common presumption that the demand for
credit by farmers is highly interest elastic. Given the figures in Table
4-14, there may be little justification for the very low or negative real
rates of interest currently being charged.
When respondents' answers on interest rates are disaggregated by
region and nominal interest charged, as in Table 4-15, an interesting fact
emerges. Western village respondents are much less willing than their
counterparts to pay higher interest charges. This holds for coop members
and non-coop members alike, although the latter (as was found for the entire
sample in Table 4-14) are much more amenable to higher interest charges.
There are certain facts particular to this village that might help explain
the difference in attitudes.
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TABLE 4-15
ATTITUDES TOWARD HIGHER INTEREST RATES BY REGION
Northern Villages (Current Nominal Rate 20% P.A.)
Coop Members Non-Coop Members
Twice Three Times Twice Three Times
as Much as Much as Much as Much
Unconditionally 91.0% 31.1% 86.7% 36.7%
Willing to Pay
Not Willing 8.9 55.6 13.3 60.0
Conditionally 0 13.3 0 3.0
Willing
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Western Village (Current Nominal Rate 18% P.A.)
Unconditionally 12.5% 0 43.8% 12.5%
Willing to Pay
Not Willing 83.3 91.7 43.8 68.8
Conditionally 4.2 8.3 12.5 18.8
Willing
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Eastern Village (Current Nominal Rate 12% P.A.)
Unconditionally 81.3% 26.7 90.9 72.7
Willing to Pay
Not Willing 6.7 26.7 9.1 27.3
Conditionally 13.3 46.7 0 0
Willing
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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In the western village of Araromi, the effective interest charges
are slightly higher than the nominal charges. Even barring the inclusion
of amounts paid for cooperative society shares, etc. in the interest rate
calculations, effective interest charges come to 22% per annum, as compared
with the 18% nominal rates. This is because the government agency that
gives the cooperative the loans in this instance deducts the interest pay-
ments before the loan is given out. In this village also (much more than
in the others), well-organized informal loan sources exist that provide an
attractive alternative to cooperative loans. These are the indigenous
non-rotating savings associations. There are many of these associations,
and some have saved up several thousand Naira that are available for lend-
ing.
Nominal interest charges in the village range from 0 to 60%per annum,
with the modal interest charge for the savings associations coming to 18%,
and a mean interest charge for the village loans in the survey of 24% per
annum. It could be that the greater availability of loan sources willing
to lend fairly high amounts (N 100 upwards) in this village has given the
inhabitants more freedom to worry about rates of interest. And, as depicted
in Figure 4-2(a), the effective formal loan rate of 22% per annum (P2) may
very well be close to the equilibrium market rate of interest (P ) in the
village; hence, the greater reluctance to pay interest charges twice or
three times the formal rates, which would really be 44% and 66% per annum
if the effective interest charge is taken as the base rate.
For the northern villages, probably because of Moslem customary law,
there is a greater percentage of loans bearing no interest charges--84%,
as compared to 69.6% in the west and 46.6% in the east. The fewer alter-
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FIGURE 4-2
POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VILLAGE EQUILBRIUM RATES OF INTEREST
AND COOPERATIVE LOAN RATES
S
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native sources for borrowing in the informal financial markets of the
north may account for the expressed willingness to pay high rates as a
means of guaranteeing loan availability. In the eastern village, however,
there are many more informal loan sources than in the north, but a greater
tendency to charge interest. In this situation, the formal cooperative
rate of interest (P2) may be considerably below the village equilibrium
rate (P ), as depicted in Figure 4-2(b). This notion is supported by
the fact that nominal interest charges in this village range from zero
to 124% per annum. The mean rate is 43.3%, and it is far above the 12%
nominal rate charged by the cooperative society.
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The differing attitudes toward higher interest charges in the
three sets of villages has interesting policy implications. It suggests
that arbitrary attempts to set interest rates without reference to the
prevailing credit environment (e.g., alternative loan sources, charges in
the informal credit market, etc.) could result in rates that are too high
and thus unattractive to the area borrowers. Or, as is more frequently
the case, the result can be rates that are too low. Such low rates create
allocational problems. They also render potential borrowers unattractive
to non-governmental lenders, such as commercial banks.
Other evidence supportive of the contention that Nigerian farmers
worry much less about interest rates than is generally supposed comes from
an unpublished 1979 study conducted by Igben, using a sample of farmers
in Borno State. In this study, farmers were asked to rank lenders' attri-
butes according to the ones they found important. On a scale of 1 to 6
(with 1 being the most important), the majority of farmers ranked cost of
loan as fifth behind attributes such as lender's knowledge of farming,
lender's willingness to lend at any time, simplicity of lending process,
etc. Miller (1977) reports on a survey conducted among small maize and
rice farmers in three divisions in Nigeria. Asked what they would be will-
ing to pay for the loan they had already stated they would request, if
additional credit were made available, the farmers provided answers that
showed "considerable support for the view that small farmers would be
quite willing to pay higher rates than they are commonly charged by govern-
ment credit agencies." I  (Agricultural Credit and Finance in Africa, p. 25).
1This willingness to pay higher rates would very likely be strongly
related to the size of loans being offered.
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In view of the evidence presented above, it would seem that the
assumption that farmers need low nominal or very low to negative real
rates of interest in order to persuade them to borrow is invalid. There-
fore, current formal interest charges by cooperatives, but especially by
commercial banks (who are allowed by government to charge only 4-6% nomi-
nal per annum rates on production loans), cannot be justified by quoting
the supposed wishes of rural farmers. Such charges must then be reviewed,
particularly in light of the distortions being caused in the behavior of
formal rural financial institutions. Such distortions will be discussed
in the next section.
Assumption (5)
The current distribution mechanisms for credit can, with little or
no modification, ensure access to poor farmers.
To anyone familiar with recent investigations into developing country
credit programs, the inequities of access to credit might appear to be so
universally true as not to warrant further investigation or proof in any
developing country. Yet in the Nigerian case, a more in-depth enquiry is
called for, because the fundamental causes and extent of inequities are
neither obvious to nor fully appreciated by policy-makers. It is true
that the policy-makers recognize that rural areas are deficient in finan-
cial services, and they have recently legislated the establishment of
commercial banks in selected rural areas as a remedy to this situation.
This legislation, however, involves a cosmetic rather than a structural
change, because it does not deal with the fundamental attitudes and prac-
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tices of the banks toward rural borrowers. Neither does it recognize
interest rate policy as an important root cause of these attitudes.
In this section, the existence and extent of inequities in access
to credit from the formal distribution mechanism will be examined, and
the fundamental causes of inequities, wherever they exist, will be dis-
cussed. The formal institutions involved in the channeling of credit
to agriculture and to rural areas have been described in Chapter Three,
as has the extent of the institutions' coverage of the rural areas and
the concessional interest rate structure to which they are subject.
Since cooperatives and commercial banks are the two sets of institutions
supposed to play the largest role in channeling credit directly to rural
farmers, they will be examined further to determine what problems exist
with regard to access to rural farmers in general, and poorer rural farm-
ers in particular.
Commercial banks in Nigeria have long been noted for their reluctance
to serve agriculture and the rural areas. This reluctance has been dis-
cussed at length in Chapter Three. It has often been attributed to the
domination of the commercial banking system by foreign interests concerned
only with financing export-import trade (or manufacturing) undertaken by
individuals and firms from their metropolitan countries. (Report on
Nigerian Financial System, 1976) While there may be some truth in this
assertion, it can only serve as a partial explanation for commercial bank
behavior, because, as is clear from Table 4-16, indigenous (wholly
Nigerian-owned) banks have often performed no better than expatriate-
controlled banks with regard to their meeting up to the Central Bank's
minimum lending ratio for the agricultural sector.
TABLE 4-16
COMMERCIAL BANK PERFORMANCE COMPARED TO CENTRAL BANK PRESCRIBED RATIOS
Central
Bank
Sectors and Prescribed
Subsectors Ratio
PRODUCTION 45.0
-Agriculture, 4.0
Forestry, Fishing
-Manufacturing 30.0
-Mining & Quarrying 4.0
-Real Estate & 7.0
Construction
SERVICES 11.0
-Public Utilities 3.0
-Transportation & 8.0
Communication
GENERAL COMMERCE 32.0
-Bills Discounted 2.0
-Domestic Trade 10.0
-Exports 10.0
-Imports 10.0
OTHERS 12.0
-Credit & Finan-
cial Institutions
-Governments 2.0
-Personal & Prof. 6.0
-Miscellaneous 3.0
TOTAL 100.0
1972/73 - 1974/75
All
Banks
42.6
2.7
25.7
3.7
10.5
7.6
0.9
6.7
31.7
1.6
11.0
8.6
10.5
18.1
2.1
2.5
6.8
6.7
100.0
Expa-
triate
Banks
45.7
3.0
30.7
6.8
10.1
7.9
1.1
6.7
34.4
2.5
10.2
8.0
13.7
12.0
2.3
2.8
4.4
2.5
100.0
Indig-
enous
Banks
37.4
1.5
17.4
6.8
11.0
7.2
0.6
6.6
27.3
0.2
12.3
9.7
5.2
28.0
1.9
1.8
10.8
13o6
100.0
Central
Bank
Prescribed
Ratio
48.0
6.0
30.0
2.0
10.0
10.0
2.0
8.0
32.0
2.0
12.0
8.0
10.0
10.0
3.0
2.0
4.0
1.0
100.0
1976
All
Banks
43.8
2.5
27.1
1.3
12.8
7.6
1.1
6.5
30.2
1.7
10.3
6.4
11.7
18.2
2.4
3.4
6.0
6.2
100.0
Expa-
triate
Banks
47.5
2.4
30.8
1.6
12.5
7.9
1.4
6.4
31.1
2.5
8.7
5.2
14.7
13.2
1.8
3.8
5.0
2.5
100.0
Indig-
enous
Banks
35.7
2.6
18.9
0.5
13.5
6.9
0.3
6.5
28.3
13.9
9.1
5.2
29.0
3.9
2.5
8.2
14.2
100.0
1977/78
Central
Bank
Prescribed
Ratio
48.0
6.0
30.0
2.0
10.0
10.0
2.0
8.0
30.0
2.0
12.0
6.0
10.0
12.0
3.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
100.0
1977
Average
January-June
All Banks
53.3
3.8
28.4
0.8
20.3
9.4
1.0
8.4
23.8
0.9
10.1
3.6
9.2
13.5
2.6
2.9
4.8
3.2
100.0
SOURCES: Renort of the 
p. 29; Central Bank of Nigeria,
Developments in the Economy During the First Half of 1978, p. 55.
1978
Average
January-June
All Banks
55.2
4.6
27.6
1.1
21.9
8.8
1.6
7.2
21.8
0.7
9.6
2.3
9.2
14.2
3.2
3.4
4.8
2.8
100.0
Committee on the Nigerian Financial System
- ,, , .
 Report of the p. 29; Central Bank of Nigeria,
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Another very plausible explanation, suggested by Fabiyi and Ekong
(1979) can be found in the economics of the commercial bank situation
with regard to agricultural sector lending. Commercial banks are allowed
to charge 4-6% nominal per annum interest on agricultural production loans
(the loans of major interest in this study). They are currently required
to pay a 5% per annum nominal rate on passbook savings deposits. If the
banks concentrated on agricultural production lending, the above rates
would leave them, at most, only a 1% margin for covering loan-processing
costs and the risks involved with agricultural loans. Is is, therefore,
not surprising that banks consistently underperform (more than in other
sectors) with regard to meeting the Central Bank prescribed minimum ratio
for agricultural lending (Table 4-16).
Neither is it irrational that commerical bank loan volume to agricul-
ture is relatively small (Table 4-17) when compared with economically less
important sectors, such as Personal and Professional, which enjoy higher
commercial loan interest charges of up to 11% and fewer lending risks.
Browbeating and threat of punitive measures by the Central Bank, as well
as the oil-generated financial boom in the country in the mid-1970s, have
accounted for apparent improvements in commercial bank performance toward
agricultural lending. However, that performance, as discussed in Chapter
Three, still leaves much to be desired.
Given the government mandate to provide low interest loans to agri-
culture and the realities of profit and loss mentioned above, commercial
banks would theoretically be interested in supplying the smallest volumes
of credit to agriculture. If the prescribed interest rate to be charged
is represented as P2 (see Figure 4-3 below), commercial banks would be
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FIGURE 4-3
SUPPOSED THEORETICAL BEHAVIOR OF COMMERCIAL BANKS WITH REGARD TO
BELOW-EQUILIBRIUM RATES OF INTEREST
P S
P1 ---- - -- -P
P1
I D
I I Q
interested in supplying quantity q1 of credit instead of quantity q3
demanded at the prescribed rate of interest.
As discussed in Chapter Two, in this situation the commercial bank
would resort to rationing the loans, looking for less risky borrowers,
and giving larger loans with smaller processing-cost-to-loan ratios.
Such methods would clearly militate against poorer and smaller borrowers
in agriculture.
That the commercial banks in Nigeria practice forms of rationing
detrimental to the interests of rural borrowers in general, and poorer
rural borrowers in particular, is clear from their scanty geographical
presence in the rural areas (see Chapter Three), and from their insistence
on unavailable collateral as guarantees for loans. For example, in 1975,
TABLE 4-17
ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS AND ADVANCES (N '000s) 1
Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec.
Class of Borrower 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
1. Agriculture, Forestry 6,992 9,272 19,246 21,588 27,166 37,370
& Fishing
2. Mining & Quarrying 6,584 11,624 10,156 6,280 12,165 16,288
3. Manufacturing 76,388 119,716 143,984 182,173 258,484 410,683
4. Real Estate & Constr. 25,956 37,396 49,180 76,561 97,790 212,781
5. Public Utilities 678 3,642 5,162 3,552 7,265 17,114
6. General Commerce 167,542 221,204 222,188 274,635 284,992
(a) Exports (69,544) (91,652) (90,342) .. (91,705) (100,593)
(b) Imports (59,934) (63,102) (50,184) .. (81,137) (230,584)
(c) Domestic Trade (32,210) (56,426) (73,656) .. (98,137) (144,308)
(d) Bills Discounted ( 5,854) (10,024) ( 8,006) .. (14,013) ( 28,215)
7. Transportation & 18,974 31,786 44,378 51,748 65,939 81,950
Communication
8. Credit & Financial 2,722 5,778 14,236 11,823 21,653 51,552
Institutions (a)
9. Governments 1,296 3,592 9,016 17,639 31,693 37,306
10. Personal & Professional 23,260 33,136 61,928 .. 62,360 84,796
11. Miscellaneous 20,958 241876 40,026 107,451 68,560 83,783
TOTAL 518,892 723,226 841,698 753,450 938,067 1,537,327
1Detailed information from this source is currently available only until 1975.
SOURCE: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1975, p. 138.
0
206
nearly 80% of commercial banks' loans and advances outstanding were
secured, 28% of the total being secured against real estate. (Report of
the Committee on the Nigerian Financial System, 1976, p. 16) This insis-
tence continues even under the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme set
up by the government in 1977 to aid agriculture in general, and small
farmers in particular, in obtaining loans.
Since Central Bank directives urge the commercial banks to treat all
the applications under the Guarantee Scheme "with the same degree of dili-
gence, good faith and competence with which they would normally be expected
to treat all applications for loans received in the normal course of their
banking business" (Guidelines to the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme,
p. 2), the banks have even more of an excuse to continue asking for the
popular forms of collateral, such as real estate, life insurance policies,
stocks and shares, which effectively exclude rural and poor borrowers.
Table 4-18 is an attempt to examine who gets the loans from commer-
cial banks under the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS). The
table contains very scanty information, both because of the reluctance
of the banks to give out what they consider to be private information and
because of poor record keeping at various banks. Seven out of 19 banks
were sampled. Only five were able and willing to provide even the limited
information in Table 4-18, and, as noted earlier, before the information
was released the author had to promise not to mention the actual names of
the banks. The three largest commercial banks in Nigeria mentioned in
Chapter Three, however, are represented among the five in Table 4-18.
Loans to three categories of borrowers, individuals, limited liability
firms, and cooperative societies are depicted in the table.
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TABLE 4-18
DESTINATION OF LOANS UNDER THE AGRICULTURAL
CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEME (ACGS) BY BANK
(All Money Values in N)
Category of
Borrowers
Number
of Loans
Total Amount
Granted
Total Amount Requested
by Grantees I
Individuals
Limited Liability
Firms
Cooperative
Societies
Bank A (as of April 27, 1979)
9 237,600
261,000
0
Bank B (May 1978 to May 1979)
Individuals 254
Firms
Cooperative
Societies
4,052,287
4,066,593
1,033,5002
Bank C (Amounts Recommended for Approval
Sept. 1978 to June 1979 by
Recommending Officer
Individuals
Firms
Cooperative
Societies
Individuals
Firms
Cooperative
Societies
Firms
1,139,744
1,555,600
2 80,000
(Amounts Actually Approved)
3 179,397
3 115,000
0 0
Bank D (as of April 1979)
2 289,940
(continued on following page)
417,375
2,350,998
0
5,848,604
6,534,560
924,308
3,149,265
2,243,440
463,724
289,940
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TABLE 4-18
(continued)
Category of Number Total Amount Total Amount Requested
Borrowers of Loans Granted by Grantees 1
Bank E (as of December 31, 1978;
Information for Eight Branches Only)
Individuals 40 474,731
Firms 5 196,878
Cooperative 8 700,000
Societies
iInformation on total amount requested by everyone (grantees and
others) applying for funds was either not available or was not released
to the researcher during field surveys.
2The total amount granted in this case was more than the amount
requested, probably because the Bank considered that one or two of the
cooperative societies required more money than requested in order to
successfully carry out the proposed projects.
3Only information on the two loans granted was provided by this
bank.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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The category 'individuals' represents individual direct borrowers
from the bank headquarters and their branches. Since the majority of
the country's farmers are to be found in the rural areas, a preponderance
of rural-based borrowers would have been expected, especially under a
scheme developed to assist small farmers. This was not, however, the case
from the information revealed to the author through the names, titles,
and positions of these borrowers. This information (which, because of
bank rules, could not even be extracted in writing from their records)
showed the predominance of urban-based 'farmers' (university lecturers
and their wives, army officers and their wives, school teachers, top
ranking civil servants, businessmen, and private sector managers), who
would have the type of collateral demanded by the banks. A few rural-
based farmers were included, but they were mostly the rural elite, such
as village heads and district clerks. One bank did give upwards of ten
loans to small non-elite rural farmers, but these were farmers involved
in a World Bank scheme, and their loans had been granted with special
recommendations from the scheme.
Limited liability firms are registered firms claiming to be involved
in agricultural activities. Cooperative societies, as seen in previous
sections, represent groups of rural farmers. The figures in the table
show the loans that were actually granted by the banks to each of these
groups. Except in the case of Bank A, where the author was told that no
cooperative societies had applied, and Bank C, where figures on number of
loans recommended for approval and number actually approved were given,
there is no indication of how many applications were turned down. The
figures show that individuals and firms received the bulk of the total
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number of loans granted by the banks as of the dates reported in the table.
Cooperative societies received less. These societies may not apply for
loans, as in the case of Bank A, because they may get enough from govern-
ment sources. However, the societies are also reluctant to try commercial
banks, because they often face the same barriers as individual rural bor-
rowers. They may not have the types of collateral or security attractive
to the commercial banks, and could be turned down for loans unless they
can obtain a government agency or ministry guarantee to back up their
requests. And commercial banks are not, of course, interested in wooing
cooperative societies.
In cases where cooperative societies do apply, their treatment is
uncertain. They may receive favorable treatment, as in Banks B and E,
or their requests could be completely denied, as was the case with amounts
actually approved in Bank C. Although cooperative society membership
sizes were not available to the author in this case, it is clear (if the
range of sizes of 45 to 140 members found during the survey is taken as
an indication) that each cooperative society member may receive no more
than a few hundred, or at most a thousand, Naira by the time their loan
is shared out among all members. This is in contrast to the urban-based
individual borrowers whose per capita loan shares run, on the average,
into several thousand Naira.
The differential in loan shares could be partly explained by the
fact that the agricultural expenditures outlined by the urban-based bor-
rowers run several times higher than those of their rural counterparts.
However, the high economic and social positions of the urban-based borrow-
ers and their ownership of attractive collateral probably enables them
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to command loan amounts sometimes in excess of actual needs. Even among
these individual urban-based borrowers, the distribution of loans could
be heavily skewed in favor of a few persons.
For example, in a branch of one of the banks in Table 4-18, one
businessman, within a short period of time, applied for and received three
separate loans, ostensibly for different cash crops,for an amount totalling
N 460,000. In another branch of the same bank, another businessman was
granted separate loans totalling N 200,000. Anecdotal information from
the agricultural loan managers or officers of the commercial banks reveals
that they have encountered several instances where these individual loans
were definitely not invested in agricultural activities, since site inspec-
tions of the agricultural facilities of these borrowers showed little or
no activity.
Other circumstantial evidence that points to the preponderance of
urban-based, well-off borrowers among the participants in the Agricultural
Credit Guarantee Scheme is contained in the type of agricultural activities
for which the loans under the scheme are being made. It is open and veri-
fiable knowledge in Nigeria that very few if any rural farmers are involved
in running modern poultry facilities. The farmers do keep some chickens,
along with other livestock, such as goats, cows and sheep. Yet, as is
visible in Table 4-19, 32% of the total number of loans under the ACGS
(representing one-half of the total loaned sum) were made for setting up
modern poultry facilities, probably proposed by the more sophisticated
urban borrowers. Though the borrowers may locate some of these poultries
in their home villages, a good number also use the back gardens of their
urban homes or pieces of land acquired on the outskirts of the metropoli-
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TABLE 4-19
SUMMARY OF LOANS GUARANTEED BY THE AGRICULTURAL
CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEME FUND BY PURPOSE, 1978
Purpose
Poultry
Cattle
Other Livestock
Mixed Farming
Grains
Tuber and
Root Crops
Other Crops
TOTAL
Number
of Loans
109
35
79
37
53
341
Percent of
Total Number
of Loans
32.0
6.5
1.8
10.3
23.2
10.9
15.5
100.2
Amount
of Loan
(N '000s)
5,680.0
347.0
13.0
1,555.5
2,277.7
590.5
820.7
11,284.4
Percent of
Total Amount
of Loans
50.3
3.1
0.1
13.8
20.2
5.2
7.3
100.0
due to rounding.
SOURCE: Compiled from Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund,
Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, December 31, 1978.
NOTE: Percentage totals may not add up to 100.0
213
tan area. This means that the demonstration effect on rural farmers of
having modern facilities that could introduce them to modern practices is
also lost. The output of poultry farms is purchased only sporadically
by the urban poor. The main consumers are the middle- and upper-income
classes for whom these products are affordable on a regular basis.
Although the evidence presented here on commercial banks' lending
activities is scanty and far from conclusive, it is suggestive of the fact
that commercial banks in Nigeria behave so as to ration rural, especially
poor rural, farmers out of the market for agricultural loans.
Cooperative societies are another set of institutions involved in
channeling loans to farmers. These societies are geared specifically
toward on-lending activities for rural, particularly poor rural, farmers.
With regard to these village-level societies, the questions are: To what
extent are those who belong to the societies (coop members), and thus
have access to formal loans, more well off than those who do not (non-coop
members)? What is the structure of control of these societies? How well
are the poorer farmers (defined as those whose total cash incomes were
N 0 - 499 in the study year) who gain access to the societies treated rela-
tive to other members with regard to loan shares? To answer these questions,
several measures of wealth were developed for purposes of comparison
between coop members and non-coop members. Data deficiencies have been
discussed in Chapter One. Because of these deficiencies, the measures
developed are far short of perfect. However, they do provide some indica-
tion of differences between the groups of interest.
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The measures used are Mean Total Cash Income. This is cash income
from farm and non-farm sources per respondent. It does not include cash
income from other members of the respondent's household; and, as noted in
Chapter One, this may be a significant deficiency in the case of households
where female-generated incomes are important. Mean Per Capita Cash Income
is the respondent's cash income divided among members of the respondent's
household or dependents. The Mean Asset amount is again per respondent.
Assets include livestock--goats, cows, chickens, sheep, donkeys and other
animals--as well as valuable property, such as bicycles, motorcycles, and
other motor vehicles. Land is not included because in the majority of
these communities it is not ordinarily saleable by those who farm it.
Instead, the Mean Number of Acres Farmed in the study is measured separately
for those respondents for whom the figures were available. The other
measures used are the number of respondents giving loans to other villagers
in each subgroup, and the mean amount loaned out per respondent in each
subgroup. This use of lending activity as a measure is done on the assump-
tion that lending is some function of income, though it is, of course, a
function of other variables such as reciprocity.
Using these measures, the figures in Tables 4-20 and 4-21 indicate
the differences between coop members and non-coop members. In addition,
a test for statistical significance in the differences (at the 5% level)
is made for some of the measures in Table 4-20. The figures in the tables
show that coop members tend, on average, to have higher cash incomes and
greater assets than non-coop members. Coop members are also apparently
more willing and able to lend than non-coop members. However, except for
the differences in lending performance, none of the other measured differ-
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TABLE 4-20
INDICATORS OF WEALTH: COOP MEMBERS AND NON-COOP MEMBERS COMPARED
(All Money Values in N)
Coop Non-Coop
Members Members F-Statistic Significance
Mean Total Cash Income
(per respondent)
Mean Per Capita Cash
Income (per respondent's
dependents)
Mean Asset Amount
(per respondent)
Mean Amount Loaned Out
to Other Villagers
(per respondent)
Mean Number of Acres
Farmed in Study Year
1599.0
139.8
966.9
85.1
24.61
1226.9
128.9
748.8
32.8
21.02
2.04
0.24
0.57
5.99
0.16
0.63
0.45
0.02
IMean for 72 out of 83 respondents.
2Mean for 41 out of a total of 57 respondents.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
TABLE 4-21
LENDING BY INDIVIDUALS: COOP MEMBERS AND NON-COOP MEMBERS COMPARED
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
Number Lending
40 out of 83
18 out of 57
9 out of 40
4 out of 27
31 out of 43
14 out of 30
SOURCE: Field surveys.
Total
Sample
Southern
Villages
Northern
Villages
Percent
48.2
31.6
22.5
14.8
72.1
46.7
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ences are statistically significant. This would seem to imply that it
would be dangerous to conclude that coop members are significantly better
off than non-coop members.1
When these measures are examined on a regional basis, however (Tables
4-22 and 4-23), a difference emerges between the north and south. Whereas
coop members are definitely better off than non-coop members in the south
(the measured differences are statistically significant in three cases),
this is not the case in the north where, again, only differences in amounts
loaned per respondent show statistical significance. The lumping together
of these north/south figures thus accounts for the inconclusiveness of
the figures in Table 4-20.
The fact that better-off people in the south may indeed tend to have
greater access to cooperative society membership is supported by the rea-
sons given by non-coop members for not joining the cooperative societies
(Table 4-24). Among the most frequently mentioned reasons are the barriers
caused by the monetary requirement for joining, such as the amount needed
for buying a minimum number of shares, and the tips that may be demanded by
a coop member asked for introductions to the society by a non-coop member
(row 1), as well as the feeling that the societies are for elites only
(row 3). These reasons were either not mentioned in the north or were less
frequently mentioned.
The evidence on lack of difference in assets and income between coop
members and non-coop members in the north is surprising and demands explana-
1Note, however, that coop members perform consistently better than
non-coop members on all five measures of wealth. The interesting question
is the overall probability that this should be so.
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TABLE 4-22
INDICATORS OF WEALTH IN SOUTHERN VILLAGES:
COOP MEMBERS AND NON-COOP MEMBERS COMPARED
(Money Values in N)
Coop Non-Coop
Members Members F-Statistic Significance
Mean Total Cash Income 912.2 495.3 7.69 0.01
(per respondent)
Mean Per Capita Cash
Income (per respondent's 123.6 80.3 3.87 0.05
dependents)
Mean Asset Amount 429.6 191.7 5.36 0.02
(per respondent)
Mean Amount Loaned Out
to Other Villagers 29.7 8.0 0.94 0.34
(per respondent)
Mean Number of Acres 8.91 6.72
Farmed in Study Year
iMean for 30 out of total of 40 respondents. Information not avail-
able for the remainder.
2Mean for 17 out of total of 27 respondents.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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TABLE 4-23
INDICATORS OF WEALTH IN NORTHERN VILLAGES:
COOP MEMBERS AND NON-COOP MEMBERS COMPARED
(Money Values in N)
Coop Non-Coop
Members Members F-Statistic Significance
Mean Total Cash Income 2237.8 1885.3 0.68 0.41
(per respondent)
Mean Per Capita Cash
Income (per respondent's 154.8 172.7 0.23 0.63
dependents)
Mean Asset Amount 1491.1 1250.2 0.21 0.65
(per respondent)
Mean Amount Loaned Out
to Other Villagers 135.4 55.1 6.08 0.02
(per respondent)
Mean Number of Acres 35.71 31.42
Farmed in Study Year
IMean for 42 out of 43 respondents.
2Mean for 24 out of 30 respondents.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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TABLE 4-24
REASONS GIVEN BY NON-COOP MEMBERS FOR NOT JOINING
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY, BY REGION
Number of
Times Mentioned
South North
1. Monetary constraints: No money to buy shares
or give tips to people for introduction to 5 3
the society, or for any required contribution
2. Was not allowed to join; told membership 3 1
filled up
3. Didnot try because of feeling it is for 5
elites only
4. Was sick at the time 5 -
5. Did not know when people were joining, or 2 9
was not around at the time
6. Did notwant to be indebted, or was not
interested in joining because of availability 3 4
of other loan sources
7. Did not know the benefits of joining 2 2
8. Didnot know procedures for joining 4 2
9. Did-not know a person could belong to both
the cooperative and other informal savings 2 -
and loan organizations at the same time
10. The loans do not arrive at the time needed - 3
11. Loan amounts are too small 1 8
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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tion, because it differs from what has been found in earlier research car-
ried out in the north and in other parts of Nigeria (e.g., see King, 1976).
Part of the explanation seems to lie in one of the answers given by non-
coop members in the north for not joining the cooperative society (Table
4-24, column 11). The small size of the loan amounts given by the coopera-
tive societies in the north is the second-most frequently mentioned reason
for not joining the societies. That is, some potential borrowers feel that
loan amounts are so small when compared with their expenditures, that it
is not worthwhile to go through the procedures for joining the cooperative
society.
Figures for total expenditures, i.e., farm, consumption, and non-farm
expenditures, are not available for the sample. However, when mean loan
amounts are compared with mean farm expenditures for coop members in the
north and south, the notion of small loan-to-expenditure ratios espoused
by the non-coop members in the north is borne out. The figures in Table
4-25 show that, on the average, coop members in the north receive much
less in loans than their southern counterparts (N 133 as compared with
N 262). Within the income groupings, southern coop members receive loan
amounts that more than compensate for their farm expenditures. This is
not the case in the north, where, particularly for the highest income
group, the loan-to-expenditure ratio of 0.1 is a very small number.
Unlike their southern counterparts, the more well-off farmers in the
north, on the average, appropriate less, on a per capita basis, of the
total loan amounts. 1 This is probably due to the smaller total loan
1Note, however, that as a group they still command the largest
share of the total amount of loans.
TABLE 4-25
MEAN AMOUNTS BORROWED FROM FORMAL
SOUTH
Mean
Amount
Borrowed
261.5
134.0
500-1499 303.7
813.3
Number
Borrowing
40 out of 40
Mean
Farm
Exp.
107.2
225.4
641.2
SYSTEM (COOPERATIVE SOCIETY) BY REGION AND INCOME GROUP
(All Money Values in N)
NORTH
Ratio of
Loan to
Farm Exp.
1.3
1.4
1.3
Mean
Amount
Borrowed
133.0
106.7
113.0
146.6
Number
Borrowing
43 out of 43
3
16
Mean
Farm
Exp.
173.3
406.1
24 1255.7
Ratio of
Loan to
Farm Exp.
0.6
0.3
0.1
SOURCE: Field surveys.
Entire
Sample
of Coop
Members
Cash
Income
Groups
0-499
1500 and
Above
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amounts available for sharing in the north, coupled with the greater
sense of responsibility of richer farmers toward poorer ones (according
to Moslem tradition) in the north than in the south. These factors thus
serve to make cooperative society membership currently least attractive
for the extremely well-off farmers in the north. The recent rapid growth
in farm expenditures (see Chapter One) caused by the price rises in the
largest input (labor) and the much slower growth in loan amounts has ren-
dered cooperative society membership much less attractive to richer farm-
ers in today's northern villages than in the past. This has the interest-
ing implication that one way of keeping richer farmers out of cooperative
societies is to keep total loan amounts small enough so that any per capita
shares they may receive will prove insignificant when compared with their
overall expenditures.
Within the cooperative societies themselves, when the structure of
control is examined (compare Tables 4-26 and 4-27), a pattern emerges
which is similar to that discussed above in the comparison between coop
members and non-coop members. In the south, the committee members who
control the societies are much wealthier than the rest of the members.
This is not the case in the north. The findings in the north are again
contrary to expectations. It would be expected that even if there is no
differentiation on the average between coop members and non-coop members
in terms of wealth, within the societies themselves, where richer and
poorer farmers exist, the richer farmers would be in control of the soci-
eties because of their greater prestige.
In the northern villages, the committee members, on the average, are
not better off than other coop members. If anything, they are less well-
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TABLE 4-26
INDICATORS OF WEALTH: COMMITTEE MEMBERS OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES
(All Money Values in N)
Members in Members in
All Committee Northern Southern
Members Villages Villages
(Sample = 18) (Sample = 9) (Sample = 9)
Mean Total 1689.2 1903.6 1474.9
Cash Income
Mean Per Capita 152.2 140.0 171.5
Cash Income
Mean Asset Amount 875.8 1034.1 735.0
Mean Numberea  29.6 37.1 20.0
Acres Farmed
Mean Number
of Years 3.2 2.3 4.1
Western-Type
Education
Mean Amount
Borrowed 466.4 227.2 705.6
from Coop
NOTE: The difference in mean per capita cash income between
committee members in the north and south is accounted for by the much
larger mean household sizes of northern committee members (12.5 persons
on average per household in the north compared with 7.5 in the south).
Furthermore, it may be that committee members in the north need to
borrow less for "farming" because larger household sizes indicate larger
labor supplies for household farms. This latter point is, however,
debatable, since northern committee members also have on average much
larger farms than those in the south.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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TABLE 4-27
INDICATORS OF WEALTH: COOP MEMBERS (EXCLUDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS)
(All Money Values in N)
Total
Coop Members
(Sample=65)
Northern Villages
Coop Members
(Sample=34)
Southern Villages
Coop Members
(Sample=31)
Mean Total
Cash Income
(per respondent)
Mean Per Capita
Cash Income (per
respondent's
dependents)
Mean Asset Amount
(per respondent)
Mean Number
Acres Farmed
Mean Number Years
Western-Type
Education
Mean Amount
Borrowed from
Formal System
SOURCE: Field surveys.
1572.4
144.3
1005.6
19.9
0.4
145.6
2326.3
158.1
1642.4
34.3
0.2
106.0
748.8
111.1
341.0
4.1
0.4
132.6
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off, as can be seen by comparing Tables 4-26 and 4-27. This difference
in control is explicable by the fact that in the south, there is a strong
correlation between being wealthy and having some degree of Western-type
education. In the north, where community leaders and richer villagers
traditionally spearheaded the attacks on non-Islamic education, this is
not the case. Hence, with the need for Western-educated people to run
the societies so as to maintain record keeping procedures compatible with
those in the government cooperative offices, the better-off cooperative
society members in the northern villages (with their low or zero education
levels) were less able to gain control of the societies than their better-
educated southern counterparts. In both northern and southern villages,
however, committee members used their positions to acquire much larger
mean per capita loan shares than the rest of the coop members. The dif-
ferential in the south between committee members and other coop members
is particularly noticeable.
One important point in favor of the cooperative societies is the
treatment of lower-income farmers with regard to mean per capita loan
shares and farm expenditures (see Table 4-25). Even though upper-income
farmers do command larger per capita and larger absolute loan shares than
farmers in the lowest income group, these latter farmers fare reasonably
well when the mean per capita shares they receive is compared to mean farm
expenditures. In the south, these farmers are, on average, more than com-
pensated for their farm expenditures, just as is the case for the upper-
income farmers. In the north, as noted previously, the lower-income farm-
ers enjoy a larger loan-to-farm expenditure ratio than the upper-income
farmers. This means that if poorer farmers are afforded access to coop-
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erative society loans, they stand a good chance of favorable treatment
relative to farming costs in the society loan sharing process.
There are usually problems of cause and effect relationships during
a socio-economic research exercise, such as in this study, and another
logical interpretation of the figures presented above is at least possible.
This alternative interpretation would suggest that the coop members in the
south were not, on the average, necessarily wealthier than non-coop mem-
bers at the time of joining the cooperative society, but rather they
became better off after joining because they could use relatively low-
interest cooperative society loans to enrich themselves. While this could
conceivably be the case, anecdotal information from non-coop members as
to the long-term status of most coop members in their village makes it
doubtful that these people were not also better off to begin with. Further-
more, the testimony of these non-coop members as to the peopling of the
society with elites (Table 4-24) suggests that the coop members in the
south were indeed on the average the better-off people in their villages
even before joining the cooperative societies. In one village, for
instance, the long-standing ruling family had four members in their village
cooperative society, and these members were, in effect, the society's con-
trolling officers. In any case, even if the above alternative interpreta-
tion of the figures is accepted, it does not detract from one of the main
points in this author's argument which concerns the present-day underlying
inequities in the credit distribution mechanism in both the north and the
south.
Cooperative society members are the only ones who, by virtue of
their membership, are assured access to formal loans in each year that
227
loans are made available. Non-members cannot obtain cooperative loans.
Membership expansion may be restricted in any year by members (see Table
4-24), and by the government cooperative offices (when the loans available
to these offices for disbursement are very small), so that only a sprink-
ling of additional farmers can join. In this situation, the welfare gap
between those who can obtain low-interest formal loans and those who can-
not will continue to widen.
It is obvious from the discussion above that just as with the produc-
tion objectives of credit policy in Nigeria, problems exist with the welfare
objectives. Commercial bank agricultural loans tend to be concentrated on
rich, upper- and middle-class, urban-based borrowers. At the village level,
in at least one part of the country, wealthy rural farmers may be the ones
who are largely enjoying the benefits of cooperative society loans. And
if this is the case--as the data for the southern villages suggests, then
the situation is further compounded by the fact that these same privileged
coop members appear to have greater access to interest-free (i.e., free of
monetary interest) loan sources in the informal loan market. Thus, in both
Tables 4-28 and 4-29, a greater percentage of coop members' loans are
obtained from relatives and friends, compared with loans for non-coop members.
A relatively large percentage of non-coop members' loans are borrowed from
the interest-charging savings organizations. This difference is even more
marked in the south (Table 4-29), where the inequities in the distribution
system appear to be more prominent.
What is certainly suggested by the data presented in this section
(if welfare objectives are to be achieved) is the necessity for a rethink-
ing of interest rate policy,along with structural reforms in the organiza-
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TABLE 4-28
INDEBTEDNESS TO THE INFORMAL SECTOR BY SOURCE:
COOP MEMBERS AND NON-COOP MEMBERS COMPARED,
NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN VILLAGES COMBINED
Source
Savings
Organization
Moneylender
Patron
Relatives
Friends
TOTAL
% of Coop Members' Loans
Borrowed from Source
5.4
2.7
5.4
54.1
32.4
100.0
% of Non-Coop Members' Loans
Borrowed from Source
36.1
33.3
30.6
100.0
1Total number of loans borrowed by coop members = 37.
2Total number of loans borrowed by non-coop members = 36.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
TABLE 4-29
INDEBTEDNESS TO THE INFORMAL SECTOR BY SOURCE:
COOP MEMBERS AND NON-COOP MEMBERS COMPARED,
SOUTHERN VILLAGES
Source
Savings
Organization
Moneylender
Relatives
Friends
TOTAL
% of Coop Members' Loans
Borrowed from Source
8.3
4.2
45.8
41.7
100.0
% of Non-Coop Members' Loans
Borrowed from Source
56.5
0
8.7
34.8
100.0
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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tion of the credit distribution mechanism. In the next section, other
factors that highlight the need for interest rate reform will be discussed.
Assumption (6)
Lack of credit is the most important financial service problem in
the rural areas. Savings mobilization is relatively unimportant since
savings capacities are quite low. Given this, there is little need to
revise the interest rate structure in favor of savings.
In Chapters Two and Three of this study, the fundamental reasoning
accounting for assumption (6) was discussed. King (1976) aptly summarizes
the essential points that lie behind this emphasis on credit, as opposed
to savings, in Nigeria and other developing countries. Agricultural (land
and labor) productivity is customarily low. The rate of accumulation by
farmers of capital goods that could increase this productivity is also
very low. Policy-makers reason that this low capital accumulation is due
to the fact that farmers' production is barely sufficient for their consump-
tion needs, implying that there is little or nothing left over for the sav-
ings necessary for the acquisition of capital goods. The logical remedy
to the situation, therefore, is the infusion of credit--particularly low-
interest credit--into the farmer's production cycle. King notes that "this
reasoning is particularly attractive because it suggests that a little
lubricant in the form of credit supplied by the government will automati-
cally set in motion the machinery of agricultural development in rural
areas." (!'Capital, Credit and Savings . . .", p. 17)
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Arguments and data presented in previous sections of this chapter
suggest that such low-interest credit policies not only face difficulties
in achieving these agricultural development objectives, but also actually
tend to prove detrimental to the interests of poorer farmers.
If it could be proved that savings capacities are not insignificant
in rural areas, that farmers are interested in savings mobilization efforts,
and that poorer farmers may stand to benefit more from an emphasis on sav-
ings mobilization than they currently do by the stress on disbursement of
government credit, then a further argument could be made for a re-examina-
tion of current credit policies which, in addition to their other disad-
vantages, serve to discourage savings by under-rewarding savers.
The evidence on savings capacities and availability in Nigeria's
rural areas is very limited, and has been compiled mainly through the
scattered case studies of researchers in different rural areas of the
country. Matlon (1978) remarks on the contradictory nature of this evi-
dence with some studies indicating the existence of significant savings
capacities and savings availability in the rural areas, while others point
to radically different conclusions.
Matlon cites two studies--that of Zuckerman carried out in 1970-71
and one by Simmons (1976)--that seem to support the popular notion of zero
savings capacities in Nigeria's rural areas. In his study of three western
villages, Zuckerman found that annual expenditures exceeded income by
between 10 and 30%. He concluded that while dissaving of this magnitude
was unlikely, savings close to zero were probable for the average small
farmer (Matlon, p. 5). Simmons conducted a study in three villages in
the Zaria area of northern Nigeria and found shortfalls of incomes below
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expenditures roughly similar to the ones found by Zuckerman (Matlon, p. 5).
Different conclusions than the ones suggested above have been arrived
at by several other researchers in studies carried out in varying time
periods. Galletti and Baldwin (1956) and Vigo (1965), in their respective
studies in western and northern Nigeria, found evidence of extensive cash-
lending activities by higher-income farmers, indicating high savings capa-
cities by these farmers (Matlon, p. 6). Upton, in a 1967 study of six
villages in southwest Nigeria, found average savings propensities of between
16.7 and 37.1% for the sample of farm families there, while marginal sav-
ings propensities ranged from 0.2 to 0.8 (cited in Ojo, 1976, p. 75;
Matlon, 1978, p. 5).
Matlon himself, in a 1978 study in northern Nigeria, noted that posi-
tive or negative savings rates could be found for farm households in dif-
ferent income groups, depending on the treatment given female-generated
incomes. In his study, when male and female (but predominantly male) har-
vesting incomes were considered, four out of his seven income groupings
emerged with positive savings ratios. Extremely high rates of dissaving
(-94.9% and -53.3%) were found for the poorest two income classes. When
female off-farm incomes (not necessarily full employment) were considered,
however, as being made available to the males on a loan basis for agricul-
tural investment purposes, positive savings ratios were calculated for all
but the poorest two income groups. The average household savings for the
entire sample amounted to N 68 (or 16%) of net household income. Dissaving
for the two lowest income groups in this instance fell to -23.5% and
-14.6%, respectively. Under a full-employment assumption for women in the
lowest two income groups, dissaving for these groups fell further to -7.1%
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and -3.7% (pp. 23-25). Such evidence leads to the conclusion that for all
but the very lowest income groups, the capacity for savings does exist,
and even when predominantly male incomes are considered, middle-to-higher
income groups are still able to save.
Other support for the existence of positive savings capacities in
the rural areas comes from a study of rotating credit and savings associa-
tions (esusus) undertaken by Miller and Okorie (1976) in eastern Nigeria.
They found that the 25 clubs studied succeeded in accumulating in 1974,
in Miller's words, "an impressive total of N 17,925 or N 13.63 per member."
(Miller, 1977, p. 103)
A 1977 study of five non-rotating savings organizations, undertaken
by the author in Ogwashi-Uku (a rural area of Bendel State), showed similar
per member savings of N 17 for the calendar year. King (1976) notes that
the existence of various savings-credit arrangements and institutions in
northern Nigeria signifies a capacity for savings, even though these sav-
ings may be made largely for ceremonial purposes. Thus, "Biki," a system
of mutual obligation between partners of the same sex in which gifts are
exchanged to help each other fulfill ceremonial obligations, is one such
arrangement. The rotating credit associations, "adashi" (esusus in the
south), that in the north are patronized mainly by women, is another. In
addition to these ceremony-related savings, King also reports the deposit-
ing by poorer farmers with rich traders of harvest-time savings to be
withdrawn and utilized at the beginning of the next cultivating season.
He notes that most farmers may save in the form of commodities or live-
stock.
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Information gathered in this study, while far from conclusive, tends
to support this notion that a good number of farm households in the rural
areas do save, and the savings are made not just for ceremonial purposes.
Like the earlier Galletti and Baldwin (1956) and Vigo (1958) studies,
extensive lending activities were found in the villages studied. Farmers
obtained loans from other farmers (relatives, friends, and patrons) in
amounts ranging from N 10 to N 1000 (see Table 4-6). And most of these
loans were made in the difficult April-to-July period of the planting
season, when the lenders themselves must have needed cash for production
and consumption purposes. It must mean then that there were farm house-
holds with available surplus cash in these villages.
More direct evidence on savings availability was obtained by asking
respondent-farmers if they had any savings in cash in the study year.
The author made an attempt to distinguish savings from cash held for cycli-
cal consumption purposes. Although the distinction may have been difficult
for respondents, they seemed to understand what was meant. Table 4-30
shows that 41% of the sample admitted to having cash savings. This is
encouraging, given the tendency for a downward bias in the figures because
of farmers' natural reluctance to admit having savings. The percentage of
savers was slightly higher in the north than in the south, where, as is
evident from previous tables (see for instance Table 4-22 and 4-23), cash
farm incomes are higher.
The relationship between savings and income is confirmed in Table
4-31, which shows savings availability by income group. The figures indi-
cate that the highest income group also contains the largest number of
savers. The surprising factor, however, is the small but significant
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TABLE 4-30
AVAILABILITY OF CASH SAVINGS
Region
Total Sample
Northern Villages
Southern Villages
Number of Respondents % Having Cash Savings
Having Cash Savings Within Group
58 out of 140 41.4
32 out of 73 43.8
26 out of 67 38.8
SOURCE: Field surveys.
TABLE 4-31
SAVINGS AVAILABILITY BY INCOME
Total Cash Income
Group (N)
0 - 499
500 - 1499
1500 and Above
TOTAL
Number of Persons
Within Income Group
Having Cash Savings
13
14
31
58
Percent of
Total Number
22.4
24.1
53.5
100.0
SOURCE: Field surveys.
percentage of savers in the lowest income group. So, while most farm-
households in the low strata of rural income may not be able to save
(on a net basis), there are a significant number in this group who are
able to put some cash aside, at least at some point during the year.
GROUP
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Obtaining information on where people had their cash savings was a
much more sensitive issue, and only a few farmers volunteered such infor-
mation when asked. Savings were kept with a variety of sources, almost
none of which paid any interest. In fact, in a few instances, respondents
paid a small commission to have their savings held for them. Two respon-
dents noted that they gave their savings to their patrons (other wealthy
farmer-traders) to hold for them and gave the patron or his children small
gifts for this favor. One person saved with an "indigenous banker."
Indigenous bankers are a new and fast spreading breed of people in the
informal financial markets who, for a fee, provide banking-type facilities
for those interested in saving.1
1Indigenous bankers could be urban- or rural-based men or women.
They go around collecting savings deposits from interested people.
Although only one person in the sample admitted to saving with such a
banker, others in the sample and in the villages described the way these
people function. In two of the cases described, one in the village of
Giwa in the north, the other in Araromi in the south, the indigenous bank-
ers were young men who rode in on motorcycles every village market day
(every three or four days, as the case may be) from the neighboring cities
of Zaria and Ibadan. The 'banker' from Zaria was a junior worker employed
in some capacity at Ahmadu Bello University. The occupation of the one
from Ibadan was not clear. These young men collected deposits from sev-
eral participating villagers (men only in Giwa, men and women in Araromi).
The deposits ranged from 20 kobo to N 2, depending on the income or desires
of each depositor. The amounts were kept constant to make record keeping
easier and also to enable the depositor to keep track of his savings.
The bankers recorded each deposit in a big notebook against the saver's
name. At the end of each month, a depositor could either collect his sav-
ings minus the amount of first deposit (which went to the banker as a fee)
or continue making deposits. Some people said that these bankers kept the
savings collected in a bank account in the city. Others were not sure
what was done with the savings. No one reported loss or embezzlement as
yet.
Such a system of banking requires enormous trust on the part of
the depositors--trust which is possible if the bankers belong originally
to the village communities from which they collect deposits. This was
the case in Araromi. In Giwa, it was not so clear if the banker was a
member of the village or if his family still resided there. But from
what the author was told, he clearly had strong connections in the vil-
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Several respondents mentioned keeping deposits with "safe" socie-
ties. These societies are a non-rotating variant of the much described
"esusus" (adashi) or rotating credit associations. Here, savers deposit
a certain and constant amount every week or every fortnight for a year or
more. Records are kept by an elected secretary, and sometimes, as was
the case in the rural area of Ogwashi-Uku, the deposits are literally kept
in a wooden box known as a safe--hence the name of these societies. In
the case of the "Alajeshekun" Society in Araromi, the money was kept at
the Cooperative Bank in Ibadan. Savers receive interest on their deposits
only to the extent that borrowers from the society pay interest (which is
shared among members according to the size of their contributions), or to
the extent that the commercial bank pays interest on the deposits, as with
the Alajeshekun Society in Araromi.
Other deposit arrangements or institutions utilized by respondents
included keeping savings in their own homes or participating in rotating
credit associations (Roscas). However, because of the attempt by the
author to avoid including cash destined for cyclical consumption expendi-
lage. Unfortunately, due to time constraints, interviews could not be
obtained from these bankers to inquire whether their visits included
other villages as well. In addition to the visiting young banker in
Araromi, a resident woman banker was also mentioned. These banking
activities must provide substantial benefits to the bankers, not only
in the form of fees received, but also in the form of interest-free
loans (which is, in effect, what these deposits are) that they can
invest in short-term activities of their own interest. The use of
these bankers by some rural savers indicates the great need by the savers
for a banking institution or arrangement that would provide depositor or
cash-management services.
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tures as savings, some of the respondents participating in Roscas I did
not count their deposits as savings.
Except for the amounts contributed to Roscas or "safes" (informa-
tion which respondents were not loath to part with), it was difficult to
obtain figures for actual amounts saved for respondents in the sample who
claimed they had cash savings. Only eight out of the 58 savers in the
sample revealed the amount they had saved in the study year, and only five
of these gave information as to the period of time over which savings were
made. These five belonged to a "safe" society. This information is con-
tained in Table 4-32, which also shows the total cash incomes of the
respondents in the study year. The information on the first respondent
in the table (Respondent A), showing fairly high savings in previous years
compared with cash income in the study year, appears unusual. This is
because the study year was an abnormal one for the respondent. His
cassava farm, from which most of his cash income would have been obtained,
IA notable point about Roscas and safes is the strong participation
of women. In the south, they may have their own associations (Okonjo,
1976) or become members of a joint female-male association. In the north,
Roscas are associated with women, although they are beginning to become
popular among men. The women use their lump sum takeouts to start a trade
(north and south) or to buy household goods for their daughters' weddings
(north). Some women who owned farms in the south even invested their take-
out in the farms. The lump sums in the north came to N 40 every fortnight
for two Roscas investigated in Giwa. These sums are fairly small because
of the smaller size of the membership in the north (10-30 women) and the
smaller contributions (due to women's limited economic activities), aver-
aging about 10 kobo per day. In Araromi in the south, contributions for
two 80- and 83-member female Roscas investigated averaged 15 kobo per
woman per day, and resulted in takeouts of approximately N 80 and N 83
per receiving member per week. Such activity by women indicates the
importance of securing their participation in potential savings drives.
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TABLE 4-32
INDICATION OF SAVINGS AMOUNTS AMONG STUDY SAMPLE
(All Money Values in N)
Cash Amount
Respondent Saved
A 100
B 100
C 72
D 800
E 40
F 72
G 40
H 80
Number of Years
over Which
Amount Saved
3
4
3
6
N.A.
3
N.A.
N.A.
Mean Cash
Savings
Per Annum
33.3
25.0
24.0
133.3
N.A.
24.0
N.A.
N.A.
Total Cash Income
of Respondent
in Study Year
(1978/79)
70
228
150
1510
409
272
95
810
N.A. = Not Available
SOURCE: Field surveys.
was, according to him, the object of an antelope attack, which left him
with lower than normal cash income in that year. Although average savings
ratios (in the accepted sense of the term) cannot be calculated for the
other respondents because of difficulties in the measurement of total cash
incomes (see Chapter One), if the total cash incomes of these respondents
in the study year is taken as a proxy for other years, it can be said that
respondents saved a low, but significant, percentage of their cash earn-
ings, given the savings-to-cash-income ratios of 9-16%.
Other data on amounts saved comes from the author's study (1977-
1978) of safes cited earlier. The information collected then (along with
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additional information on two other safes obtained during this study)
is presented in Table 4-33. The per member annual amount saved ranges
from N 10 to N 40 (actually on a 10-month basis). Except for the N 40
figure, these amounts may not appear so large on a per capita basis.
However, the amounts are significant when considered in terms of the zero
savings capacities attributed to farm households. Furthermore, as argued
in the earlier study, when these savings are looked at in terms of the
millions of potential savers in Nigeria's rural areas, the absolute sav-
ings amount that could be mobilized looms large indeed. The necessity
for mobilization efforts is made even more significant by the fact that
some of these savings could be idle for months and even years during the
duration of an association's savings period (usually one calendar year or
more). For example, as of September 1979, when the data for the Otu-Uka
association were collected, of the N 6787 saved, N 3342 was out on loan,
while N 3445 was lying idle in the association's safe. The occurrence of
such an event in a rural area where people are looking for loans under-
scores the communications and fragmentation problems that plague the infor-
mal rural financial markets.
In addition to the cash savings described, respondents also saved
'in-kind.' This became apparent when some farmers who said they had no
cash savings added, "but we have other types of savings." Savings in live-
stock was the most frequently mentioned 'in-kind' savings (five respondents),
though foodstocks was also mentioned (two respondents). The citing of
these in-kind savings was done by farmers in the northern villages and
prompted the addition to the questionnaire of questions about livestock
ownership in the study year--on the assumption that even respondents who
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TABLE 4-33
SAVINGS IN NON-ROTATING SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS ("SAFES")
(All Money Values in N)
Mean Per
Period Total Number Member
Association of Amount of Savings
Name Location Savings Saved Savers for Period
Onyeliyachei Ogwashi-Uku 1975 823 44 19
Onyeliyachei Ogwashi-Uku 1977 654 36 18
Aniuba Ogwashi-Uku 1977 452 29 16
Ogbe-Ofu Ogwashi-Uku 1977 3944 178 22
Ogbe-Ubu Ogwashi-Uku 1977 1000 100 10
Otu-Uka Ogwashi-Uku Dec. 1978 to 6787 168 40
Sept. 1979
Alajeshekun Araromi 1978 900 75 12
(a branch)
SOURCE: Field surveys in 1977 and 1979.
may not have said so could also have purchased livestock as a form of sav-
ings. The livestock figures given were then translated (after several
assumptions as to size and average worth--see Chapter One) by the author
into monetary figures.
These figures are presented by region and income group in Table
4-34. The type of animals that were considered for conversion into cash
figures were those on which the farmer was not directly dependent for food
or income earning purposes. Thus, cows (which are generally given to
Fulani herders for care and safekeeping), goats (whose milk is not popu-
larly consumed), sheep, chickens, ducks, and turkeys were considered for
conversion, while donkeys (used as pack animals) were excluded.
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TABLE 4-34
MEAN AMOUNTS INVESTED IN LIVESTOCK 1 BY REGION AND INCOME GROUPINGS
(N)
Total Cash
Income Group Northern Villages Southern Villages
Total Sample 876.4 279.0
0 - 499 76.0 179.9
500 - 1499 454.5 383.5
1500 and Above 1308.8 399.4
1This excludes work animals with which the farmer can earn a
direct livelihood, e.g., donkeys.
SOURCE: Field surveys
The figures in Table 4-34 show fairly high levels of cash accumulated
in the form of livestock over a number of years. In some cases, the figures
surpass the mean total cash income for the group in the study year. Unfor-
tunately, the number of livestock purchased during the study year itself
was not separated out. It is, therefore, impossible to make comparisons
between amounts invested in livestock and cash incomes for that year. As
would be expected, the mean amount accumulated in livestock in the north
is higher than in the south. This is because of the greater emphasis on
livestock in the north and the more nearly disease-free environment for
animals, as well as the lack of informal savings organizations, such as
"safes," where cash could be deposited.
The mean amount accumulated by the lowest income group in the north
is considerably lower than for the same group in the south, despite simi-
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lar mean total cash income figures (see Table 4-11). This could be due
to higher mean household sizes for this group in the north than in the
south, and also due to the fact that some of the lower income group farm-
ers in the north invested in donkeys, which they used to earn extra income
(carrying manure to other farms and carrying farm produce back).
The very high levels of livestock investment observed for the highest
income group in the north represents higher levels of cattle ownership.
King (1976) has noted that ownership of cattle constituted a long-term
investment and a sign of wealth conferring great prestige on the owner
(p. 92). High levels of cattle ownership, and indeed of other livestock,
was also an astute way of beating inflation and making quick gains, because
the animals could be fattened and sold off several months later. Food-
stocks of millet, maize, guinea-corn, and rice were also kept and sold off
for similar reasons. However, investing or saving in foodstocks was a much
riskier business because of storage problems resulting in spoilage. In one
of the villages visited, a farmer (who claimed he invested over N 2000 of
his own and a friend's savings in grains to be sold off later for gains) was
almost in tears when he showed the author the damage being done by insects
to the grain in his mud storage house.
Attempts to invest or save in livestock and foodgrains for the purpose
of making gains later indicate that if similar monetary rewards could be
offered by a savings institution to the farmers, they might be induced to
reduce the extent of their investment in tangible assets and make deposits
in cash instead.
The evidence presented in this section on savings availability and
savings capacities in rural areas, while not conclusive, is substantial
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enough to cast doubts on the assumption about lack of cash savings among
farm-households in the rural areas. The question is, if some farm-house-
holds do experience cash surpluses in certain years or at certain periods,
why are these surpluses not further invested in agricultural production?
Moreover, why is it that while some farm-households have surpluses, others
(even within the same geographical area) experience difficulties in obtain-
ing credit at certain periods? The answers to these questions seem to lie
in structural problems1 with agriculture and with the communications and
fragmentation problems that beset the rural informal financial markets.
In any case, what is apparent from the available data is that a sav-
ings mobilization effort in the rural areas would be a worthwhile project.
Part of this effort would involve setting up various types of savings
institutions--not just commercial banks--that could join with already
existing informal mechanisms in a savings mobilization effort. The offer-
ing of attractive savings incentives in the form of higher interest pay-
ments could be another part of the mobilization effort.2 This stress on
the role of financial intermediation in the savings effort is important
because as U Tun Wai (1972) noted, savings is a function not just of income,
but also of the degree and extent of financial intermediation. Thus, par-
1Part of the answer, of course, can be attributed to the personal
preferences of households, as well as differences between households.
2It should be noted, as discussed in Chapter Two, that setting up
appropriate and attractive institutional savings forms might initially
be more important than interest rate incentives. However, efforts to
maintain positive interest payments on savings may ultimately be impor-
tant if savers are to be effectively persuaded to switch away from sav-
ings in real assets to savings in financial assets.
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ticularly in the rural areas of developing countries, increased financial
intermediation could increase the savings rate through the widening of
savings opportunities, and the offering to the saver of a more preferred
package of yield, risk, and liquidity (p. 31).
Benefits of savings mobilization in the rural areas include the
extra income that would accrue to farm-households from the interest pay-
ments. This is especially relevant to poorer farmers, some of whom (as
has been pointed out) do save, because such interest payments could prove
to be a significant addition to their cash incomes. Furthermore, poorer
farmers would also benefit from a larger pool of cash available for lend-
ing, because if the pooling of more resources is coupled with the charging
of realistic interest rates on loans, their chances of being elbowed out
of the loan process would diminish, while the amounts they would receive
could increase.
In addition, if savings mobilized within a given community are also
loaned out within the same community, the risk of default would decrease
as social pressure by the community would encourage potential defaulters
to pay back the borrowed funds. Financial intermediaries themselves would
benefit from the type of mobilization effort being mentioned, because it
could lead to greater financial liquidity and higher earnings on their part.
In Chapter Five, the specific details about the various intermediaries
and intermediation packages that could be offered in the rural areas will
be dealt with in greater depth.
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Summary and Revision of Assumptions
The focus in this chapter has been on the presentation of evidence
that would help examine the validity of various assumptions underlying
present credit policy in Nigeria. The necessity for examining these common
assumptions arises out of their distorting influence on the direction and
scope of credit policy. Most of the evidence presented has not been of a
conclusive nature, but it has been significant enough to cast serious
doubts on the validity of virtually all the assumptions examined. Given
this fact, it would seem that, based on the findings in this chapter, a
rethinking and reformulation of the assumptions is in order as a guide to
alternative credit policies to be discussed in Chapter Five.
Reformulated Assumptions
Assumption (1)
Some rural farmers--particularly the poorer ones--do face credit
shortages, but it is doubtful whether this shortage is primarily for agri-
cultural credit.
Assumption (2)
Significant amounts of credit are readily available at reasonable
costs from a variety of informal sources. However, the length of time for
which informal sector loans are available is fraught with uncertainty and
can be extremely short. Therefore, within certain villages, and at certain
peak credit demand periods such as early in the planting season, additional
outside credit (particularly of a longer-term nature) may be necessary.
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Assumption (3)
It is doubtful whether credit availability has had much of an impact
on input adoption or output expansion under Nigerian conditions--particularly
on the expansion of the marketable surplus. It is more probable that at
present the mere availability of appropriate inputs and the instruction of
rural farmers on input use will have a more widespread effect on input
adoption than the provision of credit.
Assumption (4)
Rural farmers' demand for credit appears to be relatively interest
inelastic. The range of interest rates at which demand will sharply fall
off due to high prices is quite high. It would seem that present credit
institutions could charge nominal per annum rates as high as 40% before
demand really begins to fall off. Nevertheless, a study of different rural
credit environments is necessary, and flexibility is the key in formulating
interest rate policies.
Assumption (5)
Given the current interest rate structure and institutional practices,
the present credit distribution mechanism is biased against rural, particu-
larly poorer rural, farmers. The tendency toward bias may be less strong
in those parts of the country where the obligations of richer toward poorer
farmers is well established and where the amounts at stake for sharing are
smaller.
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Assumption (6)
Some cash savings are available in the rural areas, and savings
capacities are positive, particularly among wealthier farmers. Farm-
households exhibit interest in institutions that can perform savings and
cash management functions. Given this, there is a need to devise appro-
priate intermediary institutions and intermediation packages that would
also link up with existing informal savings mechanisms.
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CHAPTER FIVE
A NEW APPROACH TO CREDIT POLICY
Introduction
The concern in previous chapters of this study has been with point-
ing out the difficulties inherent in the Nigerian government's "blanket
type" credit approach to the rural-agricultural sector's problems. In
Chapter Four, in particular, six basic assumptions underlying credit
policy were examined. These assumptions were found to be of questionable
validity and in need of reframing to fit the realities of credit and sav-
ings needs and use in rural-agricultural areas. The reformulation of the
basic assumptions in the last chapter bring to light new directions in
which Nigerian credit policy ought to be moving.
The main task of this chapter is to outline and discuss the possible
new focus for Nigerian credit policy, including problems that might be
inherent in any new approach. The concern in this chapter will not be
so much with the specifics or exact details of a new credit policy (since
this requires a broader base of information than is available in this
study), but rather with a more generalized discussion of the directions
toward which policy ought to be oriented. It will be useful to begin
the discussion by reviewing briefly the major findings in Chapter Four.
From the discussion in Chapter Four, suggesting fairly substantial
borrowing activities in the rural areas, it would seem that many rural
farm-households do indeed require credit for their activities. However,
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this credit need may not be solely, or even primarily, for purposes of
agricultural production, since other types of activities may be more
profitable or beneficial in a welfare sense.
Many rural farm-households requiring credit seem able to fulfill a
substantial part of their needs from rural sources. This is supported by
indications (contrary to government's and conventional economists' beliefs;
see Chapters Two and Three) that some surplus cash does exist in the rural
areas. However, there are problems with the uncertain and short-term
structure of loans from the informal rural financial markets. Furthermore,
fragmentation in these informal markets means that surplus cash may be
available in one part of a village while credit needs go unfulfilled in
another part of the same village. In addition to the above, there are
certain credit needs, perhaps even for longer-term credit, that the infor-
mal rural financial markets (RFMs) at present seem incapable of fulfilling.
The formal financial institutions designated to serve the rural population--
cooperative societies, and particularly commercial banks--have been unable
to fill the service gap left by the informal RFMs. This has been due in
large part to low interest rate credit policies, which have made the rural
areas unprofitable for commercial operations.
The Chapter Four discussion has also brought out that, contrary to
the government's view of a high interest elasticity of demand for credit
on the part of the rural-agricultural population, rural farm-households
appear willing to pay fairly high rates of interest on loans. Since the
loans do not appear to be directed solely (or in some cases, mainly) at
increased agricultural investment, it must be that there exist other eco-
nomic and non-economic, off-farm activities (e.g., trading) with high
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enough pay-off rates to enable the payment of high rates of interest on
loans.
The above summary of the study findings suggests two major areas of
focus for a new credit policy. The first area is that of the need for
better financial intermediation services in the rural areas. Such ser-
vices must be more rural area-specific. That is, they must take into
account the financial services that already exist in the rural areas, the
needs and desires of rural farm-households for financial services, and
the constraints in providing these services from the lender side. A new
focus on intermediation should involve equal emphasis on both savings and
credit, including the implications of such an emphasis for a low interest
rate policy. Furthermore, if one of the objectives of credit policy is
to help improve rural incomes through increased financial services, then
there should be a realization that better financial intermediation ser-
vices need not necessarily be synonymous with better agricultural credit
services. This is because rural farm-households can use the intermedia-
tion services to foster investment in income-increasing, non-farm activi-
ties. Therefore, there should be the freedom within a new intermediary
network for a household requiring non-farm-related investment loans to
be able to obtain such loans.
The second major area of focus for a new credit policy involves the
improvement of agricultural production and the marketable surplus. Given
that (among those who receive credit) credit is not currently very effec-
tive in fostering increased agricultural input use or increase in the
marketable surplus, the relevant questions here should be: What are the
real constraints on agricultural production, and what are the implications
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of these constraints for rural incomes? Can credit be meaningfully used
to ease the constraints, or are other government policies more appropri-
ate? If credit appears useful, how can this credit be made most effec-
tively available to the agricultural sector?
The remainder of this chapter will consist of an elaboration of the
implications of the above two major focuses of a new credit policy.
Better Financial Intermediation Services
Credit policy must focus on the need for better financial
intermediation services in the rural areas, not just for
purposes of agricultural investment but for all types of
credit needs and for savings.
The need for better financial intermediaries in rural areas is cur-
rently being expressed by policy-makers in Nigeria. However, such expres-
sions fall far short of the approach that will be suggested in this chap-
ter, for they involve the proliferation in their current form of formal
intermediaries such as commercial banks. These intermediaries, as has
been discussed in Chapters Three and Four, have serious difficulties in
effectively serving the rural-agricultural population. It would seem
that a useful approach to formulating guidelines for better intermediation
services in the rural areas should involve asking the questions: What
type of financial intermediation services are needed, and what character-
istics of intermediaries seem most or least useful to rural farm-households?
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Useful Intermediary Services and Characteristics
From discussions in previous chapters, and as noted in the introduc-
tory summary in this chapter, it appears that rural farm-households need
some additional credit (in some cases, of a longer-term nature) from out-
side the rural areas. This credit could be for farm or off-farm invest-
ment, and maybe even for short-term consumption--the assumption here being
that all such needs are legitimate from the viewpoint of personal and
national welfare. It should be stressed, however, bearing in mind the
fungibility issue, that most of the credit requests reported by households
in the study sample were for investment rather than consumption activities.
(See Chapter Four.) Rural farm-households also need more effective savings
facilities and better intermediation services among individual households.
This intermediation should enable them to tap all the available financial
resources within the rural area itself.
Data from the study survey provide some information on the issue of
useful/desirable characteristics of financial intermediaries. The data
concern the opinions of farm-household heads surveyed about current (for-
mal and informal) RFMs with which they have either had dealings or about
which they have some knowledge. The questions asked to elicit opinions
on RFMs were open-ended, allowing the 1451 respondents to list as many
opinions as they wanted, and nothing if they had no opinions on the issue.
1It was noted in Chapter One that 145 respondents were interviewed,
of which five were dropped from the sample because of inconsistent answers,
leaving a sample of 140. For purposes of questions on RFMs, the five
respondents originally dropped were added back because their answers on
this particular section of the questionnaire (unlike answers on other
sections) seemed reliable.
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Table 5-1 presents information (on a regional and overall sample basis)
on what the respondents regarded as the positive attributes of formal
RFMs (e.g., cooperative societies, banks, etc.) as far as savings and
credit activities were concerned. The regional information provides a
means of comparing the importance of different attributes in the south
and north. Significant regional differences could mean different
approaches in designing appropriate intermediary services in the two
broad geographical areas.
Table 5-1 (column 3) shows that leniency in dealing with defaults
and with slow repayment of loans is extremely important to rural house-
holds. This may be a reflection of the uncertain returns from the economic
activities, i.e., agriculture, in which they are principally engaged. The
security of savings--and surprisingly, interest payment on savings within
formal institutions--appear important to those respondents surveyed.
The positive opinions on interest payments is surprising given the fact
that policy-makers believe small savers, such as rural households, do not
care about interest payment on savings. The fact that putting savings
into institutions can prevent the money from being squandered also appears
important. Low interest charges on loans appear fifth on the list of
positive attributes, supporting the notion mentioned in Chapter Four that
low interest charges on loans may not be as important to the rural-
agricultural population as policy-makers imagine.
The order of priorities on positive attributes for the total sample
holds more or less true on a regional basis, but there are a few differ-
ences between the north and south. For example, interest payments on
savings and larger loan amounts from formal than from the informal system
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TABLE 5-1
PERCEIVED POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES OF FORMAL SYSTEM WITH REGARD TO
CREDIT AND SAVINGS ACTIVITIES
Number of Times Mentioned1
(3)
Total Sample
(1) (2) (in Descending
Northern Southern Order of
Attribute Villages Villages Importance)
With regard to credit:
Patience of formal institutions
(e.g., cooperative societies) 47 50 97
in waiting for loan repayment
and dealing with default
With regard to savings: Security
of savings within the banking 39 35 74
system (safeguarded from
thieves, fire, and termites
Interest payment by formal 38 6 44
institutions on savings
Money management function of
savings institutions which 16 22 38
prevents savings from being
squandered
Low interest charges on loans 9 15 24
from formal institutions
Larger loan amounts from
formal than from informal 10 3 13
system
No personal conflicts in 2 11 13
dealing with formal system
Privacy in transactions with 4 3 7
formal system
Trustworthiness of formal 4 2 6
institutions
Formal system available 1 4 5
to everyone
iTotal number of respondents to questions on RFMs = 145; number of
respondents in the north = 76; number of respondents in the south = 69.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
255
are more important in the north than in the south, while low interest
charges on loans from formal institutions and lack of personal conflicts
in dealings with the formal system are more important in the south than
in the north.
Table 5-2 shows the negative attributes of formal RFMs mentioned
by respondents (see column 3 in particular). Heading the list of nega-
tive attributes in Table 5-2 is the fact that long delays are encountered
in getting money out of deposit accounts with formal institutions. The
issues of disciplinary actions by formal institutions in case of loan
defaults and lack of timeliness in arrival of loans also appear important,
although they are far less so than the issue of delays in withdrawing money
from deposit accounts. (Compare the number of times (24) mentioned for
the latter with 6 and 5 for the former.) The order of priorities of
negative attributes for the overall sample again holds on a regional basis,
except that in the south timely arrival of loans is not mentioned at all.
This may be because in the south people have many more alternative sources
of informal loans, such as rotating and non-rotating credit and savings
associations from, from which they can borrow if formal loans do not
arrive on time, or at all. This latter alternative is less available in
the north, as evidence in Chapter Four shows.
Among the formal RFMs, commercial banks were singled out for greater
analytical attention because the government is currently pushing commer-
cial branch banking in the rural areas as a means of improving intermedi-
ary services in villages. Table 5-3 establishes the level of knowledge
of respondents about the more general activities of commercial banks.
Table 5-4 looks specifically at reasons for not requesting commercial
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TABLE 5-2
PERCEIVED NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF FORMAL SYSTEM
Number of Times Mentioned
(3)
Total Sample
(1) (2) (in Descending
Northern Southern Order of
Attribute Villages Villages Importance)
Delays in getting money out 10 14 24
of savings accounts
Formal institutions can take
court or disciplinary action 2 4 6
in case of default on loan
Formal institutions do not 5
give loan on time for needs
Illiteracy is a handicap in 2 1 3
dealing with formal institutions
Location of banks too far 0 1 1
Impersonal attitudes of bank clerks 1 0 1
Formal loans are too small 1 0 1
Formal institutions only help 0 1 1
important people
Savings can be made void in 0 1 1
case of war'
IThis reason was mentioned in Nomeh village in Anambra State
where, during the Nigeria-Biafra war of 1967-1970, some villagers
lost the money they had in banks and post office savings accounts,
since the Biafran currency was declared abolished by the winning
Nigerian side.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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TABLE 5-3
KNOWLEDGE OF COMMERCIAL BANKING
Do you know
you can borrow
from a bank?1
Number of
Responses
Do you know
you can save
in a bank?
Number of
Responses
Do you know interest
is paid on savings
in banks?
Number of
Responses
Yes
7
TOTAL
Yes
No
TOTAL
Southern Villages
63
0
63
Northern Villages
76
0
76
1The discrepancy between the number of people answering questions
on borrowing versus saving arises from the fact that the author was
originally interested only in the savings aspect and added the question
on borrowing a little later in the survey, thereby missing some respon-
dents. Also, not all respondents who were asked these particular ques-
tions answered them because it was toward the end of the questionnaire
and they were tired. A total of 139 people out of 145 surveyed on
opinions about RFMs answered the questions on savings in the table. A
slightly lower number (124) responded to the questions on borrowing.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
Responses
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TABLE 5-4
REASONS FOR NOT BORROWING FROM COMMERCIAL BANKS
Number of Times Mentioned
(3)
Total Sample
(1) (2) (in Descending
Northern Southern Order of
Reason Villages Villages Importance)
Have no savings in banks, 28 11 39
so cannot borrow
Bank is only for important 4 16 20
people/Nobody knows me
Do not know procedures 8 8 16
for borrowing
Have no need to borrow from bank 2 10 12
given current available sources
Have no guarantor 3 6 9
Bank is too far 3 3 6
I am illiterate 3 0 3
SOURCE: Field surveys.
bank credit. 1 From Table 5-3, it appears that the level of knowledge
about general (if not specific) commercial bank activities is high among
respondents. However, a significant minority of respondents in the
south did not know that interest is paid on savings deposits. This may
account, in the south, for the lower priority given interest payments
IRespondents were also asked why they had no savings accounts with
commercial banks. The answer was almost uniformly that they did not have
savings, or the savings they had were not enough to warrant the bother
with commercial banks. This latter answer matches the negative attitudes
toward delays in withdrawing savings from formal institutions.
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among positive attributes of formal RFMs (see Table 5-1). In the north
also, a significant minority of respondents did not know credit could be
obtained from commercial banks. Table 5-4 (see column (3) in particular)
shows that rural people feel there are a lot of barriers to their use of
commercial banks for credit activities. At the top of the list of reasons
for not borrowing from commercial banks is the fact that people feel they
must already have savings accounts in a bank before they can approach that
bank for credit.1
Respondents also feel the banking system is not for ordinary farmers
like themselves, while the fact that they are not familiar with banking
procedures ranks high. On a regional basis, the degree of alienation from
the commercial banking system is much higher in the south than in the
north, while in the former region also, people feel they have less need,
given home resources, to resort to commercial banks for loans. This sug-
gests that either the need for outside sources of credit may be more impor-
tant in the north than in the south, or that there is greater need to
mobilize local financial resources and make these available to rural
households in the north. The information presented in Table 5-4 sug-
gests that the recent spread of commercial bank branches in rural areas
may not result in increased use of intermediary services by rural people
unless the barriers they feel separate them from the banking system are
broken down through information and publicity campaigns and through some
changes in banking practices. How realistic it is to expect accomplish-
IThis is, in fact, sometimes true in practice. Some banks insist
that potential borrowers establish themselves first as bank customers
by opening deposit accounts.
260
ment of the latter will be a subject for discussion later in the chapter.
With regard to informal RFMs, respondents also displayed positive
and negative feelings. Table 5-5 shows that on both an aggregate and a
regional basis, the greatest strengths of the informal institutions were
seen to be their accessibility, particularly in times of emergency need,
and their flexibility with regard to loan use, size, and repayment terms.
At the same time, this flexibility of the informal RFMs and the very per-
sonal nature of dealings spurred negative feelings, especially with regard
to non-relatives (Table 5-6). Quarrels, the threat of court action, and
the constant worry about being asked to repay before a loan is due rank
high on the list of negative attributes. Also important, on both an
aggregate and a regional basis, are the uncertainty about getting loans
when these loans are requested, the lack of respect for the privacy of
a borrower's financial affairs, high interest charges by non-relatives,
and forced seizure or sale of property to repay loans. It therefore
appears that while rural farm-households would like some freedom in mak-
ing financial arrangements suited to their needs, they would also appre-
ciate some degree of formality, certainty, and standardization in their
financial transactions.
The sentiments expressed above about formal and informal RFMs are
not peculiar to Nigeria's rural-agricultural population. In a Latin
American survey conducted by Nisbet in the 1960s (quoted in Donald, 1976,
p. 84), farmers' comments about formal and informal RFMs were similar to
some of the comments found in Tables 5-1 through 5-6.
Given the opinions expressed in the various tables above, and other
information about informal RFMs presented in Chapter Four, guidelines can
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TABLE 5-5
PERCEIVED POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES OF INFORMAL SYSTEM
Number of Times
Attribute
Accessibility of informal
lender sources
Flexibility of informal sources
with regard to loan use, loan
size, and loan repayment
Promptness of informal system
in giving loans
No interest charges from
relatives
Relatives maintain privacy
of dealings
(1)
Northern
Villages
14
15
4
3
3
(2)
Southern
Villages
22
14
0
0
0
Mentioned
(3)
Total Sample
(in Descending
Order of
Importance)
36
29
4
3
3
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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TABLE 5-6
PERCEIVED NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF INFORMAL SYSTEM
Number of Times Mentioned
(3)
Total Sample
(1) (2) (in Descending
Northern Southern Order of
Attribute Villages Villages Importance)
Occurrence of personal conflicts 25 25 50
(e.g., quarrels over loan)
Threat of court action by lenders 30 4 34
who are non-relatives
Impatience with regard to loan
repayment (i.e., asking for 20 8 28
repayment before agreed-upon
loan term is up)
Uncertainty about obtaining 11 8 19
loan/loan scarcity
Lack of privacy in dealings 9 6 15
High interest charges by 8 7 15
non-relatives
Forced seizure or sale of 7 5 12
property to repay loan
Untrustworthiness of informal 11 11
dealers in transactions
SOURCE: Field surveys.
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be constructed for the operations of the 'ideal' or 'desired' rural
financial intermediary institution. These guidelines (or characteristics)
are compiled in Table 5-7 for both the credit and savings sides of such
an intermediary's financial operations. As the title of Table 5-7 sug-
gests, the successful implementation of the guidelines, if indeed this
were possible, would result in a perfect or near-perfect rural financial
institution (i.e., bearing in mind what rural farm-households want).
Such an institution would not only grant agricultural production loans
to farm-households, but would also allow them the freedom to receive
other types of loans. At the same time, it would help farm-households
manage their finances better by instituting convenient and lucrative
savings schemes.
The willingness and ability of any financial institution to imple-
ment the guidelines set out in Table 5-7 would depend to a large extent
on the sort of financial incentives that were available to the institu-
tions. These financial incentives would hinge largely on the rates of
interest payable on savings and chargeable on loans. Under current gov-
ernment interest rate policies, it would be impossible for even the best-
intentioned rural financial institution to implement most of the guide-
lines set out above. As such, it is important to discuss necessary
reforms in interest rate policies before considering possible institu-
tional forms that might incorporate the characteristics mentioned in
Table 5-7 above.
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TABLE 5-7
GUIDELINES FOR (OR CHARACTERISTICS OF) AN IDEAL RURAL
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTION
A. General Characteristics
1) Intermediary must perform joint savings and credit functions.
2) It must be within easy reach of the community or set of communities
it serves.
3) It should cultivate a community image, be able to integrate well
into the community, and maintain as much openness and publicity as
possible about its affairs.
4) It should avoid dealing with community elites only and strive for
the image of availability to all community members.
B. Characteristics/Policies Important for Savings
1) Intermediary should allow accounts to be opened with very small
initial amounts (e.g., from N 0.2 to N 0.5).
2) It should consider having a clerk or clerks who can go around the
community on a regular basis (once a week, or once a fortnight) to
collect agreed-upon, specified amounts of savings from savers. This
will help in cash management.
3) The intermediary should have strict and visible security measures
against theft, fire, etc. Savings could also be protected through a
Federal government savings insurance scheme.
4) There should be attractive remuneration, in the form of interest pay-
ments, for savings.
5) Intermediary should institute additional incentives to attract savings
deposits. Such incentives could be occasional lotteries for savers,
with prizes such as educational scholarships, small household durable
goods (radios, clocks, etc.), cash, etc. (These incentives have been
used successfully in Taiwan and Korea.)
6) Intermediary should institute savings schemes for specific purposes
in which rural community savers might be interested (e.g., cultiva-
tion of new stands of tree crops, educational funds for children,
house building, trading funds, marriage funds, etc.).
7) Intermediary should have very simple and fast deposit and withdrawal
procedures requiring little or no reading and writing ability.
8) There should be as few restrictions on withdrawals as possible.
9) The intermediary should have some clerks familiar with the language
and customs of the area, who can explain financial transactions
to rural savers, and answer their questions.
(continued)
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TABLE 5-7
(continued)
B. Characteristics/Policies Important for Savings
(continued)
10) The intermediary should show a willingness to reinvest savings
within its host community. This would keep rural funds within
rural communities, reinforce feelings of a community stake in the
intermediary institution, and put pressure on borrowers not to
default.
C. Characteristics/Policies Important for Credit
1) Intermediary institution should have no pre-set requirement for
potential borrowers to open or maintain savings accounts in the
institution before being eligible for loans, although inducements
may be given to borrowers to open new accounts.
2) The granting of a fairly wide range of loan amounts should be pos-
sible in order to cater to both large and small loan requests.
3) Intermediary should be open to financing any type of genuine loan
request, be it for agriculture, trading, education, consumption, pur-
chase of consumer durables, etc. The latter two might be handled
through group loan schemes.
4) There should be the ability on the part of the intermediary to
finance both short-term (one year or less) and, at least, medium-
term (2 to 5 year) projects.
5) There should be flexibility as to type of loan repayment arrangement,
either installment repayment or repayment in bulk.
6) Intermediary should be willing and able to renegotiate loan due dates
in the face of genuine, extraneous circumstances for the rural borrow-
er, e.g., natural (agricultural) disasters, ill health, business
problems, etc.
7) Collateral requirements should be commensurate with realities of
rural life. Items such as crops in field, livestock, could be used
as security instead of real estate, life insurance, etc. If possible,
collateral requirements should be dropped altogether in favor of such
mechanisms as group guarantee schemes.
8) Intermediary should have simple and fast loan application procedures
requiring little or no reading and writing aptitude on applicant's
part. Granting of loan should be prompt.
9) Polite and pleasant clerks able to speak the language of the area
to interpret loan terms and answer questions should be employed.
10) Applicant's financial position and transactions should be held
confidential.
(continued)
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TABLE 5-7
(continued)
C. Characteristics/Policies Important for Credit
(continued)
11) Rates of interest on loans should be considered reasonable from both
borrower and lender viewpoints. That is, rates high enough to cover
lender costs with some margin for profit and low enough to make
borrowing attractive and possible for the majority of rural households.
12) Intermediary should have the ability to call on outside financial
sources where necessary, to augment rural community's loanable funds.
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Reform of Interest Rate Policies for
Better Financial Intermediation
It has been a consistent theme throughout this study that current
government interest rate policies bear great responsibility for the inade-
quate financial services available to the rural-agricultural population.
It is clear that if better financial intermediation (particularly of the
type outlined in Table 5-7) is to be achieved in the rural areas, rates
of interest on loans and on savings will have to be revised upwards to
make the rewards on rural financing at least as attractive, if not more
so, than those on urban-based financing.
While the exact rate of interest that should be charged on loans
cannot be specified in this study, upper bounds on rates that would be
willingly borne by borrowers can be suggested from the findings in Chapter
Four.
A look at Table 4-14 in Chapter Four, which shows respondents' atti-
tudes toward higher interest charges, suggests that a nominal interest
charge of 40% or slightly more per annum might be acceptable to most rural
farm-households. Using a 24% per annum inflation rate, the 40% nominal
rate would imply an approximate real rate of 16% or more.
Whether such loan rates would be acceptable from the lender's view-
point would depend on its costs for rural lending. Cost estimates for
rural lending were not made by the author for the Nigerian financial
1Such a rate may not be appropriate for most or all rural areas in
the country. The case for variable inflation premiums based on different
communities' inflation rates will be made a little later in the discussion.
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intermediaries described in Chapter Three of this study. However, if the
estimates made for small farmer lending in other studies are used (e.g.,
see Donald, 1976, p. 1161), and if the inflation rate of 24% per annum is
1Donald compiled figures from various country studies to arrive at
the estimates below:
Comparative Cost Estimates for Small Farmer Lending
Costs
Administrative
Cost of Capital
Allowance for Defaults
Allowance for Funds Not on Loan
Inflation Rate
Estimates
10 (median)
3a - 10 b
5 (10 maximum)
0-6
4 (median)
22 - 35
aConcessional rate on public capital.
bCost of a savings program.
These estimates can be adjusted slightly for the Nigerian case, as below:
Costsa
Administrative
Cost of Capital
Allowance for Defaults
Allowance for Funds Not on Loan
Inflation Rate
Estimates
10
10
b
5 (10 maximum)
0 - 6
24
49 - 60
aNote that these costs could also be handled by allowing variable
premiums to be charged for each loan, depending on the cost situation
for each loan or the range of costs in the community in which a bank is
located. This is discussed at greater length in the next few pages.
bThis cost of capital is used assuming that the institution would
be wholly dependent on private funds. If public funds were to be used,
then the cost of capital could decrease to the 3% figure quoted by
Donald.
269
taken into account, then it seems that a 49% nominal rate per annum would
be the lowest acceptable rate for rural lending in Nigeria. (Note that if
the Federal Office of Statistics 16.6% rate of inflation figure is used,
the lowest acceptable per annum nominal rate would be 41.6%.) This lower
rate would cover all costs of lending (e.g., administrative, default allow-
ance, cost of capital, etc.). A 49% nominal rate of interest might just be
acceptable to rural borrowers if they could get the size of loan desired,
receive the loan on time, and not be tied down to using the loan for a
pre-specified purpose. Lenders could adjust the nominal rate downwards
in areas (such as Araromi village in this study) where the cost of capital
appears comparatively lower. Lenders could make some economic profit if
default rates were to be minimized (for example, as a result of community
pressure on borrowers to repay loans) and if lender-loan transactions costs
were to decline because of the use of group loan schemes.
For the ideal financial intermediary outlined in Table 5-7 above,
default rates and lower loan transactions costs (if group lending were
used) would allow the intermediary to cover the additional adminstrative
costs that could result from the greater flexibility built into its oper-
ations. Even in this case, such an intermediary could just break even
in its operations, implying a need for some kind of public intervention
to give it added incentive to operate.
If it were possible to charge the interest rates discussed above
on loans, then financial institutions would be able to pay up to a 10%
real rate (34% or 26.6% nominal rate, depending on which inflation figures
are used) of interest on rural savings deposits. Whether these rates
would be attractive enough to substantially increase savings is perhaps
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debatable. The controversy over the relationship between the level of
savings and the real interest rate still rages, but as mentioned in Chap-
ter Two, evidence from Taiwan and Korea show that higher real rates of
interest have resulted in higher savings levels in these countries.
Moreover, since a good number of rural respondents interviewed for the
present study expressed positive opinions on interest payments on savings
(see Table 5-1), it would seem that higher interest rates than the cur-
rently prevailing ones would make these rural farmers even more willing
to save. Higher rates would perhaps induce a greater than expected level
of savings. At the very least, positive real rates of interest on sav-
ings (in the face of high inflation) could persuade farmers to hold some
of their savings in financial forms, such as savings accounts, instead of
in real forms, such as foodstocks and livestock. This in itself would
increase the level of savings in rural financial institutions and, pro-
vided these savings were kept within the rural communities, as suggested
in Table 5-7, they would augment the volumeof loanable resources in the
rural areas.
It may be that the level of interest rates on savings and credit
suggested above would be politically unpalatable to the government
because the rates are seemingly high. In this case, a more flexible
approach to interest rates on credit and savings could be taken. With
regard to credit, for instance, the government could allow commercial
banks flexibility in setting interest charges to cover all lending costs--
administrative costs, default costs, the opportunity cost of capital,
etc. In places where these costs were low, interest charges on loans
would be low, and vice versa for places or circumstances entailing high
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lending costs. Alternatively, the government could announce some basic
minimum interest rate (to cover administrative and capital costs, perhaps),
and then allow banks some flexibility in deciding on various additional
premiums to cover inflation and default costs, etc. The premiums could
vary from community to community (or group to group), depending on the
extent of these costs in each individual circumstance. For example, in a
community with very low default rates and a low inflation rate compared to
the national average, the premiums charged would be very low. The overall
average nominal rate of interest on loans in that community would, there-
fore, be moderate. In a community with high default rates and a high infla-
tion rate, the reverse would be the case. Similarly, the nominal interest
payment on savings deposits could vary depending on the local rate of infla-
tion and the opportunity costs of capital in the area (in the event that
this latter was not fixed by the government at a nationwide rate).
It should be noted that with regard to loans, commercial banks might
be more interested in being permitted flexibility to vary premiums over
time than over space. That is, commercial banks may be more concerned with
keeping up and ahead of monthly or yearly cost variations than with cost
variations from community to community or group to group. In this case,
the government could allow banks the flexibility they need to vary differ-
ent premiums according to cost fluctuations over time, while maintaining
differences in the premiums charged different communities (or groups, or
individuals) within a narrowly specified margin. The government could, in
fact, decide not to permit spatial variations in the different types of
premiums charged by banks (except maybe for the risk premium which could
differ considerably from community to community), and allow variations in
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premiums only over time. This latter strategy would minimize the chance
of horizontal inequities arising with regard to premiums paid commercial
banks by different communities or groups of people.
Some policy-makers may be uncomfortable with the idea of allowing
commercial banks some flexibility in deciding on interest charges. For
one, some commercial banks may abuse this privilege by charging unfairly
high rates on loans. Secondly, bank behavior and performance would be
difficult to monitor in the face of such flexibility. The strategy of
allowing commercial banks some flexibility in setting interest rates
would, however, solve the problem (for government) of having to announce
high (and perhaps politically embarrassing) nominal interest rates, par-
ticularly on rural loans. Besides, even if some commercial banks were
tempted to charge unjustifiably high (given the costs in a community, or
costs at varying time periods) premiums on loans, they would be constrained
to some extent by the demand situation in the market. Evidence on farmers'
willingness to pay varying interest charges on loans (see Chapter Four)
shows that most farmers do have a clear upper limit of interest charges,
above which they would be unwilling to take out loans.
Interest rates (under a flexible or fixed system of setting interest
charges) could be made high by high rates of inflation throughout the coun-
try. In this case, the government might wish to reduce the rate of infla-
tion first, before announcing charges or reforms in interest rate policy.
Attempts to reduce the rate of inflation or to overhaul the system for
setting interest rates could be regarded as longer-run objectives of
interest rate policy.
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In the short-run, the government could, at the very least, still
revise interest rates upwards by some margin. An effective margin should
be high enough to ensure that rural (predominantly agricultural) loans
would be slightly more attractive than other types of loans. This would
help counter the bias of formal RFMs against rural, particularly poorer
rural, borrowers. The government could also eliminate or modify the cur-
rent multiple-rate structure which gives direct farmer-borrowers an advan-
tage over farmers borrowing from, or through, cooperative societies. The
existing horizontal inequities in the interest rate structure would thus
be eliminated.
Whatever the interest rates that are finally instituted on rural
savings and credit, it is clear that unless these rates are more advan-
tageous to rural lenders and savers, better financial intermediation will
not be possible in the rural areas. Formal RFMs will continue to discrimi-
nate against poor rural borrowers, and rural savings mobilized by RFMs
will continue to migrate out of rural areas--an undesirable state of
affairs for those of the rural-agricultural population seeking loanable
funds.
Possible Institutional Forms for an "Ideal" Rural
Financial Intermediary Institution
Having outlined earlier the desirable characteristics for a rural
financial intermediary and, as discussed above, the type of interest rate
policies that would be conducive to better financial intermediation in
the rural areas, a question that comes to mind is: Can any existing RFMs
be suitably adapted to incorporate the characteristics set out in Table 5-7?
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The formal RFMs that currently deal directly with rural savings and
credit activities are commercial banks, cooperative societies, and the
Federal Savings Bank. The commercial banks already possess, in their func-
tions and operations, some of the characteristics mentioned in Table 5-7.
There are, however, other important characteristics (e.g., flexibility in
repayment terms, simple loan procedures, suitable collateral requirements,
etc.) which they lack. Given attractive financial incentives, commercial
banks might be willing to adapt their operations to the desires of the
rural-agricultural population. However, it is doubtful whether, in reality,
they could adapt enough to meet all the requirements set out for such an
institution. This is because commercial banks have an entrenched bureau-
cratic system which has been operating in a particular way for decades.
Such systems usually prove very difficult to change substantially. Thus,
while commercial banks, if given incentives, might approach the requirements
for the ideal RFM, they could not (operating alone) represent that "ideal"
institution.
The cooperative movement would seem promising as a foundation insti-
tution on which to build the desired RFM. However, cooperative societies
currently lack many of the required characteristics and functions of such
an institution and, consequently, it would take almost complete reorganiza-
tion of the societies to incorporate the guidelines outlined in Table 5-7.
This would be almost tantamount to setting up a new institution, but with
the probable disadvantage of some (perhaps involuntary) resistance from
an entrenched cooperative division in the government's Ministries of Agri-
culture. The same remarks would apply with regard to the Federal Savings
Bank.
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On the informal side, the only institution that meets many of the
requirements for an ideal RFM is the non-rotating savings and credit
association ('safe'). This institution (more common in the south of
the country) is easily accessible to rural people, and performs savings,
credit and money management functions.2 (See Chapter Four.) However,
many of the 'safes' pay no interest on savings, and their cash holdings
are susceptible to attack by thieves or fire. As such, these non-rotating
savings and credit associations would also need considerable reorganiza-
tion to formalize procedures, provide security, etc., before they could
prove entirely satisfactory by themselves as the 'ideal' RFM. In the
process of such extensive reorganization, many of the characteristics that
endear the institutions to the rural-agricultural population would be lost.
Barring the complete reorganization of existing institutions dis-
cussed above, another alternative for satisfying the desires of the rural-
agricultural population for a suitable type of financial institution would
be to create an entirely new institution, perhaps under the auspices of
IThe non-rotating savings and credit associations, known locally in
some areas as 'safe' associations, have been picked out as meeting more
of the requirements over their rotating counterparts because these latter,
as their name implies, do not actually keep collected funds (except in
rare cases). Instead, they rotate the funds from member to member at
each meeting. As such, their operations do not give much outside room
for non-members to borrow, and they are much less like banking-type tran-
sactions than those of non-rotating savings and credit associations whose
funds stay collected in a place over an agreed-upon period.
2The 'safe' is, of course, a cooperative organization, but it differs
from the government cooperative societies in that it is completely organ-
ized and managed by its rural members without government input--monetary
or otherwise. It reaches many more rural people. The mobilization of
savings is taken very seriously in 'safes' (in fact, it is their primary
function). This contrasts with the lax attitude taken toward savings
mobilization in government cooperative societies.
276
the Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB). This new institu-
tion would start its operations with a new image and a clean slate, and
it would probably be more successful in endearing itself to its service-
population than a reorganized older institution such as the cooperative
societies. Setting up a new institution is, however, always very expen-
sive in terms of human, financial, and other resources; and if there are
other promising ways of achieving the same or approximate results at
lower cost, then these may be worth trying.
One tentative suggestion might be to modify and then to forge links
between a formal and informal RFM, so that jointly they would combine the
characteristics desired by the rural-agricultural population. For example,
such links could be developed between the non-rotating credit and savings
associations ('safes') and commercial banks. Commercial banks perform
savings and credit functions, savings held in the banks are fairly secure
and receive interest payments, and banks have recourse to outside sources
of credit to augment loanable rural resources. 'Safes' are very accessible
to members of the rural community. They have a community image, simple
and fast procedures for savings and loan transactions, in-depth knowledge
of the membership, and membership pressure not to default on loans. Very
few personal conflicts arise in dealings with these associations, as also
is the case with commercial banks.
Given this joint list of favorable characteristics, commercial banks
and 'safes' need only make a few modifications to their operations to
closely approximate the 'ideal' RFM. The commercial banks would have to
make more branches accessible in the rural areas, although they need not
try to reach every village or hamlet since 'safes' could do this. Com-
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mercial banks would also have to make loan repayment arrangements more
flexible, and they would need to hire some local clerks to deal with the
'safe' officers or with other individuals. The number of local clerks
hired need not be so many, however, because a good number of customers
would carry out their transactions through the 'safes.' The 'safes'
themselves would have responsibility for the periodic door-to-door collec-
tion of savings that bank clerks would have had to do. As for the opera-
tions of 'safes,' these would have to be modified to allow the deposit of
a designated proportion of collected savings with the commercial banks.
Members of 'safes' would receive interest payments for these savings and
the savings would be secure. An individual 'safe' association would also
have the advantage of obtaining larger loan amounts (whenever needed) for
members from commercial bank funds. These borrowed funds could be shared
out among members according to the previously established loan sharing
formula of the 'safe.' 'Safe' association members could also jointly
guarantee repayment of the loans.
To attract the 'safes' and establish the needed links between them
and commercial banks, both an extensive publicity campaign and higher
interest rates on savings would be needed. High rates on savings would
imply higher rates of interest on loans which, as discussed previously,
individual rural community members appear willing to pay. There would
have to be some margin of difference between rates charged on loans and
those paid on deposits in order to give the commercial banks incentive
to operate. Or, government could offer commercial banks some type of
economic reward for each given number of 'safe' accounts successfully
opened and retained. Commercial banks themselves would probably have
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some flexibility in lowering and increasing loan and savings rates in
order to make these activities more attractive to 'safes.' In addition
to interest rate incentives, other incentives such as lotteries, with
attractive prizes for members of 'safes,' could also be used, while the
banks might offer officers of these 'safes' special assistance in setting
up their records and doing their accounts. If the commercial banks can-
not, because of higher costs, offer technical assistance to officers of
the 'safes,' then a government agency could take charge of providing this
type of assistance.
A knowledgeable observer might note that many 'safe' associations--
including those located close to commercial banks--do not currently make
use of these banks' facilities. The question would be, why should this
change under the proposed system? From the author's investigations in
the field, three reasons might be hypothesized for the current relative
lack of association between 'safes' and commercial banks, even when they
have operated in close proximity.1 These reasons are: the 'safe' asso-
ciation membership feels itself "closed-off" from commercial banks
because they think the banks are for elites or elite organizations only.
The economic rewards of dealing with commercial banks have not been
high enough to warrant the difficulties, delays and paperwork experienced
with the banks. The liquidity requirements of 'safe' association members
may be so great that they would think it unwise to deposit their savings
IIn the rural town of Ogwashi-Uku, for example, and in Araromi
village (surveyed during this study), one or two 'safes' had deposits
in nearby commercial banks. However, most others did not use the com-
mercial banking system despite reasonable proximity, especially in the
case of Ogwashi-Uku.
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in a bank where the savings might not be easily accessible when needed.
If these are indeed taken as the reasons for the reluctance of 'safes'
to deal with banks, then under the new relationship being proposed
between the two sets of institutions, the perceived difficulties could
be taken care of, and commercial banks would have an economic incentive
to make 'safes' feel wanted. The 'safes' would, themselves, have economic
and other incentives to associate with commercial banks, and they would
have flexibility to deposit only that amount of their savings that they
felt to be compatible with their liquidity requirements. In fact, they
could be encouraged to apply to the banks for additional liquidity in
case of need.
Dealing with 'safes' would not preclude banks from dealing with
individual rural community members (although banks might encourage indi-
viduals to work through these groups). Individuals could open up accounts
or request loans. In the latter case, they could apply to a given 'safe'
to act as a guarantor for their loan, thereby making it unnecessary for
the banks to request other types of security on the loan.
'Safes' are currently common only in the south of Nigeria. After
trial-associations with commercial banks, their development could be
actively encouraged in the north.I Close relationships between 'safes'
and a formal institution would make these informal societies more accept-
able in the north, where the major complaint against them is that the
1Alternative or supplementary arrangements (in the case that
'safes' do not gain popularity here) are discussed later in this section.
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person keeping the funds collected might embezzle or abscond with these
funds. In the north, unlike the south, 'safe' associations could ini-
tially be encouraged to deposit all collected funds with the commercial
banks until such time as members develop trust in a given individual who
could then retain some of the funds for emergency loans.
Should the 'safe'-commercial bank relationship prove successful
and spread, it would provide one example in Nigeria of an integrated
rural financial institution with fairly strong links between a formal
and an informal organization. This type of integrated financial institu-
tion could even become the predominant organization with which government
would deal whenever it required a medium for rural reforms.
The formal use of both rotating and non-rotating credit associations
has been previously discussed elsewhere in the literature (e.g., see
Donald, 1976, and the AID Spring Review Volume on Informal Credit). Many
of the views on their use have usually been pessimistic, because these
associations have been considered primarily from the viewpoint of agri-
cultural credit. It has been said, for example, that as a medium for
agricultural credit disbursement, rotating and non-rotating savings and
credit associations would be unsuitable because they would not be able
to provide technical assistance to accompany the agricultural credit.
In the type of association envisaged here between 'safes' and
commercial banks, the main concern of the 'safes' would not be with
agricultural credit alone, but with other types of financial activities.
The 'safes' would be free to disburse loans received from commercial
banks for all types of activities desired by members. This freedom is
desirable because, as has been argued previously, it would be misleading
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to focus solely on agricultural credit when the need for other types of
credit is pressing and even predominant. If a specific need arises to
disburse agricultural credit from outside (e.g., government) sources,
the 'safes' could still be used in conjunction with technical assistance
from a government agency. This would be far better than the current
cooperative movement, where farmers receive little or no technical
assistance with credit and only a few farmers are reached.
Some other writers on the use of rotating and non-rotating savings
and credit associations advocate direct intervention by government in
the operations of these associations to formalize them and make them more
useful as rural financial intermediaries (e.g., see Ijere, 1979). In
the viewpoint of such writers, the rotating and non-rotating savings and
credit associations would be required to register with government, send
officers for training, and submit to government legislation and control
of their activities. Such massive intervention by government would prob-
ably have adverse instead of beneficial effects. There would be extra
paperwork for officers (whose current remuneration is very small), mem-
bers would be suspicious of government registration requirements, and
membership might fall off, not increase. Excess formality would probably
destroy rather than reinforce the essence of these organizations.
In contrast to the forced formalization recommended by these writ-
ers, the type of relationship between commercial banks and 'safes' recom-
mended in this study would rely on persuasion and economic incentives,
and not on coercion, to obtain improvements and integration in rural
financial markets. The voluntary route would probably take longer to
achieve and would require more sustained public effort. However, if
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the commercial bank-'safe' relationship took off the ground, there would
be far longer lasting effects on rural financial market operations than
if coercive tactics had been used.
It has been noted above that the type of 'safe'-commercial bank
relationship envisaged would hopefully involve very little direct govern-
ment or formal intervention in the activities of the 'safes.' There
might be circumstances, however, requiring direct contact between govern-
ment agencies and 'safes.' This could occur, for instance, if, as men-
tioned earlier, government agencies decided to use 'safes' as a conduit
for credit to farmers. Such contact between government agencies and
'safe' associations could set up stresses damaging to the character of
'safe' organizations, particularly if the agencies insisted on imposing
their rules and regulations on the 'safes.'
To minimize the occurrence of such disruptions, government agencies
would have to follow closely the rules already established between 'safes'
and commercial banks. The agencies would have to limit paperwork arising
from the loan process. They would have to ascertain that the credit being
channeled to 'safe' association members for agriculture was really desired
by them for that activity. The agencies would have to allow the 'safes'
flexibility (within certain mutually agreed-upon limits) to decide on
suitable (for 'safe' members) loan sharing and loan repayment formulae.
This flexibility would permit the 'safes' to maintain some consistency
in their dealings with formal organizations. It would also serve to
encourage the 'safes' to maintain their ties with both the commercial
banks and the government agencies.
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It is important to mention at this point that, with regard to the
credit aspect, the type of relationship proposed in this chapter between
non-rotating savings and credit associations and commercial banks has been
successfully tried, in slightly different forms, in credit programs in
some developing countries. 1 For example, the Prideco/Fedecredito Program
in El Salvador, involving a government development agency and a credit
union, gives loans to solidarity groups of five to eight people who are
proprietors of micro businesses. The members of these solidarity groups
collectively guarantee loans for one another, and also are collectively
responsible for paying back the individual loans of each business owner.
The program provided loans averaging US $80 - US $200 (approximately
N 48 - N 119, at 1980 rates of exchange) to 2735 businesses in 18 months.
Default rates were very low (about 2%), while administrative costs aver-
aged US $30 for the first loan and US $10 for the second and subsequent
loans.
The Working Women's Forum (an organization of low-income women)
in Madras, India, has used a group mechanism (5-50 members) similar to
the one in El Salvador to obtain loans from banks for group members'
economic activities. In this case, group leaders have stood as personal
guarantors for loans to the entire group. The group leaders have also
been responsible for collecting payments daily and depositing these in
the lending bank. Individual loans, in this case, have been very small,
1For a more detailed description of these and similar programs,
see the series of 1980 reports on Assisting the Smallest Scale Economic
Activities of the Urban Poor, published by Accion International/Aitec
in Cambridge, MA.
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averaging about US $2 - US $36 (N 1.2 - N 21.4), while default rates
and administrative costs have been even lower than in the program in
El Salvador.
The programs described briefly above differ from the non-rotating
savings and credit association-commercial bank relationship proposed in
this chapter in that they involve urban rather than rural groups. They
may involve government rather than private lending institutions, and
further, the emphasis may lie more on credit than on savings. However,
the principles underlying the loan process are similar to those proposed
for non-rotating savings and credit associations interested in obtaining
loans from commercial banks. As in the programs above, groups of low-
income people in the 'safes' can collectively guarantee, obtain, and repay
loans from commercial banks at what would probably be lower administra-
tive, default, and other costs for these banks. In the case of 'safes'
in Nigeria, members can also collectively deposit and earn interest on
savings in commercial banks. The fact that relationships between infor-
mal groups and formal institutions have worked successfully (albeit in
a different setting) in other developing countries provides some encour-
agement for a trial of the non-rotating savings and credit association-
commercial bank relationship being proposed for Nigeria's rural areas.
So far, the author has advocated the encouragement of a new type
of rural financial intermediary involving an association between 'safes'
and commercial banks, because this intermediary would seem to approximate
the 'ideal' financial institution desired by the rural-agricultural popu-
lation. The stress on establishing a 'safe'-commercial bank relationship
in the rural areas is not, however, meant to imply that existing formal
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rural financial institutions, such as the Nigerian Agricultural Bank
(NACB), the cooperative societies, or the Federal Savings Bank, should
be closed up or neglected. Indeed, this latter action would be most
difficult to achieve, given the considerable amount of public effort and
funds that have been invested in these institutions over a period of time.
Moreover, entrenched bureaucratic and political interests would work to
keep the existing institutions functioning.
It would seem that even if a 'safe'-commercial bank relationship
were encouraged in the rural areas, current rural financial institutions
could still play a role (even if only in the short run) in providing
financial intermediation services to the rural population. For example,
the NACB could still continue its function as a conduit for government
funds intended for rural areas, except that it would have an additional
grassroots organization--the 'safe'--through which it could channel these
funds.
With regard to cooperative societies, they would duplicate to a
large extent the functions of the 'safes,' so that the encouragement of
one type of institution might serve to discourage the development of the
other. This need not be the case in every instance, however, because
circumstances could arise requiring the coexistence of both types of
intermediaries. For instance, it has been mentioned earlier that, in
some rural areas, it could take the 'safe'-commercial bank relationship
considerable time to develop. During this development process, the coop-
erative societies (if they exist in those areas) could continue in their
role as village-level financial intermediary institutions for farmers.
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It could also be the case that the 'safe'-commercial bank relation-
ship fails to develop successfully in some rural areas. Should this hap-
pen, the cooperative societies (perhaps modified to stress savings mobili-
zation) could at least provide a limited set of financial services for
the rural households in those areas.
Finally, some rural households may want to see both 'safe'-commercial
bank associations and cooperative societies develop in their villages. In
this circumstance, both types of financial intermediaries could coexist
and compete, until such time as one of them becomes more widely accepted
than the other. This process of competition could also be allowed between
the 'safe'-commercial bank associations and the Federal Savings Bank. No
matter which institution survived in the competition, the important point
would be that rural households would have access to a financial institu-
tion which they considered suitable.
The 'safe'-commercial bank relationship has been suggested in this
chapter as one means of approximating the desired characteristics of an
'ideal' rural financial institution. Other ideas involving associations
between formal and informal RFMs or the modification of a formal or an
informal RFM could doubtless be worked out to approach this ideal. This
is, in fact, one of the areas in which, as will be pointed out in Chapter
Six, further research on RFMs in Nigeria could be fruitfully carried out.
In this section of the chapter it has been suggested that rural
credit policy should change its focus from sole concern with agricultural
credit, and concentrate instead on instituting better financial inter-
mediation services for savings and for all types of credit in the rural
areas. The type of intermediation services that might be instituted,
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the incentives to encourage such services, and the institutional form
that a specific intermediary offering these services might take have
been discussed.
An important point underlying the discussion has been that concern
with improving rural incomes should involve not only agricultural credit,
but other types of credit as well as savings activities. This viewpoint,
however, might seem to leave credit policy with the still important task
of improving agricultural production, because better financial intermedi-
ation services in rural areas and a more integrated rural financial market
may not necessarily suffice to improve agricultural production. It is
important, therefore, to consider separately whether and how credit policy
might help solve the problem of improving production in the agricultural
sector.
Improving Agricultural Production
Credit policy should eschew a 'blanket-approach' to
increasing credit in the agricultural sector and focus
on finding the real constraints to agricultural pro-
duction as a means of improving performance in that
sector.
It was mentioned earlier in this chapter that among those who
received credit, credit does not appear to have been very effective in
improving agricultural input use or increasing the marketable surplus.
Furthermore, agricultural credit has, in some cases, been diverted to
other uses, suggesting that currently lack of credit may not be the
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important constraint on agricultural production for many rural farm-
households. The implication of the above statements is that a 'blind'
approach to credit policy, emphasizing increases in the amount of agri-
cultural credit without carefully studying whether and how that credit
might be most useful, may well be ineffective in improving agricultural
production. A more sensible approach to credit policy would be one that
asked the question: Putting aside the issue of credit for adopting agri-
cultural inputs, what might be the important constraints on agricultural
production, and how can credit be useful (if at all) in easing these con-
straints?
Answering this question in any detail would require an in-depth
study of the various facets of agricultural production in Nigeria, with
a view to discovering which of them posed the real problems for produc-
tion in the agricultural sector. Such a study is outside the scope of
this thesis, and would be best carried out by the government or other
designated bodies. What can and will be done within this study is to
formulate some plausible hypotheses concerning possible constraints on
agricultural production, and then to briefly explore if and how credit
might be useful in easing these constraints. The hypotheses would be
based on the perceptions of other authors (discussed in Chapter One)
about the agricultural sector's problems, and on the author's own field
experiences among farmers in 1977 and 1979.
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Hypotheses on Constraints in the Agricultural Sector
Five sets of hypotheses concerning marketing, technological, per-
sonnel, risk, and labor problems seem suggested from the discussion in
Chapter One and elsewhere in the study as explanations for the agricul-
tural sector's problems. Of these five, the hypothesis on labor constraint
seems, from the author's own investigations, to have greatest explanatory
potential. Its implications will, therefore, be discussed in somewhat
more detail than the implications of other hypotheses. The five hypothe-
ses are set out below.
Hypothesis A
Difficulties with marketing, especially poor farm-to-market roads,
and inadequate storage facilities are responsible for the shortfalls in
agricultural production--particularly the marketable surplus.
The concern with marketing problems by government officials and
academics has been mentioned in Chapter One. Though it is difficult to
measure the exact extent of this problem, the generally visible poor
state of many rural roads in Nigeria provides some support for this hypoth-
esis. In fact, two of the villages visited during the survey for this
study (Nomeh and Turawa) had difficulties with marketing products because
of poor farm-to-market roads. This occasionally had an adverse effect
on farm prices and further created pressure for storage facilities.
There is a difficulty, however, with attributing too much explanatory
power to the marketing problem. The reason is that many villages have
always had poor farm-to-market roads. The situation was even worse in
the 1940s and 1950s. Yet, agriculture experienced boom periods during
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these years. It seems, therefore, that while inadequate marketing facili-
ties may carry some blame for the agricultural sector's performance, the
lack of these facilities cannot constitute the major explanation for the
sector's performance. Other explanations must be sought.
The above line of reasoning does not preclude, however, asking the
question: If marketing problems of the sort outlined above indeed pose
difficulties, how can agricultural credit to farm-households help? The
answer is that credit to farm-households can help very little. For
example, in the area of road building, a public or community effort,
rather than individual farmer effort, is clearly needed. If the govern-
ment cannot undertake required road building projects itself, then it
would have to consider giving aid to communities in terms of money and
some equipment so they can carry out the projects themselves. Many rural
Nigerian villages have been known to use community effort to carry out
such projects successfully.
Individual farmer credit might, of course, be useful in building
storage facilities. However, in some rural areas, villagers have suc-
cessfully built storage barns from materials available to them. What
is needed, perhaps more than credit, is the introduction and adaptation
to local conditions of these methods in areas where such knowledge is
lacking. Modification of storage facilities, e.g., cementing the floor
and inside walls of storage areas, may also have to be introduced as a
means of guarding against insects and rodents. Such modifications need
not be very expensive. However, to the extent that they require consid-
erable investment by farm-households, then it may be legitimate to con-
sider the granting of credit to such farm-households.
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Hypothesis B
Lack of trained personnel in the fields of agricultural and irriga-
tion engineering, farm and extension management, etc. constitutes a con-
straint on the expansion of agricultural output.
There appears to be some truth to the statement that adequately
trained personnel for agricultural development in Nigeria are lacking.
The poor ratio of extension agents to farmers, mentioned in Chapter One,
is a case in point. However, in the case of this hypothesis (as in that
of Hypothesis A), it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the
lack of trained personnel is contributory to the agricultural sector's
current problems.
What can be said is, if lack of trained personnel is the problem
in agricultural production, then credit to individual farmers is not a
solution. What will be needed are fast and innovative approaches by gov-
ernment for the training of these personnel. This could include the draft-
ing (in the case of extension agents) of trainees who are already farmers,
instead of concentration on young, urban-oriented, upwardly-mobile school
leavers, as is currently the practice.
Hypothesis C
Lack of technological inputs and the inappropriateness of these
inputs bear responsibility for the poor growth of agricultural output,
including the marketable surplus in rural areas.
It is true that many Nigerian rural areas lack modern technological
inputs (e.g., fertilizer), and this could account for the slow growth of
agricultural output. However, it was mentioned in Chapter Four that some
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farmers have access to fertilizer which they use in very little quanti-
ties, even when the fertilizer is heavily subsidized, as is the case
with cooperative society members. This implies, then, that for these
farmers, the lack of inputs may not be as important a constraint on out-
put expansion as the inappropriateness of the inputs,
It could be that the lack of enthusiasm over a modern input is due
to the fact that this input has not demonstrated considerable superiority
over traditional methods. The lag in the development of appropriate fer-
tilizer and seed technology for root crops--the most common crops in
Nigeria--is well known. Lack of superiority, therefore, could be due to
inappropriateness of the input for local crops and conditions, or to
improper application of the input. If this is the case, then credit to
farmers to adopt the given input is again of little or no use because
the problems with inputs need to be dealt with at a more aggregate level.
What could be more useful is research into inputs suitable for local
crops and conditions and instruction of farmers in the proper use of
these inputs. If, after these measures are undertaken, the use of appro-
priate inputs should also require expensive complementary factors, such
as irrigation channels, then some individual farmer credit may again be
in order. The priority, however, would lie with developing the appropriate
inputs, and then disseminating them widely, along with proper instruc-
tions as to their use.
Hypothesis D
The desire to minimize the risks inherent in agricultural production
could prove to be an important deterrent to the expansion of agricultural
output and the marketable surplus.
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Farmers in Nigeria, as elsewhere, are subject to various natural
risks--vagaries of weather, disease, and pest attacks--in their agricul-
tural production activities. In the absence of programs to ensure against
this type of risk, farmers could be hesitant to plough back savings into
expansion of farmed acreage for fear of losing these savings (in case of
any of the eventualities listed above) and endangering the household's
livelihood. This type of behavior could then slow the expansion of agri-
cultural output and the marketed surplus. It is likely that the type of
risk avoidance behavior described above is of some importance in Nigeria
and may be contributory to the agricultural sector's problems. However,
the extent of its importance is difficult to determine.
Individual household credit could be of some help in easing constraints
on agricultural production arising from the type of risk described because
farmers could use the credit (rather than their savings) to undertake
potentially production-increasing expansion of farmed acreage. The grant-
ing of such credit would only be risk-reducing, however, to the extent that
repayment requirements were flexible and entailed at least some forgive-
ness or reduction of debt in the case of any of the natural eventualities
mentioned above. In any event, crop insurance programs or direct payments
to affected farm-households (after the occurrence of any natural disaster)
might be more effective and efficient than allocations of credit in dealing
with this type of constraint on agricultural production.
Farmers could also exhibit risk- averse behavior if asked to adopt
innovative agricultural inputs or practices. Such behavior could delay
the use of modern inputs which might ensure the fast expansion of output.
It is unlikely that this type of risk-averseness is as yet an important
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problem in current Nigerian agriculture. This is because there is still
very little known about appropriate, truly innovative farming approaches
and packages in the country. If and when such approaches and packages
become available to farmers, some credit may be needed to enable poorer
farmers to undertake the risk inherent in these new approaches. However,
it may be that, given attractive prices for farmers' output, credit could
prove unnecessary as an inducement (even for poorer farmers) to adopt new
agricultural packages and approaches.
Hypothesis E
Labor scarcity in the rural areas, resulting in high and fast rising
prices for agricultural labor (the major input), renders agriculture unat-
tractive, even in the face of rising prices for agricultural products.
This leaves investment in agriculture with low profits, thereby reducing
incentives to increase production and the marketable surplus.
The issue of labor scarcity and prices in agricultural product and
input markets has been explored in Appendix A. The institution of univer-
sal primary education (diverting some potential agricultural labor to
school), increasing rural-urban migration and rising agricultural wages
seem to provide some support for the belief in labor scarcity in rural
areas. Rising wages (consequent to this scarcity), which appear to be
keeping pace with rising agricultural product prices (see Appendix A),
provides some support for the idea of reduced incentives for agricultural
investment. In turn, the likelihood of reduced incentives for agricul-
tural investment may be borne out by the failure of farmers who received
credit in the study sample to invest significantly more in agriculture
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than other farmers with the same income and farm-acre characteristics who
did not receive credit.
The hypothesis of reduced agricultural investment incentives due to
high labor prices would seem to have more powerful explanatory power than
other suggested hypotheses, because, as remarked above, many of the prob-
lems implied in the other hypotheses have always existed--even in boom
periods for agriculture. This has not been the case with year-round agri-
cultural labor scarcity. In fact, this latter is a recent phenomenon that
only came to public attention with the drafting of the Third National Devel-
opment Plan in 1975.
Labor scarcity may hit agricultural production hardest in terms of
the clearing of new land. Most farmers in Nigeria increase the amount of
output produced, not by farming a given piece of land more intensively,
but by clearing and farming additional land. This is probably where labor
is most needed.
If the idea of labor scarcity is accepted, the question becomes:
How can this problem be solved, and, again, how can agricultural credit
help in its solution?
In order to find solutions to the labor scarcity problem, the issue
of the cause of the labor scarcity itself has to be addressed. It has
been mentioned above that the declaration by the government of the avail-
ability of universal primary education in 1975 is partly responsible for
the diversion of some actual and potential agricultural workers to the
school room. The other cause of labor scarcity is primarily the migra-
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1
tion of rural youth to urban areas because of the greater economic and
social attraction provided by these urban areas. This trend toward migra-
tion has undoubtedly been exacerbated by the oil boom of the 1970s and
the consequent concentration of oil-generated revenues in investment in
urban areas2 (e.g., see Okonjo, 1976).
Given the above, there are several possible methods of dealing with
the issue of labor scarcity, high labor prices, and the shortfalls in mar-
ketable agricultural surplus. Some of these methods may be regarded as
short-run strategies, while others would be longer run. Some would indi-
cate the need for agricultural credit, while others would not.
One method that immediately comes to mind as a solution to the agri-
cultural labor problem is the subsidization of farmers by government to
enable them to hire more labor. This could be done either by direct grants
or through a credit program. In fact, the current government efforts at
directing low-interest agricultural credit to farmers could and has been
interpreted earlier in the study as a means of helping farmers purchase
inputs such as labor 3 and fertilizer. This strategy has not worked, even
Urban population grew at an average annual rate of 4.7% from 1960-
1970, and 4.9% from 1970-1980. The overall rate of population growth was
2.5% during the same period. (World Bank, World Development Report, 1980)
2Although social and historical circumstances differ, there is a
suggestion that oil-generated booms in the urban areas of other oil-
exporting countries (e.g., Venezuela, Qatar) have served, or are serving,
to draw people to the urban areas at a much faster rate than would nor-
mally have been expected, thereby exacerbating the labor-supply constraint
in rural areas.
3It is not made explicit that farmers should use the loans to pur-
chase labor input.
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when farmers have received loans equal to as much as 61-100% of their
average farm expenditures (see Table 4-8, Chapter Four). This is because
the strategy of giving loans or grants to farmers for labor will not in
itself increase the supply of labor in a given area. Although the farmers'
effective demand for labor may be increased, if people have migrated out
of the area or removed themselves from the labor force, increased farmer
demand for labor would probably not bring these people back into the agri-
cultural labor force. This may be because of social and economic costs
of moving for those contemplating reverse migration, or because of other
problems associated with moving. Instead, the increased effective demand
for labor would largely serve to drive the price of existing laborers
higher. Direct subsidization of farm labor payments may not be an effec-
tive solution, therefore, to the labor problem.
The government could decide to subsidize laborers directly to
migrate back to rural areas and swell the agricultural labor force. It
could institute incentive schemes (payments to returnees, moving costs,
etc.) to attract people. In this case, credit to farmers would be unneces-
sary. Available resources would instead be used to finance the incentive
scheme. Although this solution to the labor supply problem is possible
in theory, in practice it would prove very difficult to administer and
may not even work if prospective returnees feel themselves stigmatized
as failures for not having "made it" in urban areas.
Another short-run strategy that the government could pursue would
be to allow agricultural product prices to rise much more sharply than
they are doing now, by disallowing or scaling down considerably the impor-
tation of staple or substitute food items such as wheat and rice. This
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strategy would sharply increase farmer earnings if demand for the neces-
sary food products does not fall off greatly. Agricultural wages would,
of course, rise in response, but perhaps not immediately. The rise might
serve to attract laborers back to the rural areas, or it might at least
decrease the rate of outmigration. This would, in turn, dampen wage
increases, allowing farmers more profit and therefore greater incentives
to invest in agriculture.
Again, this strategy is attractive, but is likely to be unpalatable
to government because of the political implications of extremely high food
prices. Moreover, it could be argued once more that labor response in
terms of reverse migration would be uncertain.
It must be stressed here, however, that government should realize
that massive imports of rice and wheat probably worsen the incentive struc-
ture in the agricultural sector, worsen rural-urban income differentials,
and contribute to a dampening of agricultural production. A case in
point is the village of Nomeh in Anambra State (surveyed during this
study), where farmers were unable to sell their local rice crop because of
the presence of government-imported, superior-quality rice. This caused
these farmers to delay repayments on their loans from the Anambra State
Agricultural Finance Agency. If the government, therefore, wants some
improvement in agricultural sector production, it may find it necessary
to trade off some of its political popularity in urban areas for some
greater rise in agricultural product prices and greater income increase
in rural areas. This could be done by scaling down imports and allowing
local farmers a chance to sell their products at more favorable prices.
In the longer run, production would increase in response to these prices,
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and prices might even hopefully start to decrease.
As a longer-run strategy to decrease the labor migration rate, and
perhaps even induce reverse migration, government could reorient its
aggregate economic and social investment decisions to allow the rural
areas to catch up with urban areas. This would involve investing larger
amounts in the near future in rural infrastructure, health, education,
and rural (not necessarily agricultural) jobs, etc. Such a strategy
should certainly be favored. It would make the rural areas much more
attractive to live in than currently, improve the farmers' standard of
living, and be beneficial to the agricultural sector--not only in terms
of retaining or attracting agricultural labor, but in other more general
ways. Such a longer-run strategy would be favorable to the economy
because it would help overall to alleviate the problem of a land-surplus
agricultural sector existing side-by-side with a labor-surplus industrial
or modernized sector.
All the strategies discussed above have thus far focused on inducing
labor back or keeping labor in the agricultural sector as a means of reduc-
ing agricultural wages and enabling farmers to increase production and the
marketable surplus. A question could be asked, however, as to how the
increased labor supply strategies would affect overall incomes for farmers
and laborers in the agricultural sector, particularly in the long run.
For it seems that while farmers and agricultural laborers could increase
production and make some gains in the short run, in the longer run larger
labor supplies in the agricultural sector might ultimately mean decreased
per capita incomes in agriculture. This could come about because of the
sharing of gains by a larger number of people. Such a situation could
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exacerbate already existing income distribution problems between agricul-
ture and other sectors.
To avoid the above problem, an alternative strategy could be
envisaged. This strategy would increase agricultural production and the
marketable surplus in the short and long run without requiring large
increases in labor supply. This would mean that increased agricultural
earnings (assuming prices were not too dampened) would be shared by a
smaller number of people, implying higher and sustained agricultural
income increases.
The strategy would, of necessity, involve some mechanization. Since
labor is most important in clearing additional land and preparing it for
planting, tractors could instead be introduced for clearing this land and
for other required tasks. The wider introduction of tractor and other
mechanized services would probably be more welcome in the north of the
country where, during the study survey, many farmers expressed explicit
desires for such services. Tractor services would also be more easily
used in the north because of the larger average acreages farmed and owned
per household.
In the south, the introduction of mechanized services would meet with
more difficulties because of greater fragmentation of land and other land
tenure problems. To avoid this, mechanized services need only be used
for opening up unused contiguous parcels of land designated by individual
interested communities. Each community could then share out the opened
and prepared land to individual farmers interested in increasing their
farmed acreage. These farmers would subsequently be responsible for pay-
ing for the mechanized services.
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The introduction of some degree of mechanized farming is not a
policy to be taken lightly, for it could have far-reaching economic and
social consequences. For example, if the land tenure system permitted,
it could lead to the increased acquisition and concentration of land in
fewer hands, as wealthier farmers sought to parcel larger pieces of land
together to make such farming easier. This would mean the increasing
concentration of income in those same few hands and the possible develop-
ment of a landless class of laborers as people became dispossessed. In
short, greater social and economic inequities could be created and main-
tained in the agricultural sector under such a system. Since the absence
of a landless class of laborers is one of Nigeria's favorable social char-
acteristics, the government would have to develop policies to avoid or
restrict such unpleasant outcomes as a dispossessed class of laborers,
were it to decide to go the mechanization route.
Introducing some degree of mechanized farming in a country like
Nigeria, where overall unemployment is generally acknowledged to be high,
would at first seem to represent a contradiction in terms. However, as
has been mentioned above, this unemployment is currently concentrated in
the urban rather than rural areas. And it is doubtful, as discussed,
whether the urban unemployed could be persuaded to return to the rural
areas to farm, though they might return to other rural jobs. A policy
of introducing mechanization in agriculture would, therefore, probably
not entail depriving these people of jobs, since they would not have
wanted the jobs in the first place.
Other policies, such as those helping to create agriculture-related,
economically-attractive, small-scale industrial jobs in the rural areas,
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could help solve the unemployment problem at the same time as they helped
make the rural areas more attractive to live in.
Should a strategy requiring some mechanization of farming be pur-
sued, then some credit to individual farm-households would probably be
needed to pay for tractor hire or other such services. Such credit could
be given in the form of withheld payments for tractor clearing. That is,
the government or other body would clear the land with its set of tractors,
and farmers would then pay for the services after harvest on an individual-
billing basis. Or the government could provide credit to farmers (who
needed it) to hire these services.
It is also possible that individual farmers or groups of farmers may
want to purchase tractors1 or other types of mechanized tools for their
own use and for rental to other farmers. Should this be the case, then
credit might be needed by these farmers to enable them to purchase the
necessary machines. Credit might also be needed for working capital,
should these farmers find that they have to hire out machine services to
other farmers on a delayed payment basis. 2
1The idea of individual farmers in Nigeria's rural areas wanting
to purchase tractors may not be as far-fetched as many Nigerians would
believe. During the survey process in the north, the author encountered
one farmer who expressed interest in purchasing some kind of medium
grade tractor for his own use and for rental to other farmers.
2Various commercial operators may also want to purchase tractors
for rental to farmers. These operators may need government credit.
However, it is likely that they would be able to obtain credit from com-
mercial banks.
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The introduction of mechanization could generate a need for agricul-
tural credit far beyond that which is currently being provided. It is
questionable whether the government would be able to provide all the funds
needed. It might have to rely on RFMs, such as the commercial banks and
non-rotating savings and credit associations, to mobilize funds in and
out of rural areas and to channel these funds into agricultural investment.
To achieve this, the government could, of course, continue to rely on its
current paraphernalia of bank and other legislation. However, as has been
suggested in the earlier section on interest rate policy in this chapter,
the government would probably achieve greater results if it allowed the
banks greater economic incentives (in the form of realistic interest rates)
for operating in the rural areas. The banks might then work through their
counterpart rural institutions, the non-rotating savings and credit associ-
ations ('safes') to reach the farmers with credit. With adequate incen-
tives in the agricultural sector through the lifting of the labor con-
straint (as a result of mechanization) and through some increase in product
prices, farmers would be more interested in investing this credit in agri-
culture rather than in other enterprises. If government or any of its
institutions such as the NACB desired, they could also use 'safes' to
channel credit to needy farmers.
The granting to farmers of credit for agricultural services at higher
or more realistic rates of interest would mean the exclusion from these
agricultural services of some very poor farmers who would be unable to pay
the rates charged despite higher economic returns to agriculture. Such
farmers might be helped through other 'direct-aid' schemes, although it
must be said realistically that singling out these farmers and administer-
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ing the aid to them solely would be most difficult to carry out in practice.
The hypotheses, solutions, and uses of credit that have been sug-
gested in this section of the chapter have been put forward bearing in
mind the market character of Nigeria's economy. More radical, and perhaps
ultimately more equitable, solutions to the agricultural sector's problems
could have been proposed. However, in the current political environment
of the country, such solutions would more likely be rejected out of hand
as unrealistic. As such, a more moderate, and perhaps more incrementalist,
approach to solutions has been suggested here. Even at that, policy-makers
would still consider some of the suggestions--such as those favoring higher
interest rates--exceedingly difficult to carry out, despite the fact that
they would ultimately prove highly beneficial to the rural-agricultural
population by encouraging the growth of needed financial services.
Summary
The effort in this chapter has been to summarize the major findings
of the study, and to suggest new directions for credit policy based on
these findings. Most of the suggestions put forward for a new credit
policy de-emphasize agricultural credit until a determination has been
made as to the proper need for, and use of, that credit.
There are two major suggestions. The first is that credit policy
should focus more carefully on the provision of suitable financial inter-
mediation services in the rural areas, since a real gap exists in this
area. Such services would be based on the needs and desires of the rural-
agricultural population, as well as on the operational constraints of
intermediary institutions. Providing suitable financial intermediation
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services would also involve taking the issue of financial market integra-
tion seriously by promoting appropriate interest rate policies and by
fostering direct interaction between popular informal RFMs such as non-
rotating savings and credit associations, and formal ones such as commer-
cial banks. The promotion of better financial intermediation services
for the rural-agricultural population would have at its heart the improve-
ment of economic conditions for farm-households through all available means
including non-agricultural ones.
The second suggestion for a new credit policy involves a more careful
study of agricultural sector problems by policy-makers in order to deter-
mine how best to improve agricultural production with or without the use
of agricultural credit. In this respect, several hypotheses on marketing,
personnel, technology, risk, and labor, as constraints on agricultural
production, have been suggested and examined--with the labor constraint
problem being stressed as perhaps offering the most powerful explanation
for current agricultural sector problems. The usefulness of credit--in
the event of each hypothesis holding true--has been explored, and it has
been argued that agricultural credit may be unnecessary in most cases.
Credit may be useful, however, as a complementary input in some cases,
and particularly in the event that the government decides to encourage
mechanization as a solution to the labor constraint problem. In this
case, individual farmer credit for tractor hire services or tractor pur-
chase could be provided at 'realistic' rates of interest.
The government would probably find, in examining the hypotheses put
forward, that each problem area is contributory to the agricultural sec-
tor's difficulties to a different degree, and some problem areas might
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have to be tackled simultaneously if the agricultural sector's difficul-
ties are to be overcome. The government would then have to proceed with
immediate solutions for the more urgent problems, while leaving others
for longer-run consideration and treatment.
In the next and final chapter, the study findings and recommendations
are summarized in a more operational manner, while suggestions are made
for further research.
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CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, agricultural credit has emerged as one of the
leading policy tools for dealing with agricultural production and with
income-raising problems in the rural areas of most Third World countries.
This emergence has been due partly to the ease with which credit policy
and the accompanying low interest rate legislation can be enacted. The
stress on increasing allocations of agricultural credit for the rural
areas of the Third World has been predicated on the belief by policy-makers
in certain rarely investigated assumptions concerning the need for and
uses of agricultural credit and the related behavior of rural farm-
households.
This study has been concerned with examining, for the Nigerian case,
the extent to which these assumptions can provide a basis for a national
credit policy aimed at increasing the amounts of agricultural credit.
Of particular interest in the study has been the effectiveness of low
interest rate policies for encouraging agricultural credit use by rural
farmers.
Six major assumptions concerning rural credit and savings behavior
were examined in the study, with a view to showing that a credit policy
based on these assumptions is misguided and inadequate as a means of
solving the income-increasing and agricultural production problems of
Nigeria's rural sector. These assumptions are:
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(1) Rural farm-households in Nigeria face credit shortages, par-
ticularly for agricultural credit.
(2) Such credit as is needed is not readily available in the rural
areas, or is available at prohibitive costs from usurious money-
lenders.
(3) The existence of credit shortages prevents the adoption by farm-
households of modern technological inputs which could ensure
increases in output.
(4) Such credit as is provided by the formal system must be given
at low or concessional rates of interest in order to persuade
farmers to borrow, since their demand for credit is highly
interest elastic.
(5) The current distribution mechanisms for credit can with little
or no modification be effective in reaching poorer farmers.
(6) Lack of credit is the most important problem related to finan-
cial services in the rural areas. Savings mobilization, in
particular, is relatively unimportant since savings capacities
are quite low. Given this, there is little need to revise the
interest rate structure in favor of savings.
On close examination (with the aid of data gathered during a sample
survey), many of the assumptions were found to be of questionable validity
and in need of reformulation in order to provide better guidelines for
the institution of a more realistic and effective credit policy. The major
study findings can best be seen through a reformulation of the assump-
tions.
(1) Some rural farmers--particularly the poorer ones--do face
credit shortages, but it is doubtful whether this shortage
is primarily for agricultural credit.
(2) Significant amounts of credit are readily available at reason-
able cost from a variety of informal sources. However, the
length of time for which informal sector loans are available
is fraught with uncertainty and can be extremely short.
Therefore, within certain villages and at certain peak credit
demand periods, such as early in the planting season, addi-
tional outside credit (particularly of a longer-term nature)
may be necessary.
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(3) It is doubtful whether credit availability has had much of
an impact on input adoption or output expansion under Niger-
ian conditions--particularly on the expansion of the market-
able surplus. It is more probable that the mere availability
of appropriate inputs and the instruction of rural farmers
on input use will have a more widespread effect on input adop-
tion than the provision of credit.
(4) The demand for credit by rural farmers is relatively interest
inelastic. The range of interest rates at which demand will
sharply fall off due to high prices appears to be quite high.
It would seem that credit institutions could charge nominal
per annum rates as high as 40% or more before demand really
begins to decrease. Nevertheless, a study of different rural
credit environments is necessary, and flexibility is the key
in formulating interest rate policies.
(5) Given the current interest rate structure and institutional
practices, the present credit distribution mechanism is biased
against rural, particularly poor rural, farmers. The tendency
toward bias may be less strong in those parts of the country
where the obligations of richer toward poorer farmers is well
established and where the amounts at stake for sharing are
smaller.
(6) Some cash savings are available in the rural areas, and savings
capacities are positive, particularly among wealthier farmers.
Farm-households exhibit interest in institutions that can per-
form savings and cash management functions. Given this, there
is a need to devise appropriate intermediary institutions that
would link up with existing informal savings mechanisms.
Based on these study findings, recommendations were made for changes
in the focus of credit policy--away from the current concern for increas-
ing agricultural credit allocation to the rural sector, and toward more
informed approaches involving (i) changes in interest rate policy, (ii)
emphasis on savings mobilization and the allocation of other types of
credit besides agricultural, and (iii) emphasis on exploring and dealing
with the real constraints on agricultural production. Specifically, two
major recommendations were made in the study, along with suggestions as
to how these recommendations might be implemented. The first recommenda-
tion called for:
310
(A) Credit policy to focus on better financial intermediation in
the rural areas. Intermediation services should be concerned with savings
and other types of credit besides agricultural, as these would help farm-
households pursue various non-agricultural, as well as agricultural,
income-increasing activities.
To help implement the above recommendation, it was suggested that:
(i) Rural financial institutions (RFMs) should perform both credit
and savings functions.
(ii) Interest rates on savings and credit should be revised upwards
to make it more attractive for rural savers to save and lend-
ers to extend credit. Specifically, interest charges on credit
should cover administrative costs, with various flexible premi-
ums (depending on geographical location and characteristics of
borrowers) to cover default costs, the opportunity cost of
capital, and the inflation rate. Interest payments on savings
should also have some inflation premium built in so as to make
saving in financial assets at least as attractive as saving
in real assets.
(iii) Links between commercial banks in rural areas and local non-
rotating savings and credit associations ('safes') should be
actively fostered through interest rate and other incentives,
because these two institutions working together can provide
the characteristics of RFMs (accessibility, flexibility in
dealings, promptness of service, security of savings, privacy
of financial affairs, etc.) which rural savers and borrowers
want.
(iv) Additional and innovative economic incentives should, if pos-
sible, be offered by RFMs to rural borrowers and savers, and
by government to RFMs so as to make rural financial activities
asormore attractive than urban. In the case of borrowing,
this will help prevent capital flight out of rural and into
urban areas. Examples of innovative economic incentives
could be the holding by RFMs of lotteries with prizes for
rural savers and borrowers (this has been successfully tried
in Taiwan and Korea), and the institution of some kind of pay-
ment by government to commercial banks for each non-rotating
savings and credit association account successfully opened
and maintained.
Given that there appears to be as yet little impact of credit on
input adoption and on the expansion of the marketable surplus, the second
major recommendation for changes in credit policy called for:
311
(B) Credit policy to focus first on searching out the real con-
straints to agricultural production, and then second on outlining how
credit could be used (if at all) in easing these constraints.
To implement the above recommendation, it was suggested that
hypotheses involving marketing, appropriate technological inputs, person-
nel, risk, and labor scarcity problems be carefully explored as constraints
on agricultural production and on the expansion of the marketable surplus.
Tentative ideas on these hypotheses and the usefulness of credit were
further put forward as follows:
(i) Marketing problems, involving poor farm-to-market roads and
inadequate storage facilities, might constitute a problem for
agricultural production and for the expansion of the market-
able surplus. But marketing problems of the type mentioned
are unlikely to be the current major constraint on agricultural
production since these problems have always existed, even in
boom agricultural periods.
Even if marketing difficulties constitute a problem, indi-
vidual farm-household credit can be of little help in building
farm-to-market roads. These have to be dealt with at an aggre-
gate government or community level. Farm-household credit
might be of use in building storage facilities, though here
again credit may really be unnecessary if the storage facili-
ties are kept simple enough.
(ii) Lack of technological inputs may be a problem for agricultural
product expansion, but from discussions in this study this may
not be as serious a constraint on agricultural production and
expansion of the marketable surplus as are inappropriate tech-
nological inputs. These latter are technological inputs which
show no significant improvements over traditional farming
methods and which, therefore, prove unattractive to farmers.
Should lack of appropriate inputs turn out to be the, or
one of the, major constraints on agricultural production,
individual farm-household credit can again be of no help in
easing this constraint to the extent, for example, that
increased research efforts are required to identify and
develop appropriate inputs.
(iii) The shortage of trained personnel in various areas of agricul-
tural specialization may indeed be a problem for the agricul-
tural sector, but the importance of this shortage for current
agriculture is difficult to ascertain.
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In any event, individual farm-household credit would not
be of much help, as in the above cases, in easing this con-
straint. Instead, innovative and fast training efforts are
what would be needed to solve the personnel problem.
(iv) Risk avoidance behavior could constitute a major constraint
on the expansion of agricultural output and the marketable
surplus in Nigeria if farmers (out of fear of endangering
the household's livelihood) were hesitant to plough back
savings into expansion of farmed acreage, because this acreage
could be subject to the vagaries of weather, disease, and
pest attacks. Risk avoidance behavior could also be judged
a problem if farmers were faced with innovative agricultural
inputs or practices which they were hesitant to adopt.
The first type of risk avoidance behavior is probably of
some importance in Nigeria's traditional agriculture, although
how much of a constraint it is, is again difficult to ascer-
tain. Individual farm-household credit could probably be of
some help in easing this type of constraint, provided such
credit was tied to flexible requirements entailing forgiveness
or some reduction of debt in case of the occurrence of the
vagaries of production mentioned above. However, this type
of constraint might be better dealt with, not by allocations
of credit to individual farm-households, but by direct pay-
ments to affected farmers after the event, or by some type of
crop insurance program.
The second type of risk avoidance behavior is unlikely as
yet to be an important constraint on Nigerian agriculture,
since too little is yet known about appropriate, truly innova-
tive farming approaches and packages. If and when such pack-
ages and approaches become available to farmers, some credit
may be necessary to enable poor farmers to bear the risk
inherent in these new approaches. However, this need for credit
would have to be carefully documented, because it is possible
that given attractive prices for farm output, some farmers
would be willing to risk their savings to adopt the new pack-
ages and approaches.
(v) Labor scarcity, resulting in high prices for labor, few eco-
nomic gains for farmers, and therefore little incentive to
expand production and the marketable surplus, may, and does
indeed appear to, be (from field investigations) the most
likely explanation for current problems in the agricultural
sector.
If labor scarcity problems are taken to be the major con-
straint, then individual farm-household credit would be most
useful and applicable in the event that the government decided
to promote a mechanization strategy for solving the labor
problem. Such credit would enable needy farm-households to
purchase tractors or tractor hire services in order to expand
farmed acreage.
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Further Possible Problems with Agricultural Production
Other possible problems with agricultural production (not dealt with
specifically or in detail in the study) which may warrant the allocation
of some farm-household credit concern the special case of tree crop produc-
tion and the issue of changes in taste for food products.
It has been observed in the case of tree crops such as cocoa that
production declines as trees reach old age. In this instance, credit to
farm-households to undertake new plantings would be useful, because of the
long gestation period of these crops and because of the risks inherent in
such long-term investments.
With regard to the issue of changes in tastes away from traditional
food crops, it may be that this bears some responsibility for the low
expansion of agricultural food crop production in the rural areas. Such
an assertion, however, would have to be carefully explored, since current
high and rising prices of traditional food crops (see Appendix A) such as
yams do not generally seem to bear out the argument of a change in tastes
(and therefore a drop in demand).1
Should it, however, be the case that tastes are indeed changing from
traditional to other food crops such as rice and wheat, then the government
IIt is generally accepted in the economic literature that as in-
comes rise, people consume less of low-income-elastic food items (perhaps
such as some root crops in Nigeria) and more of high-income-elastic food
items, e.g., eggs, meat, sugar, and in the Nigerian case probably rice.
It may be that this phenomenon is occurring among the upper, middle, and
lower-middle income classes in the urban areas, causing some fall in
demand for traditional food crops. In this case, then, the demand gener-
ated by the increasing population of low-income rural migrants more than
compensates for this fall, thereby continuing the upward pressures on
prices of traditional food crops.
314
might want to consider a policy of assisting farmers who wish to switch
away from production of traditional food crops to production (in many
areas) of new and unfamiliar food crops such as rice and wheat. This
might require the allocation of credit, on flexible repayment terms, to
individual farm-households to persuade them to undertake the risks
involved in producing entirely new types of crops.
In the few instances in which agricultural credit to rural farm-
households would actually be beneficial to agricultural product expansion,
it has been recommended in the study that such credit be allocated through
a new mechanism connecting non-rotating credit associations with commer-
cial banks in the rural areas. The credit would, through this mechanism,
have the chance of reaching many more needy rural farmers.
Suggestions for Further Research
The findings and recommendations in this study point to the need for
further research into problems of credit use in agriculture. The study
itself can best be regarded as a pilot study because of its base on a rela-
tively small sample survey of farmers. In order to better inform Nigerian
credit policy, there is a need to conduct a more tightly structured survey
of farmers involving many more geographical areas. Such a survey would
provide a broader base of support for the study findings on credit and
its use in agriculture, as well as the findings on the desires of rural
farm-households for better financial intermediation services.
It is specifically recommended that in a broader research effort
particular attention should be paid to various issues on which current
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information is either scanty, lacking, or contradictory. These issues
are:
(a) local practices, attitudes, and views regarding interest rates;
(b) savings capacities in rural areas;
(c) lenders' (particularly commercial banks') costs for various
types of agricultural loans;
(d) alternative, practical forms of collaboration between formal
and informal rural financial markets;
(e) possible constraints on agricultural sector performance, and
the role of credit in easing these constraints;
(f) in particular, the problem of labor scarcity and the possible
use of mechanized services to ease this scarcity; and
(g) possible changes in food tastes due to rising incomes in the
country, and the consequent implications for agricultural food
production and for credit need and use.
The problem of credit policy and of rural financial markets is multi-
faceted, and thus requires information on the demand for financial services
and the supply of these services. The research undertaken in the present
study has yielded preliminary information on both the demand and supply
sides of the financial service problem. The various pieces of research
outlined above should provide more in-depth information which will enable
greater specificity in policy recommendations. Given such specificity,
greater care can be taken in the reorientation of credit policy along
more rational and effective lines than is currently the case.
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APPENDIX A
PRODUCT AND INPUT PRICES IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
The movements of prices in both the product and the input markets
of the agricultural sector can greatly affect farmers' incentives to
produce and market given quantities of output. Very often, prices in one
market may be given prominence by policy-makers without an adequate linkup
to prices in the other market. In Nigeria, for instance, greater prominence
is being given to the inflationary pressures caused by rising food prices
in 1980, without commensurate attention to wages in the agricultural labor
market. The discussion in this appendix attempts to examine prices in both
markets in order to shed some light on what may be happening to economic
incentives and hence production in the agricultural sector. Unfortunately,
consistent series of prices are not available for the type of analysis
required. The information that is presented in this appendix is, therefore,
based on various pieces of statistical data put together from different
sources. There may be some question as to the reliability of the data,
but hopefully they give some general idea of the trend in prices in agricul-
tural product and input markets.
Table A-i (see also Figure A-i) shows the consumer price index for
Nigeria as found in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International
Financial Statistics, 1978. The table also shows food and export price
indices for various years, constructed by the author respectively from FAO,
Nigerian Marketing Board, and Nigerian Central Bank data. The food and
export price indices were set up using Laspeyre's method given by the
formula:
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TABLE A-i
THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND PRICE INDICES
FOR MAJOR FOOD AND EXPORT CROPS
(1975 = 100)
Consumer
Price
Index
40.1
44.0
42.3
42.1
46.4
52.8
61.3
62.9
66.5
74.8
100.0
122.0
148.2
184.3
Annual
Growth
Rate %
+ 9.7
- 3.9
- 0.5
+10.2
+13.8
+16.1
+ 2.6
+ 5.7
+12.5
+33.7
+22.0
+21.5
+24.4
Food 1
Price
Index
23.0
29.0
28.0
23.0
26.0
36.0
55.0
58.0
58.0
70.0
100.0
Annual
Growth
Rate %
+26.1
- 3.5
-17.9
+13.0
+38.5
+52.8
+ 5.5
0
+20.7
+42.9
Export
2
Price
Index
30.0
37.0
40.0
41.0
47.0
70.0
100.0
101.0
134.0
135.0
Annual
Growth
Rate %
+23.3
+ 8.1
+ 2.5
+ 7.3
+ 7.3
+48.9
+42.9
+ 1.0
+32.7
+ 0.8
1The food crops included in this index are rice paddy, maize,
millet, sorghum, cassava and yams. The food prices were unpublished
FAO estimates from anFAO,'Computer printout S07026-C."
2Export crops included are benniseed, cocoa, seed cotton,
groundnut, and palm kernel. The prices were obtained from Central
Bank,Annual Report 1971, 1976, 1977, and Marketing Board figures.
Year
1961-65
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
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FIGURE A-i
THE CPI, FOOD INDEX AND EXPORT CROP INDEX COMPARED 1
CPI
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1Export crops refer to Marketing Board purchases and not total
production, although the two may virtually be synonymous in some cases.
NOTE: Food prices available until 1975 only.
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) pnqo
E poqo
where pn = price in the nth year
po = price in the base year (1975 in this case)
qo = quantity in the base year
The growth rates in Table A-1 suggest that over the period 1965-1975,
food prices rose faster than prices in the consumer price index (CPI). Food
prices grew at an average annual rate of 17.8%, as compared to a 10% rate
for the CPI over the same period. If the abnormal war and after-war years
of 1967 to 1970 are excluded, the picture remains the same for growth rates
from 1971 to 1975. The table does not provide evidence for food prices after
1975. Unofficial Nigerian Federal Office of Statistics data shown in Table
A-2 suggest that food prices were still rising faster than prices in the
consumer price index. Note, however, that the food basket represented by
the Nigerian CPI differs greatly from that used by the author in constructing
the food index in Table A-i. A look at the implicit price deflator and
annual growth rates for total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the private
consumption component in Table A-3 confirms the trend of faster rising agri-
cultural prices on average for the period 1960-1977 considered in the table.
Note, however, that if the period of the 1960s is examined separately, the
picture does not hold.
Export prices (see Table A-i), like food prices, appear to have risen
faster on an average annual basis than prices in the CPI. The prices of key
export products grew at an average annual rate of 17.5% from 1968 to 1978.
During the same period, prices given by the CPI grew at an average annual
rate of 16.2%. Again, excluding the war years of 1968-1970, export crop
prices still grew at slightly higher rates than the CPI. (Compare 17.9%
320
TABLE A-2
UNOFFICIAL FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX WITH FOOD COMPONENT
(1975 = 100)
Consumer
Price
Index
123.9
143.0
166.7
Annual
Growth
Rate %
23.9
15.4
16.6
Food
Component
of CPI
122.0
146.0
171.9
Annual
Growth
Rate %
22.0
19.7
17.7
SOURCE: Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos.
Year
1976
1977
1978
_ _
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TABLE A-3
IMPLICIT PRICE DEFLATOR AND GROWTH RATES
FOR AGRICULTURAL AND TOTAL GDP
(1974 = 100)
Agriculture
42.0
46.0
55.0
53.0
50.0
53.0
68.0
76.01
83.0
85.0
100.0
141.0
178.0
227.0
Growth
Rates
+ 9.5
+ 9.0
- 3.8
- 5.7
+ 5.7
+28.3
+11.8
+ 9.2
+ 2.4
+17.6
+41.0
+26.2
+27.5
Total GDP
36.0
40.0
45.0
43.0
42.0
44.0
51.0
58.0
60.0
67.0
100.0
115.0
133.0
153.0
Private
Growth Consumption
Rates Only
38.0
+11.1 46.0
+12.5 52.0
- 4.4 52.0
- 2.3 49.0
+ 4.8 55.0
+15.9 65.0
+13.7 76.0
+ 3.4 82.0
+11.7 80.0
+49.3 100.0
+15.0 120.0
+15.7 154.0
Year
1960
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977 175.0
SOURCE: World Bank, World Tables, 1980.
+15.0
Growth
Rates
+21.1
+13.0
0
- 5.8
+12.2
+18.2
+16.9
+ 7.9
- 2.4
+25.0
+20.0
+28.3
+13.6
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for exports to 17.3% for the CPI.)
These figures on agricultural prices suggest that in the product
market, agricultural prices in general have been keeping up and even
slightly gaining on other prices in the economy.1 There is, however, a
need to look at the input market. The only agricultural input to be really
considered here is labor, because some data are available for agricultural
wage rates. Moreover, labor has been the single most important purchased
input into agricultural production. Over 70% of farmers' annual farm
expenditures are used for paying labor expenses.
To examine what is happening to labor prices, it is important to look
at the supply of agricultural labor itself. Table A-4 shows that in absolute
numbers, the agricultural labor force increased very little between 1965 and
1978. Also, while the total economically active population grew at 2.0 to
2.2% per annum during these same years, the agricultural labor force was
believed to have grown at only around 0.5 to 0.6% per annum. The figures
imply that the supply of agricultural labor is barely increasing. This
slow rate of growth can be largely accounted for by the outmigration of
rural youth to more economically attractive urban areas, thereby causing
urban population to grow at the very rapid rate of 4.9% per annum (World
Bank World, Development Report, 1980). Thus, while the agricultural labor
force is remaining virtually stagnant, the number of people dependent on
food from the agricultural sector is rising rapidly. This state of affairs
lit should be noted that not all price series quoted here (e.g.,
the food price indices) necessarily reflect farm gate prices. It may be
that prices received by farmers are somewhat less than what is suggested
by these indices. The price figures should therefore be regarded perhaps
as optimistic approximations of what farmers actually receive.
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TABLE A-4
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION (TOTAL AND AGRICULTURAL)
Economically Active Population
Annual
Total Growth
'000s Rate %
20273
22277 2.0
24665 2.1
25201 2.1
25747 2.2
26301 2.2
Agricultural
'000s
13467
13825
14236
14324
14406
14482
Annual
Growth
Rate %
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.5
% of Economically Active
in Agriculture
66.4
62.1
57.7
56.8
56.0
55.1
SOURCE:
1977 and 1978.
Year
1965
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
Food and Agriculture Organization,Production Yearbook,
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causes an upward pressure on prices in both the agricultural labor and
product markets. The situation can be depicted graphically, as in Figure
A-2 below.
FIGURE A-2
GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF PROBABLE SUPPLY AND DEMAND
CONDITIONS IN AGRICULTURAL LABOR AND PRODUCT MARKETS
(a) Labor Market
S1 IS
N (b) Product Market
I a S l S2
P2
P1
Q LABOR
In Figure A-2, D1 and S1 are the original supply and demand curves
for farm labor, while P1 is the equilibrium wage given these demand and
supply curves. The supply curve for labor moves out slightly to S2, depict-
ing the small increase in the labor force shown in Table A-4. The demand
curve for labor, however, shifts out much further, resulting in high wages
at P2. The same type of analysis could hold for the product market, as in
Wages
(N)
P12
1
325
Figure A-2(b). However, the degree to which increases in wages in the labor
market can be translated directly into increased prices in the product market
depends on the elasticities of demand in the product market, and on other
factors such as government importation of food items.
Empirical evidence on agricultural wages suggests that these wages
have indeed been rising at a fairly fast rate. A look at Table A-5 shows
that wages recorded an average annual increase (in nominal terms) of 26.4%
for the years 1972 to 1978, for which data are available. Given an average
annual inflation rate of 17.5% in the same period, it means that agricultural
wages recorded an approximate increase of 8.9% in real terms.
TABLE A-5
AVERAGE WAGES (RATES PER DAY) IN AGRICULTURE
(THOSE REMUNERATED IN CASH ONLY)
Percent Annual
Year Rate per Day (N) Increase (Nominal)
1972 0.88
1973 0.89 1.14
1974 1.10 23.6
1975 1.58 43.6
1978 3.00* 30.0 per annum
This figure comes from the author's own field investigations among
farmers, as no official figures are available for that year.
SOURCES: International Labor Organization, Yearbook of Labor Statis-
tics, 1978. Field investigations by the author.
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Looking at the agricultural product prices for the years 1972-1978
(either from the food and export index, Table A-1, or the implicit price
deflator, Table A-3), it seems that agricultural product prices, though
rising, barely kept pace with (in fact, they slid behind) the prices for
agricultural labor. Such a situation could then be responsible for a damp-
ened effect on agricultural output, including marketed surplus.
The fact that agricultural product prices are barely keeping up with
rises in the price of agricultural labor suggests, as has been mentioned
earlier, that there must be factors deterring the transfer of production
cost increases to output price increases. It could be that the demand for
foodstuffs, for example, is fairly price elastic, or that the supply curve
for foodstuffs has somehow been shifted out further than would be presumed
from Figure A-2(b). Since the foodstuffs grown (yams, cassava, millet,
etc.) are staples, implying that the demand for them should be relatively
price inelastic, the second explanation as to why agricultural product
prices should be slightly lower than expected is more appealing. The supply
curve for staple food items (or near substitutes for staples) could be
shifted out through increased government imports of food items, such as
cereals (namely, wheat for bread and rice). Table A-6 shows that cereal
imports have indeed increased substantially in absolute and relative terms
in recent years. Rice imports, in particular, have made impressive gains.
More importantly, though, cereal imports per capita, which remained fairly
stable at around 0.004 to 0.007 metric tons per capita from 1966 to 1975
(see Table A-7), have increased dramatically by over 100% on a per capita
basis from 1976 to 1978. This could, then, account for a dampened effect
on domestic food prices.
TABLE A-6
TOTAL CEREAL IMPORTS AND RICE IMPORTS AS PERCENT OF AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD IMPORTS
Cereal Imports
Value $000s
24147
20551
16562
27652
33489
48603
54164
77973
115955
141860
241903
444772
703500
As Percent
of Total
Agricultural
Imports
27.2
22.0
18.7
30.6
26.7
28.6
27.7
33.5
36.0
24.8
31.5
36.3
50.0
As Percent
of Food &
Animal Imports
29.6
23.8
20.3
32.1
29.1
31.0
30.2
35.7
43.6
31.9
39.8
45.0
Rice Imports
Value $000s
346
398
72
71
190
71
75*
1680*
2379
3800
32138
218000
419000
As Percent
of Total
Agricultural
Imports
0.4
0.4
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.04
0.02
0.4
0.7
0.7
4.2
17.8
26.8
As Percent
of Food &
Animal Imports
0.4
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.05
0.04
0.7
0.9
0.9
5.3
22.0
Year
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
Figures for these two years tend to be contradictory in the 1972 and 1973 yearbooks.
SOURCE: Food and Agricultural (FAO),Trade Yearbooks, 1972, 1973, 1976-1978.
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TABLE A-7
PER CAPITA CEREAL IMPORTS (1966-1978)
Cereal Imports Imports Per Capita.
Year PopulationI  (Metric Tons) (Metric Tons)
1966 59,950,000 224000 0.004
1967 61,449,000 166000 0.003
1968 62,985,000 147970 0.002
1969 64,560,000 236695 0.004
1970 66,174,000 317913 0.005
1971 67,856,000 449284 0.007
1972 69,581,000 392000 0.006
1973 71,350,000 441850 0.006
1974 73,163,000 389270 0.005
1975 75,023,000 477430 0.006
1976 76,977,000 851600 0.011
1977 78,982,000 1273880 0.016
1978 80,600,000 2007190 0.025
1Because of the lack of a proper census in Nigeria since 1963,
population estimates for the country from various sources differ substan-
tially. The population estimates used in the table are World Bank esti-
mates. They lie on the higher range of estimates. The Food and Agricul-
tural Organization's (FAO) population figures are lower. Using these
figures, for instance, the cereal imports per capita would be slightly
higher as shown below:
1970 0.006 metric tons per capita
1975 0.007 "
1976 0.013 "
1977 0.019 "
1978 0.029 "
SOURCES: FAO Trade Yearbook, 1972-1978; World Bank,World Tables,
1980; World Bank,World Development Report, 1980.
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It would seem, therefore, that farmers are currently caught in a
squeeze between rising prices for agricultural labor and dampened prices
for agricultural output. In this situation, the supply of agricultural
output, or more likely, of the marketed surplus, would tend to suffer.
APPENDIX B
FERTILIZER AND LABOR USE: COOP MEMBERS AND NON-COOP MEMBERS COMPARED IN FOUR INCOME GROUPS
(All Money Values in N)
Income Groups
0-400
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
Borrowing Informally
Not Borrowing Informally
401-800
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
Borrowing Informally
Not Borrowing Informally
801-1600
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
Borrowing Informally
Not Borrowing Informally
1600 and Above
Coop Members
Non-Coop Members
Borrowing Informally
Not Borrowing Informally
(1)
Number
Using
Fertilizer
(2)
%
Using
Fert.
(3)
Mean
Exp.
Fert.
63.6 5.3
45.0 2.4
38.5 2.2
57.1 3.0
88.9 20.4
80.0 8.2
83.3 9.0
75.0 7.0
88.5
69.2
57. 1
83.3
(4)
Mean
Exp.
Labor
(5) (6)
Mean Fert.
Farm as % of
Exp. Farm Exp.
62.3 92.5 5.7
57.9 85.1 2.8
66.3 92.6 2.4
42.3 71.4 4.2
156.7 234.2
182.4 234.3
125.0 182.8
268.5 311.5
19.4 216.5 349.7
19.2 233.6 355.8
16.7 175.7 315.4
22.1 301.2 403.0
92.9 89.1
92.3 68.5
75.0 40.0
100.0 81.1
703.5 1189.7
671.5 867.6
555.0 772.3
723.3 910.0
(7)
Labor
as % of
Farm Exp.
(8)
Mean
Farm
Income
(9)
Mean Total
Cash Income
67.4 212.7 278.2
68.0 173.3 216.3
71.6 156.2 217.7
59.2 205.1 213.7
66.9 407.5 534.9
77.8 441.9 513.9
68.4 437.7 499.3
86.2 448.3 535.8
61.9 928.1 1126.9
65.7 952.0 1214.0
55.7 969.0 1110.7
74.7 932.2 1334.5
59.1 2707.1 3240.1
77.4 2168.2 3425.5
71.9 1896.0 2532.0
79.5 2289.2 3822.6
(10)
Mean
Off-Farm
Income
(11)
Mean Farm Income
+ Mean Farm Exp.
65.5
43.0
61.5
8.6
127.4
72.0
61.6
87.5
198.8
262.0
141.7
402.3
533.0
1257.3
636.0
1533.4
Numbers in parentheses in column (12) refer to number of respondents for whom this
information was available.
SOURCE: Field surveys.
(12)
Mean Number
of Acres
5.3 ( 7)
6.1 (14)
5.8 ( 9)
6.6 ( 5)
10.8 (15)
6.1 ( 8)
6.7 ( 5)
5.0 ( 3)
11.7
27.5
9.5
45.5
49.5
55.3
23.5
64.4
(24)
( 8)
( 4)
( 4)
(26)
( 9)
( 2)
( 7)
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APPENDIX C
STATISTICAL METHOD CHOSEN FOR THE DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TEST
Because of the data difficulties discussed in Chapter One, the
fairly simple Subprogram Breakdown from the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) was chosen for testing the differences in the means
of the various variables of interest for the coop members and non-coop
members groups. This program provides means, sums, standard deviations,
etc. for different population subprograms as desired. It also provides
the one-way analysis of variance, which allows statistical testing of the
differences in the means printed by the Subprogram Breakdown. Specifically,
the analysis of variance permits the testing of the null hypothesis that
the different subpopulation means are not significantly different. Stated
in an alternative fashion, it permits the testing of the hypothesis that
"I =  2 = n' where I = subpopulation 
mean
The actual testing of the null hypothesis is done by comparing a com-
puted F-ratio or F-statistic (provided in the one-way analysis of variance
for each set of means being compared) with the known sampling distribution
of the F-ratio (given in most statistics textbooks). The F-ratio is
defined as
Between-groups mean square .
Within-groups mean square
The computed F-ratio is compared to the sample distribution F-ratio
to see if, given a pre-chosen level of significance, the computed F is as
large or larger than the known sample distribution F. This will enable a
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determination to be made as to whether the null hypothesis should be
rejected or not. If the computed F is as large or larger than the known
sample distribution F, at the chosen level of significance, then the null
hypothesis of no statistically significant difference in the means can be
rejected. If the computed F-ratio is less than the known F-ratio of the
sampling distribution, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
In order to compare the two F-ratios, it is necessary to know the
degrees of freedom associated with a computed F. This is provided in the
one-way analysis of variance. It is also necessary, as implied above, to
choose a level of significance. This is the same as making the decision
of how often to risk rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. The
level of significance chosen for this study is the conventionally accepted
one of 5%. This means that the author is willing to risk rejecting the
null hypothesis when it is true about one time in 20.
Suppose, as an example (of the use of the F-ratio and significance
level), the mean farm incomes of coop members and non-coop members were
to be compared to see if there were statistically significant differences
between the two means. The null hypothesis in this case would be that
the mean farm income for coop members (N 1800) is not significantly dif-
ferent (in a statistical sense) from the mean farm income for non-coop
members (N 1750). Suppose the computed F-ratio for the comparison =
0.234, the degrees of freedom for this F = 1, 71 and the pre-chosen
significance level = .05.
A look can be taken at the F distribution in a statistics textbook
(e.g., Winkler and Hays, Statistics, 1975) to see what the F-ratio is for
the chosen level of significance and the degrees of freedom. Such a look
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shows that an F of 4 or larger is needed in order to reject the null
hypothesis. Since the computed F above is 0.234, the null hypothesis of
no statistically significant difference in the two mean incomes cannot
be rejected. That is, the observed difference of N 50 between the mean
incomes could have been due to a sampling error. It is not a truly sig-
nificant difference (in the statistical sense).
As can be seen in the tables (e.g., Table 4-12 in Chapter Four),
the one-way analysis of variance also provides given levels of significance
associated with each F. This level of significance can be compared
directly with the pre-chosen significance level of .05 for the study
without comparing the F-ratios. If the computed level of significance
for each F is higher than .05 (e.g., 0.21), then the null hypothesis can-
not be rejected because of the greater than acceptable (.05) risk of
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true.
For purposes of this study, the null hypothesis can thus only be
rejected at significance levels of .05 or lower.
For more details on the Subprogram Breakdown and the statistical
testing technique, see: Norman Nie et al., Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS), New York: McGraw Hill, 1975; and Robert Winkler
and William Hays, Statistics, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975.
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APPENDIX D
QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTERED ORALLY TO RECIPIENTS
(COOP MEMBERS) AND NON-RECIPIENTS
(NON-COOP MEMBERS) OF FORMAL CREDIT
General Information
1) Name
2) Age
3) Occupation (principal)
4) Other occupation(s) or source(s) of income
5) For farmers: What is acreage of farmed land?
6) What crops do you grow?
7) Education: How many years of schooling did you have?
8) Number of dependents
Income (approximate)
9) For farmers: How much did you produce last year in physical
quantities? (stacks of yam, bags of grain, etc.)
10) How much did you sell and at what price per selling unit?
11) How much in total did you make from selling of produce last year
(last farming/harvesting season)?
12) Do you estimate your family ate as much as you sold, twice as much,
three times as much?
13) Did you obtain income or did your family members obtain income from
other occupations? If yes, how much?
14) Did you obtain income from other sources? How much?
--- ~-
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Borrowing
15) Did you in the past year borrow from any source--formal or informal?
Where?
If Formal:
16) How did you happen to hear about the credit?
17) Do you normally take loans from formal institutions?
18) What was the precipitating factor that made you decide to get a loan
last year?
19) How much did you borrow?
20) What processes did you go through to get the loan? Fill out applica-
tion forms? Bring collateral or guarantor? Others?
21) How much did application forms and fees cost you? Did providing
collateral or guarantor cost you anything? How much?
22) Did you have to travel to obtain the loan? If yes,
how many trips did you make altogether? How much did
travel cost you each trip?
23) Did you have to miss any days or half-days of work during the applica-
tion process? How many?
24) Did you make cash or other gifts to people who helped you during the
application process? How much?
25) Any other expenses incurred?
26) What was the interest charged you on the loan?
27) What was initially the more important concern to you in getting the
loan--the interest charge or the ease of obtaining the loan?
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27) (continued)
If the rate of interest on the loan had been doubled, would you
still have taken it? If it had been tripled?
For Non-Coop Members: Given average size of coop loan in your village,
would you have been willing to take the loan if the interest paid had
been doubled? Tripled?
28) What did you buy for your farming operations last year (ferilizer,
seeds, irrigation, labor, etc.)?
At what cost per item?
Did you buy the same items the year before?
In the same quantities?
What was your total estimated need for farming funds?
Where did the money come from?
Was some of it the loan?
Did you get some from other sources?
29) What were you able to do financially in your family last year that
you were not able to do before?
30) Do you have any marketing or storage problems?
Of what nature?
31) Were you able to pay off your formal loan as scheduled?
Why or why not?
32) Do you feel government or formal institutions are easier to deal with
than other sources as far as loans are concerned?
Why?
33) Do you feel governments are easier to deal with as regards defaults?
In which way?
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33) (continued)
What reprisals do you see other lenders take?
34) Is there any part of the year when you need loans more than some
other?
What do you usually do in this case?
Non-Recipients of Formal Credit:
35) Did you know that credit could be had for your operations?
36) Why did you not ask for a loan?
37) Who got the loans in this area?
Participation in Informal Activities
38) Did you borrow from an informal lender--relative, friend, rotating
organization, moneylender, etc.--last cropping/harvesting season?
39)
For what purposes?
How much? On what terms?
If you also had a formal loan, which one did you pay back first?
Why?
How many times altogether did you borrow from informal lenders last
year?
Do you belong to any informal savings and credit association?
How many altogether?
Any especially for farmers? How do the organiza-
tions operate?
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40) How much do you contribute in each one?
Any surcharge for separate credit fund?
41) If you belong to a rotating credit and savings association, did you
receive any lump sum contribution last year?
What did you use it for?
This year?
42) If you borrowed from an informal lender as stated in the previous
question: When were you supposed to repay the loan(s)?
Did you repay in installments or all at once?
What were the interest charges on the loan(s)?
Did you have to have collateral or a guarantor?
Were you able to repay on time?
the consequences?
If not, what were
43) Do you feel a need to borrow more than you do now from either formal
or informal sources? For what purposes?
How would you repay?
44) Did you lend money to anyone in the past year?
How much and on what terms?
Savings Activities
45) Apart from your contributions, do you have any cash savings elsewhere?
46) Where do you save this: bank, cooperative, other formal institution(s),
informal places not previously mentioned?
47) Do you know you can save in a bank?
savings account at a bank?
Do you have a
Why or why not?
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48) Do you know interest is paid on deposits at banks?
Do you know you can borrow from a bank?
Have you borrowed? Why or why not?
49) Do you see any difficulties with formal savings and credit systems,
e.g., banks, cooperatives, post office, etc.?
What don't you like about them?
What do you like?
50) Do you see any difficulties with informal systems?
What don't you like?
What do you like?
51) What are your priority needs for finances in this place?
Do you think that the totality of formal and informal institutions
available to you satisfy your needs?
What other financial services do you perceive you need?
Assets
52) Did you have any livestock last year? (cattle, goats, chickens, etc.)?
Did you have bicycles, motorcycles, or other vehicles?
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Integration of Formal and Informal Systems
53) If you belong to an informal credit and savings society, do you
think your society would be willing to deposit some of its funds
in a bank?
Would the society be willing to take loans from the bank?
What problems do you foresee with this?
54) Do you estimate that the amount you spent in total on both farming and
non-farming activities (including loan repayment) last year exceeded
or fell below the amount received from your farming and other activi-
ties?
By roughly how much?
How did you make up for the gap if expenditures exceeded income?
What did you do with the surplus, if income exceeded expenditures?
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